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Showing posts with label Commodities. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Commodities. Show all posts

Tuesday, November 3, 2015

#LatinAmerica: after a decade of budgets and politics buoyed by high commodity prices, the raw realities of geopolitics are back with a vengeance.

An excellent analysis from Stratfor on the future political landscape shape in Latin America. 

The New Latin America

By Reggie Thompson

Several years into a Chinese economic slowdown, the Latin American economies that relied on China to buy up their key exports are feeling the pain. With less hard currency coming in, governments across the region are rapidly readjusting their spending plans and preparing to govern in an environment in which they will have fewer resources to secure their key constituents' political loyalties.

The Role of Geography

Ever since commodity prices began dropping several years ago, much has been written about how slow economic growth and potential political instability will plague Latin America in coming years. But what will Latin America as a whole look like in a decade as a result of the Chinese economic downturn? What ideologies will dominate in a continent that over the past decade veered toward leftist populism? And what issues will define its relationship with the United States, the hemisphere's undisputed hegemon?

The region's geopolitics hold the beginning of an answer. The first step is to view Latin America's geographic regions and countries as a series of divided islands rather than a united entity. Unlike Western Europe, where the relative absence of natural obstacles eventually gave rise to interconnected political entities, South America is bisected by the dense Amazon rainforest and divided lengthwise by the nearly insurmountable Andean mountain range. Latin American colonies were divided even before the collapse of the Spanish Empire in the Americas more than two centuries ago. After independence, this disconnected geographic landscape created dozens of economies of wildly varying sizes often more linked by trade with partners outside the region than with each other. With few unbroken expanses of arable land and high transport costs across the forests and mountains, Latin America was simply not in a position to create capital on the scale of the United States or Western Europe. Consequently, even major Latin American states such as Brazil or Mexico remain highly reliant on inflows of cash from abroad to keep their economies afloat and rely on exports to China or the United States for a significant part of their foreign trade.

  

Unsurprisingly, the goal of forming institutions that can provide lasting political and economic unity has eluded Latin American statesmen. Numerous attempts have been made to unite the fractious region: Simon Bolivar's ill-fated 19th-century bid to unite South America, a similar attempt at uniting the Central American states into a federation and the more recent creation of separate economic blocs in Latin America. Yet the isolation created by geographic barriers has foiled leaders' attempts to unite the region's countries into a real economic or political union on the scale of the European Union or even the North American Free Trade Agreement. In recent history, the closest that Latin American states came to some sort of unity — besides regional trading blocs such as the Common Market of the South and the Pacific Alliance — was the wave of leftist populist governments that swept the continent beginning in the early 2000s. But after a decade of budgets and politics buoyed by high commodity prices, the raw realities of geopolitics are back with a vengeance.

The Shape of Governments to Come

We cannot define the exact nature of the national governments that will emerge during the next decade; short-term actions are less predictable than long-term trends, and attempting to forecast which people or parties will lead countries such as Brazil after its 2018 elections or Venezuela after its presidential election in 2019 is very risky. However, we have a rough idea of the shape these governments will take. With less revenue available to pacify restive populations, the new governments will likely be more economically pragmatic than their predecessors. This is not to say that populism as a means of governance in Latin America will subside; rather, rulers are likely to take more care in how they relate to their voters and the outside world.

Because the region is so dependent on foreign capital for continued economic growth, and because states' export revenues are so depleted (in Bolivia, for example, export revenue is down by nearly a third compared with last year), leaders are more likely to refrain from mass nationalizations or hostility to foreign companies. During the past decade, leftist governments seized numerous private assets in disputes with private firms. Except for extreme cases such as Venezuela  — which, because of its default risk, economic problems and past expropriations, is already de facto cut off from most foreign lending and many investments — most states will likely now try to encourage investments rather than scare them off. Consequently, Latin America is likely entering an era in which the grand populist gestures of the past decade will no longer yield the same results as before and can, in fact, be counterproductive for leaders trying to restart their faltering economies.

The weakening of the Latin American left is another factor that will shape the coming decade. In the next 10 years, the governments that came to power during the boom times will reach the end of their tenures. The list of states that will evolve from leftist administrations into some other type of government is lengthy. Venezuela will reach the painful point of reckoning in which its ruling United Socialist Party will split apart. And as the party splits, Venezuela will undergo a painful economic restructuring and a political shift away from extreme populism. In Ecuador, leftist President Rafael Correa may not secure even another four-year term. In Bolivia, low export prices for natural gas will put President Evo Morales' ability to secure another decade in office to the test.

Perhaps the only exception will be Colombia, where a possible peace deal with rebel groups could bring the left into the national fold, which could lead other parties to co-opt more leftist ideas. But even Cuba, long the bastion of Latin America's left and its ideological center, will eventually move into the United States' political orbit, likely in exchange for the lifting of the five-decade trade embargo.

The left's decline will give the United States an exceptionally benign climate for managing its relationships and priorities to the south. To be sure, longstanding concerns — such as trade, drug trafficking and illegal migration — guiding the United States' actions in much of Latin America will remain. But the bumper crop of leftist states that were often minor hindrances to U.S. political moves in the region will become less of a factor in the next decade. Washington's new priorities in the region, such as cushioning Venezuela's economic collapse and bringing Cuba into some sort of improved trade relationship, will occupy the United States' time.

Of the states currently undergoing deep economic downturns, several seem poised to make a resurgence. Mexico is an outlier, given than it is so linked to the United States through trade. But those links will ensure that despite problematic public finances, Mexico will remain a major force in Latin American economic growth. For Peru and Colombia, international trade will drop over the next several years, but their stable public finances will likely ensure some degree of social stability. And even Brazil, in the midst of a massive corruption scandal at Petrobras, will ride out the crisis due to its strong (albeit currently strained) domestic manufacturing base and sheer economic size.

Re-Emerging Differences

The rampant populism of the past 15 years — bolstered by rapidly increasing exports to hungry markets abroad — imposed a false appearance of unity among the Latin American leftist states. Superficially, Nestor Kirchner's Argentina appeared to have much in common with Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, even though both countries' individual geographic and political characteristics ultimately dictated the governments' decisions. With the rise of another leftist bloc unlikely in the next decade, the divided nature of Latin America will again become evident.

And the continent's divided nature means that the shortcomings of international bodies there, such as the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), will become even more self-evident. For example, Brasilia will use Mercosur to do what is in its own immediate benefit: increase trade links with Latin American states outside its immediate neighborhood, such as Mexico. But truly lucrative deals, such as a Mercosur-European Union trade agreement, will remain just out of reach because they require full approval of all the group's members. Mercosur's other key member, Argentina, opposes any such deals lest they harm its domestic industry. Consequently, Brazil will continue looking for small bilateral deals, but it will continue to be hamstrung by Mercosur. Unasur, on the other hand, which was originally conceived of as a sort of South American United Nations, is highly unlikely to progress beyond a regional body that meets a couple of times a year. It is not that there is no political will in Latin America to push toward greater unity, but unlike the European Union, such bodies cannot be superimposed onto a region whose trade ties and key political relationships are focused toward other continents rather than each other.

The next decade will bring with it some political and economic continuity. The region will maintain its fundamental relationship with the rest of the globe, in which its foreign trade is overwhelmingly skewed toward the export of raw materials and its economies are heavily reliant on foreign capital markets. But deeper internal changes are already in motion, and the states of the region will change accordingly. The parties at the helm of these states will be different, and the way these parties relate with the outside world on a political and economic level will be undeniably different. Over the next 10 years, the shortcomings of extreme reliance on the Chinese economy will spur cost-cutting and domestic economic diversification. The trappings of the Cold War will fade in Latin America as leaders are replaced and political institutions evolve, but the new Latin America will continue to be more defined by its divisions than by any idea of unity.


"<a href="https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/new-latin-america">The New Latin America</a> is republished with permission of Stratfor."
The New Latin America | Stratfor





Monday, July 11, 2011

China’s Cities Digging Up Mountains of Debt - NYTimes.com

Building Boom in China Stirs Fears of Debt OverloadJuly 6, 2011

WUHAN, China — In the seven years it will take New York City to build a two-mile leg of its long-awaited Second Avenue subway line, this city of nine million people in central China plans to complete an entirely new subway system, with nearly 140 miles of track.
And the Wuhan Metro is only one piece of a $120 billion municipal master plan that includes two new airport terminals, a new financial district, a cultural district and a riverfront promenade with an office tower half again as high as the Empire State Building.
The construction frenzy cloaks Wuhan, China’s ninth-largest city, in a continual dust cloud, despite fleets of water trucks constantly spraying the streets. No wonder the local Communist party secretary, recently promoted from mayor, is known as “Mr. Digging Around the City.”
The plans for Wuhan, a provincial capital about 425 miles west of Shanghai, might seem extravagant. But they are not unusual. Dozens of other Chinese cities are racing to complete infrastructure projects just as expensive and ambitious, or more so, as they play their roles in this nation’s celebrated economic miracle.
In the last few years, cities’ efforts have helped government infrastructure and real estate spending surpass foreign trade as the biggest contributor to China’s growth. Subways and skyscrapers, in other words, are replacing exports of furniture and iPhones as the symbols of this nation’s prowess.
But there are growing signs that China’s long-running economic boom could be undermined by these building binges, which are financed through heavy borrowing by local governments and clever accounting that masks the true size of the debt.
The danger, experts say, is that China’s municipal governments could already be sitting on huge mountains of hidden debt — a lurking liability that threatens to stunt the nation’s economic growth for years or even decades to come. Just last week China’s national auditor, who reports to the cabinet, warned of the perils of local government borrowing. And on Tuesday the Beijing office of Moody’s Investors Service issued a report saying the national auditor might have understated Chinese banks’ actual risks from loans to local governments.
Because Chinese growth has been one of the few steady engines in the global economy in recent years, any significant slowdown in this country would have international repercussions.
As municipal projects play out across China, spending on so-called fixed-asset investment — a crucial measure of building that is heavily weighted toward government and real estate projects — is now equal to nearly 70 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product. It is a ratio that no other large nation has approached in modern times.
Even Japan, at the peak of its building boom in the 1980s, reached only about 35 percent, and the figure has hovered around 20 percent for decades in the United States.
China’s high number helps explain its meteoric material rise. But it could also signal a dangerous dependence on government infrastructure spending.

Monday, March 14, 2011

Nuclear industry in turmoil after Japan quake | Reuters

Nuclear industry in turmoil after Japan quake

By Julie Gordon and Lynn Adler
3:26pm EDT
* Uranium stocks hardest hit, Cameco down over 14 pct
* Germany put nuclear plants on hold, Italy pushes forward
* Utility shares fall, nuclear reactor builders down

TORONTO/NEW YORK, March 14 (Reuters) - Investors hammered companies that build nuclear reactors and supply them with fuel on Monday as Japan struggled to avert a meltdown at a stricken reactor, on fear that the whole sector could be in for a downturn, in the short and medium term at least.
But analysts said the industry could recover from the stock market setback as negative perceptions fade, and the current price slump might be a buying opportunity.
"Meltdown is a very big word in people's minds, so I think that the public sentiment is probably going to swing against nuclear power," said BMO Capital Markets analyst Edward Sterck. "But I don't think this is the end of the nuclear industry."
"With the hype that some commentators are making that this is the end of the nuclear energy, I think we're going to possibly see an overreaction in the stock prices. At some point there will be value there."
Japan's crisis, already the worst nuclear accident since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, hit shares of industry giants like General Electric (GE.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) and Hitachi (6501.T: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz), along with uranium producers Cameco (CCO.TO: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) and Areva (CEPFi.PA: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz), and power utilities like Entergy (ETR.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) and Exelon Corp (EXC.N: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz).
The Japanese reactors were designed to withstand earthquakes, but Friday's quake was a record for Japan, and a devastating tsunami knocked out backup power, causing and deepening the problems.
With the 24-hour news agenda focused on the possibility of a meltdown at one or more reactors in Japan, analysts said the market will need time to recover from losses.
"We need to see those reactors brought under control before people start to review the situation with a little more perspective," Sterck said.
Nuclear power accounted for about a third Japan's of energy generation before the quake, and the damage has raised concerns about future of the industry there.

Sunday, March 13, 2011

The Silver Lining


The Silver Lining
By: Eric Sprott & David Franklin
No matter how complex our financial system becomes, the economic axiom of supply and demand will still apply. If the demand for an asset outstrips supply, the price of that asset will appreciate. The challenge in finding supply and demand imbalances in today’s market often lies in judging the quality of market data available – it frequently isn’t even close to being accurate. If the numbers don’t show the imbalances, it’s tough for investors to determine if the market price accurately reflects the market dynamics. Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the market for silver.
While gold dominates the headlines, the silver market actually enjoys a superior fundamental supply/ demand story than that for gold, although you’d never know it based on the silver demand statistics from the major reporting services. As students of the precious metals markets we monitor the numerous metals reporting services very closely. According to those services, the silver market has enjoyed a stable supply/demand balance for almost ten years now. If that’s the case, why has the price of silver appreciated from $5 to $19/oz over that same time period? Is the reporting services’ data on the silver market truly reflective of silver’s underlying fundamentals?

Although there are several reporting services for silver market information, GFMS Ltd. and The Silver Institute are the most often quoted sources for silver market data. While they provide statistics for both silver supply and demand, it is their neglect of the “investment” demand category that we find problematic. GFMS and The Silver Institute use a category called “implied net investment” to capture the demand for physical silver from institutional and retail investors. The definition for “net investment” as defined by GFMS is “the residual from combining all other GFMS data on silver supply/demand... As such, it captures the net physical impact of all transactions not covered by the other supply/ demand variables.”1 In other words, it is not an observed figure. GFMS’s “implied net investment” number doesn’t include any observable demand for silver by ETF’s and other reporting entities such as hedge funds - it is merely a plug used to balance the supply data for GFMS’s and the Silver Institute’s reporting purposes.2 As we delved deeper into the silver market, this realization prompted us to calculate our own investment demand statistic.

We present our findings in Table A. While GFMS and The Silver Institute use an implied number, we calculated a real investment demand number using a handful of ETF’s and two other large private investors, one of which is our own firm. Our demand metric is by no means complete or exhaustive - we only used seven sources of reported investment demand, and yet from our informal and incomplete survey we found that GFMS and The Silver Institute had underreported silver investment demand by at least 225 million ounces! This shortfall doesn’t consider any other investors that may have bought silver over the past year, so real demand for silver could be multiple times higher.

June 2010
Table A
Given its seemingly evident market imbalances, you might wonder why silver hasn’t performed better over the last year. The answer, we believe, lies in the way silver is priced. The silver spot price is dictated by paper contracts that trade on the COMEX exchange in New York. Paper contracts can be purchased “long” or sold “short”. If more participants sell “short” than purchase “long”, the paper market price for silver will decline. Often these contracts have little to no relationship with actual physical silver, and yet they are the most influential contract in determining silver’s physical spot price. Go figure.
In studying the silver market we owe a great debt to the work of silver analyst, Ted Butler. Mr. Butler has been writing about the silver market for fifteen years and has done much to inform investors about the reality of silver’s physical fundamentals. Butler provides some insight into the “short” positions that exist in silver today, highlighting the fact that the eight largest silver traders currently hold a net short position of over 66,000 contracts, representing more than 330 million ounces of silver.11 This means that the eight largest COMEX traders are net short the equivalent of 48.5% of the world’s total annual silver mine production of 680.9 million ounces. None of these traders are in the silver business by the way – they’re all financial institutions. In addition, the COMEX silver short position held by the eight largest traders on May 3, 2010, represented 33% of total world silver bullion inventory,
Holder
Silver Holdings in Oz as of December 31, 2009
iShares Silver Trust 3
305,205,951
Central Fund of Canada 4
67,322,479
Zürcher Kantonalbank (ZKB) Silver ETF 5
59,370,000
Sprott Asset Management 6
41,838,539
ETFS - Silver UK 7
23,370,555
GoldMoney 8
20,000,000
Claymore Silver Bullion Trust 9
2,476,400
TOTAL Holdings
519,583,924
Aggregate Implied Investment Demand (2000 to 2009)10
293,800,000
Missing Investment Demand
225,783,924
Real investment Demand for Silver
Source: Sprott Asset Management
June 2010
estimated by Butler to be approximately one billion ounces. There is no real comparison with gold, as the 24.5 million ounce concentrated net short position held by the eight largest traders represents a mere 1.2% of the 2 billion+ ounces of world gold bullion inventory as reported by the World Gold Council.12 So in comparison to total world bullion inventories, the concentrated short position in silver is 27 times larger than that for gold. In every comparison possible, the short position in COMEX silver contracts is off the charts, and if you think the short positions sound potentially disruptive, you’re not alone. In September 2008 the CFTC confirmed that its Division of Enforcement has been investigating complaints of misconduct in the silver market. This investigation is ongoing and we look forward to its resolution.13
Because we believe the demand for precious metals will continue to increase in this environment, we’re always interested to know the total supply available in today’s physical bullion market. According to the best estimates from the USGS and current mining statistics, approximately 46 billion ounces of silver have been mined since the dawn of civilization.14 In comparison, approximately 5 billion ounces of gold have been mined throughout history.15 Reading this, a casual observer might conclude that gold is currently justified in being worth more than silver based on its relative scarcity. But the current price discrepancy ($1,250/oz gold vs $19/oz silver) is misleading.

Sunday, February 20, 2011

Analysis: Big miners make brave bet on record commods boom | Reuters

Analysis: Big miners make brave bet on record commods boom

(Reuters) - Any investors willing to bet that the commodities boom is running out of steam may need both courage and patience: major miners have wagered more than $110 billion on the opposite view.
BHP Billiton (BHP.AX), Rio Tinto (RIO.AX) and Xstrata (XTA.L) have committed themselves in the last two weeks to spending vast sums on expanding production of iron ore, copper, coal and other raw materials over the next five years.
In decades past, that would signal the beginning of the end, the exuberance that leads to oversupply and tumbling prices, but this time the miners say it's different -- and, for once, commodity markets are inclined to believe them.
"The growth fundamentals certainly support these big expansion projects," said John Robinson, chairman of investment vehicle Global Mining Investments (GMI.AX) whose funds are managed by BlackRock (BLK.N), the world's biggest asset manager.
The difference this time can be summed up in a word: China. Or maybe two: China, India.
UNPRECEDENTED
Industrialization and urbanization on the scale of China are unprecedented: in three decades, the proportion of its people living in cities has more than doubled to 45 percent, creating record demand for steel and its raw materials.
China boasts around 170 cities with more than one million residents, compared to Europe with about 35, and there are still 300 to 400 million people expected to move from the countryside to the city over the next 20 years, most of whom will live in the country's rapidly expanding forests of apartment blocks.
A typical 90-square-meter (970-square-foot) apartment in China needs six tonnes of steel and each tonne of steel requires 1.7 tonnes of iron ore. And every new building needs to be wired with copper and powered mostly by coal-fired electricity.
Add a fast-urbanizing India to the mix and it's not hard to see why billions are being spent to dig more iron ore, the primary ingredient in steel-making.
SOME DOUBTS
Outright pessimists are hard to find in commodities markets, but doubts are growing, especially over the near-term outlook, with traded iron ore prices and copper at record highs and steel-making coal prices up more than 30 percent in 12 months.
Some analysts say inflationary concerns and rising interest rates in China, coupled with forecasts for slowing growth in emerging markets overall, could take the polish off commodities.
"We have seen record highs...but you can clearly see that demand is cooling down a little on the current high prices," Commerzbank analyst Daniel Briesemann said.
Though iron ore and coal prices have yet to show signs of softening, copper is off its peaks, touching a three-week low on Thursday, and aluminum has seesawed as London Metals Exchange inventories near record highs.
Read the rest here:

Analysis: Big miners make brave bet on record commods boom | Reuters

Saturday, February 19, 2011

Myth of Africa’s ‘resource curse’

Myth of Africa's 'resource curse'
Diamond rush ... Fortune hunters digging for diamonds in Marange
RELATED STORIES
Mining, agriculture: the game changers
A BELIEFthat I find to be fundamentally flawed is the so-called "resource curse of Africa". That belief is based on an equally flawed notion that because of the abundance of mineral wealth in Africa, the continent finds itself mired in endless conflicts, poverty and disease.
While I understand the frustration behind the peddlers of this belief, what they fail to discern is an emerging momentum in African countries to realise fully their mineral wealth potential for the benefit of their citizens. I believe that this steady momentum has been born out of an honest reflection of what is holding us back, and how to overcome this.
At a basic level, the main drawback can be narrowed to a poor or still nascent organisational capacity. Many conventional economic solutions have been tried and failed (e.g. ESAP I, II) in many parts of Africa probably because they focused a lot on the economy at an aggregate level.
As in physics, real and game-changing progress was achieved through the study and understanding of interaction of the smallest particles of the universe. In analysing economic development, it is also important to understand how and why some basic economic activities operate the way they do.

Sunday, February 13, 2011

Congo's east: Still smuggling | The Economist

Still smuggling

A warlord goes about his business

Congo's east

BOSCO NTAGANDA is a Congolese army general and former rebel leader wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for recruiting child soldiers. On February 3rd a plane from Nigeria landed in Goma, capital of North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and a group of his men swiftly unloaded $6.5m in cash. Pursued by police through Goma’s streets, they ferried the money to one of the general’s compounds. The plane was later loaded with over 400kg of gold, worth around $19m at today’s prices. But the authorities seized the gold and arrested the passengers—an American, a Frenchman, and two Nigerians—for trafficking.
According to the UN, General Ntaganda, once deputy to the warlord Laurent Nkunda, oversees a vast mineral-smuggling operation in eastern Congo. It is manned by former rebel allies who, under a peace deal, are now part of the army. The trade—legal and illegal—in gold, tin ore and coltan from the region is worth hundreds of millions of dollars. In September, in an attempt to clamp down on smuggling, the Congolese president, Joseph Kabila, imposed a ban on most mining in the east. Mr Kabila wants to root out “mafias”, he says, which include both the army and the armed militias that control the region’s mineral trade. That trade has fuelled more than 15 years of war, killing and displacing millions. But the prohibition has done little to limit the smuggling.
General Ntaganda, a Tutsi, is presumed to have the backing of neighbouring Rwanda, run by Paul Kagame, also a Tutsi. Rwanda may well have more influence in the Kivus than Congo’s own government, 1,000 miles (1,600km) away in Kinshasa. Even with an ICC indictment hanging over his head, the general freely walks around Goma. During the day he plays tennis on clay courts in the shadow of Goma’s restless volcano, Nyiragongo. At night he dines in lakeside restaurants frequented by UN and aid workers and the local elite.

Outside the town, his soldiers continue to plunder and rape. On New Year’s Day Lieutenant Colonel Kibibi Mutwara, who fought with General Ntaganda’s rebels, allegedly ordered his men to attack the village of Fizi in South Kivu province in retaliation for the murder of a soldier. At least 62 women, men, and children were raped, according to hospital officials. Unusually, Colonel Mutwara has been arrested. The trial, along with ten of his men, will begin shortly in Baraka, a nearby town.
Mr Kabila says that Congo needs peace before it can have justice. But General Ntaganda and men like him are a growing embarrassment to the Congolese, the Rwandans, the UN, and the ICC. Last month Luis Moreno Ocampo, the ICC’s chief prosecutor, said that the general’s arrest was his “next objective.” But the ICC’s power is limited and in this case depends largely on the governments of Rwanda and Congo.
Mr Kabila faces re-election in November. Arresting the general could rekindle the widespread support he had in the Kivus at the last vote in 2006—supposing he can maintain some semblance of peace afterwards. And if Rwanda ended its support for a man wanted by the ICC, that could help repair the damage to its reputation from a messy election season of its own last year. Will they turn on the general?


Congo's east: Still smuggling | The Economist: "- Sent using Google Toolbar"

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Friday, February 11, 2011

Pressure on cashed-up BHP to boost dividends and buybacks

Pressure on cashed-up BHP to boost dividends and buybacks

Barry FitzGerald
February 12, 2011

LIKE Rio Tinto before it, BHP Billiton is expected to succumb to investor pressure for a greater share of its bonanza profits to be returned in the form of increased dividends and share buybacks.
When it comes to a share buyback, BHP is expected to at least double the $US5 billion ($A4.9 billion) share buyback unveiled by Rio on Thursday with its report of a record underlying profit of $US13.9 billion for (calendar) 2010.
BHP's profit report for the December half will be released on Wednesday morning. While analysts had previously been tipping a $US5 billion buyback, that has now been cranked up to at least $US10 billion.
That was mainly due to the surprise factor in Rio's buyback. The thinking was that if Rio's view of the world and the prospect of its swollen cash flows continuing for the forseeable future supported its $US5 billion buyback decision, then BHP has to be good for at least a $US10 billion buyback, plus a sweetening of its interim dividend.
BHP's interim profit report is expected to put it well on to posting corporate Australia's first $US20 billion for the full June year.
The anticipated result for the June year of more than $US21 billion would represent a 68 per cent improvement on the $US12.7 billion posted for 2010 full year and would comfortably exceed BHP's previous best of $US15.39 billion in 2008.
Should BHP next week ''disappoint'' the market by not coming out with a $US10 billion-plus buyback and a dividend sweetener (Rio's annual dividend was 20 per cent higher than it had previously indicated), there will be an immediate suspicion that BHP is planning a mega-acquisition in the near-term, most likely in the oil and gas sector.
Following the failed $US40 billion takeover bid for Canada's Potash Corp in mid-November, BHP reactivated the remaining $US4.2 billion buyback of its London-listed shares from the $US13 billion buyback that was put on ice in late 2007 when it made a bid for Rio Tinto, which also failed.
Citigroup analysts have said that with forecast annual earnings before interest and tax of $US40 billion for the next four years and its notional debt net position, BHP has the ability to continue spending $US15 billion annually on capital expenditure. At the same time, it has the means to allocate $US5-$US10 billion annually to share buybacks and $US5-$10 billion annually to smaller acquisitions.
Goldman Sachs predicts BHP will announce a $US10 billion buyback next week, split 60 per cent in Australian listed shares and 40 per cent in the UK market.

Pressure on cashed-up BHP to boost dividends and buybacks

Thursday, January 20, 2011

Lithium market to see huge overcapacity by 2020-TRU Group

Lithium market to see huge overcapacity by 2020-TRU Group

Lithium specialists TRU Group warn the future of lithium mining and exploitation is not as lucrative as investors may believe.
Author: Dorothy Kosich
Posted: Wednesday , 19 Jan 2011

RENO, NV -

Tucson, Arizona-based lithium research consultants, TRU Group, says the 2020 lithium supply-demand forecast is "shocking" as " seemingly unstoppable supply growth will cause such huge overcapacity that the stability of the industry will be threatened."

TRU Group says it has evaluated and modeled most of the known existing lithium properties and advised a number of players on a wide variety of lithium business, investment and exploitation issues.

In presentations scheduled to be made during the IM Toronto 3rd Lithium Supply & Markets Conference this week, TRU Group's updated lithium model reveals the possibility of "massive lithium oversupply through 2020."

TRU CEO Edward R. Anderson estimates lithium demand will be 40,000 tonnes annually in the next decade while pipeline projects and expansions could increase capacity by an additional 40,000 tpy-"double what the industry needs."

Veteran lithium geologist Ihor I. Kunasz, who is also presenting for TRU at the conference, says existing lithium players "have three times the lithium concentration and also reserves that dwarf any of the new players."

Lower prices and fierce competition through 2020 is bad news for new lithium project promoters, "who will find it impossible to compete against the distinctive natural cost advantage of brine-based lithium producers Chemetall-SCL, FMC and SQM," TRU Group's research has determined.

"In addition, SQM, by far the world's largest lithium supplier, has for many years re-injected excess lithium produced into the Salara de Atacama, adding to the lithium resource of the salar," Kunasz noted. Kunasz developed the original lithium reserve model at Atacama.

TRU advises existing lithium chemical producers have the in-ground reserves and ability to meet nearly all market requirements in the next decade, simply by expanding capacity.

Anderson believes that lithium projects already in the pipeline will increase the mineral's supply-demand gap from 2013 to 2015. New development projects may exacerbate the oversupply situation between 2015 and 2020.

Between 2017-2018 Anderson forecasts "serious peak oversupply" that will negatively impact current lithium producers.

In his analysis, Anderson questions the need for significant new sources of lithium production, contending instead that existing low-cost (brine-based) lithium plants can expand significantly. He advised that emerging technologies-including selective iron adsorption, electrodialysis and nanofiltration "provide new options for medium-scale lithium developments."

"Lithium carbonate prices fell precipitately to $4500 per t in 2010 and will remain depressed," Anderson forecast. "Long term there is no market-driven upward-price pressure so prices will remain stable and likely below $5,000 per t."

Anderson claims that "only a select few new projects could make it into profitable production and then only as marginal suppliers. Bottom line is if you do have a good resource make sure you also have the strong possible lithium technical capability to develop it."


Mineweb.com - The world's premier mining and mining investment website Yesterday`s Top Story: Lithium market to see huge overcapacity by 2020-TRU Group - INDUSTRIAL METALS / MINERALS | Mineweb

Saturday, January 15, 2011

Global Risk and Reward in 2011 by Nouriel Roubini - Project Syndicate

Global Risk and Reward in 2011
NEW YORK – The outlook for the global economy in 2011 is, partly, for a persistence of the trends established in 2010. These are: an anemic, below-trend, U-shaped recovery in advanced economies, as firms and households continue to repair their balance sheets; a stronger, V-shaped recovery in emerging-market countries, owing to stronger macroeconomic, financial, and policy fundamentals. That adds up to close to 4% annual growth for the global economy, with advanced economies growing at around 2% and emerging-market countries growing at about 6%.

But there are downside and upside risks to this scenario. On the downside, one of the most important risks is further financial contagion in Europe if the eurozone’s problems spread – as seems likely – to Portugal, Spain, and Belgium. Given the current level of official resources at the disposal of the International Monetary Fund and the European Union, Spain now seems too big to fail yet too big to be bailed out.

The United States represents another downside risk for global growth. In 2011, the US faces a likely double dip in the housing market, high unemployment and weak job creation, a persistent credit crunch, gaping budgetary holes at the state and local level, and steeper borrowing costs as a result of the federal government’s lack of fiscal consolidation. Moreover, credit growth on both sides of the Atlantic will be restrained, as many financial institutions in the US and Europe maintain a risk-averse stance toward lending.

In China and other emerging-market economies, delays in policy tightening could fuel a rise in inflation that forces a tougher clampdown later, with China, in particular, risking a hard landing. There is also a risk that capital inflows to emerging markets will be mismanaged, thus fueling credit and asset bubbles. Moreover, further increases in oil, energy, and commodity prices could lead to negative terms of trade and a reduction in real disposable income in net commodity-importing countries, while adding to inflationary pressures in emerging markets.

Moreover, currency tensions will remain high. Countries with large current-account deficits need nominal and real depreciation (to sustain growth via net exports while ongoing private- and public-sector deleveraging keeps domestic demand weak), whereas surplus countries (especially emerging markets) are using currency intervention to resist nominal appreciation and sterilized intervention to combat real appreciation. This is forcing deficit countries into real exchange-rate adjustments via deflation – and thus a rising burden of public and private debt that may lead to disorderly defaults.

Furthermore, several major geopolitical risks loom, including military confrontation between North and South Korea and the lingering possibility that Israel – or even the US – might use military force to counter Iran’s nuclear weapons program. There are also the political and economic turmoil in Pakistan and the risk of a rise in cyber-attacks – for example, in retaliation for criminal proceedings against WikiLeaks.

In the US, slower private-sector deleveraging – given the fiscal stimulus from the extension of unemployment benefits for 13 months, the payroll-tax cut, and maintenance of current income-tax rates for another two years – could lull policymakers into assuming that relatively large fiscal and current-account imbalances can continue indefinitely. This could generate financial strains over the medium term – and protectionist pressures in the short term.
Finally, in the face of political opposition to fiscal consolidation, especially in the US, there is a risk that the path of least resistance becomes continued monetization of fiscal deficits. Eventually (once the slack in goods and labor markets is reduced), this would push inflation expectations – and yield curves – higher.

But there are also several upside risks. The US corporate sector is strong and very profitable, owing to massive labor shedding, creating scope for increased capital spending and hiring to contribute to more robust and above-trend GDP growth in 2011. Similarly, the eurozone, driven by Germany, could lurch toward greater economic and political union (especially some form of fiscal union), thus containing the problems of its periphery.
Meanwhile, growth in Germany and the eurozone “core” may further accelerate given the strength of emerging markets, which may show even greater resilience, underpinning more rapid global expansion.
The attenuation of downside risks and pleasant surprises in developed and emerging economies could lead to a further increase in demand for risky assets (equities and credit), which would reinforce economic recovery via wealth effects and lower borrowing costs. Positive feedback from consumption to production, employment, and income generation – both within countries and across countries via trade channels – could further accelerate the pace of global growth, particularly if monetary policies in most advanced economies remain looser than expected, supporting asset reflation and thus demand and growth.

Indeed, after four years (2007-2010) of either recession or sub-par recovery, the process of balance-sheet repair – while not completed yet – is underway, and may result in less saving and more spending to boost growth in advanced economies. The damage from the financial crisis is still ongoing, but stronger growth can heal many wounds, especially debt-driven wounds.

So far, the downside and upside risks for the world economy are balanced. But if sound government policies in advanced and major emerging economies contain the downside risks that are more prevalent in the first half of this year – which derive from political and policy uncertainty – a more resilient global economic recovery could take hold in the second half of 2011 and into 2012.

Nouriel Roubini is Chairman of Roubini Global Economics (www.roubini.com), Professor at the Stern School of Business at NYU and co-author of Crisis Economics

Global Risk and Reward in 2011 by Nouriel Roubini - Project Syndicate

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Wednesday, January 12, 2011

Financial Times: Risk of bust after boom haunts Latin America

January 11 2011 5:49 PM GMT
Risk of bust after boom haunts Latin America
--
By John Paul Rathbone and Javier Blas in London
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The region's abundant raw materials, from sugar and copper to iron ore, oil and soyabeans, can be a curse as well as a blessing, as surging prices fuel currency concerns
Read the full article at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4b2b677a-1da8-11e0-aa88-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss

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Friday, December 10, 2010

What Resource Curse? - By Charles Kenny | Foreign Policy

What Resource Curse?

Is it really true that underground riches lead to above-ground woes? No, not really.

BY CHARLES KENNY | DECEMBER 6, 2010

Bad news: Mozambique has just discovered between 6 trillion and 8 trillion cubic feet of gas sitting off its shoreline -- quite enough for commercial production. This on top of a recent coal-mining boom is destined to make the country a major natural resource exporter. Joining the East African country in recent misfortune is Papua New Guinea, scheduled to start exporting $30 billion worth of natural gas, and Afghanistan -- particularly blighted by the discovery of iron, copper, cobalt, gold, and lithium deposits with a combined value over $1 trillion. Oh, lackaday. Whatever chance they had of sustaining a stable, economically robust democracy is surely down the pit latrine now.
How so? Enter the resource curse -- the idea that the more stuff dug out from on or under a country, the slower it will grow and the higher the risk it will descend into civil war. Versions of the curse have been around for some time. Back in the 1970s, economists worried about "Dutch disease." Countries that exported a lot of gas or oil would see their exchange rates go up as a result. This, in turn, could make their manufacturing exports uncompetitive. But the idea really picked up steam in the mid-1990s, when Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, then both at Harvard University, found that countries that exported more agricultural products, minerals, and fuels saw slower economic growth.
Sachs and Warner highlighted Dutch disease and its knock-on effects as the likely cause. But other researchers looking at the same data argued that the link might be through empowering kleptocratic leaders with resource rents or the destabilizing political impact of easy money. In a matter of a few years, resource exports were charged with a host of ill effects -- not least, low education spending, unstable government, civil war, corruption, and poor governance.
The curse is the type of counterintuitive idea that makes for a great newspaper op-ed. Nonetheless, the curse is also the kind of counterintuitive idea where intuition may have been right to begin with. In 1997, the World Bank produced some measures of total natural resource wealth -- including agricultural land, mineral and oil resources, and protected areas. The richest countries in terms of resources per citizen were Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Norway. Their average income per head in 2008 was $24,430. Jordan and Malawi were at the bottom of the list. Jordan has a per capita income of $5,702; Malawi's is $744. Looking at mineral wealth alone, Venezuela and Norway were at the top, while Belgium, Benin, Ghana (before the recent oil discoveries), and Nepal were at the bottom. While Ghana's oil discovery suggests one problem with the rankings -- rich countries have been better explored for mineral deposits -- nonetheless, the list hardly suggests that resource scarcity is the secret to rapid growth.
Looking at recent growth across countries, Swiss economist Christa Brunnschweiler concludes that economies with greater resource wealth actually grew faster between 1970 and 2000 than resource-poor countries. She also finds no evidence that greater resource wealth is associated with weaker institutions, a finding repeated by Daron Acemoglu at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Together with her colleague Erwin Bulte, Brunnschweiler also looked at the link between natural resources and civil disorder. They found that countries with more natural resource wealth were less likely to descend into civil war in the first place. The same result held whether they were using a broad measure of resource wealth or focused only on minerals or oil. Elsewhere, Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo of Stanford University and the University of Washington, respectively, studied the relationship between oil revenues and democracy over time across countries. They found that democracies were actually made more resilient by growing oil revenues -- while they couldn't find an impact one way or another when it came to autocracies. Sure, there are cases where oil revenues and autocracy increased together. It is just that there are at least as many cases where that didn't happen -- and more cases where democracy strengthened as revenues went up.
How to reconcile these results with all the papers and articles that find a curse? Earlier studies looked at the importance of natural resource exports at a particular moment in time. There, the relationship holds -- high dependence on resource exports is associated with lower growth and risk of civil war. But that's a strange way to measure "the curse of resources." According to the usual story, the curse involves the misfortune of sitting atop an oil field or diamond-bearing rocks. It's a story of abundance -- as examined by Bulte and Brunnschweiler -- not dependence.
And dependence has got to do with a lot of other things besides mineral reserves. It is true that many countries that rely heavily on natural resource exports are poor and unstable. That's because poor and unstable countries are rarely globally competitive in banking or computer design (it's hard to develop a flourishing microchip industry as the bullets fly). Natural resources are pretty much the only thing such countries have a comparative advantage in trading. Again, countries don't get rich if all they do is produce crops and dig stuff out of the ground. Getting rich takes a vibrant services sector and at least some manufacturing. So countries where digging stuff out of the ground is an especially large part of what goes on in the economy are in trouble. But they are in trouble because they've failed so miserably to create an environment where services and manufacturing can flourish -- not because they happen to have a diamond deposit.
Do kleptocratic regimes exploit natural resources to pad their bank accounts, buy off opponents, and purchase weapons to cow holdouts? Of course they do. Exploiting, padding, bribing, and bullying are what kleptocrats do best. But they are equal-opportunity exploiters. If natural resource rents aren't available, they'll find something else -- and maybe do something worse to get it. For every Gen. Sani Abacha skimming billions off Nigeria's oil wealth, there is a Field Marshal Idi Amin massacring Ugandans by the thousands without the aid or incentive of significant mineral resources.
Happily for those countries stuck atop piles of diamonds or lakes of oil, then, it turns out the resource curse must have been enchanted by a pretty feeble witch. Once you look at the evidence more carefully, the usual argument is turned on its head. Countries that rely on natural resources for a large part of their output are indeed cursed -- by poor quality government and an institutional environment that stifles the growth of manufacturing and services. That's the good news for Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Papua New Guinea: They won't necessarily get any poorer or more unstable thanks to their massive mineral reserves. But bad news follows, too: Given the comparatively weak state of their current institutions, the countries are unlikely to use the money generated to become the next Norway, either.
That's why the most heralded talisman against the resource curse -- improving institutions through greater transparency and oversight -- makes sense regardless. In fact, because so much of the revenues from extractive industries flow through governments, improved oversight might be a particular help after a mineral find. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, for example, publishes audited statements regarding payments from industry to government in royalties and taxes. Another approach, championed by Todd Moss at the Center for Global Development, is to pass on oil revenues directly to citizens -- a model adopted in Alaska. These are good ideas, and it is great news that Mozambique and Afghanistan have signed up to the Transparency Initiative.
But at heart, they are good ideas because all governments should be more transparent and increase the flow of resources to communities, no matter what's under their land. Blaming oil wealth for poverty, though, is like blaming treasure for the existence of pirates.
GIANLUIGI GUERCIA/AFP/Getty Images
Charles Kenny is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development and a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation.


What Resource Curse? - By Charles Kenny | Foreign Policy


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Saturday, November 13, 2010

Gold falls most since July on commodities rout | Reuters

Gold falls most since July on commodities rout

Photo
3:59pm EST
By Frank Tang
NEW YORK (Reuters) - Gold suffered its biggest fall in four months on Friday, tumbling 3 percent as Chinese rate-hike talk, eurozone debt worries and weaker Treasuries prices triggered widespread unwinding of risk in commodities.

After holding firm this week in the face of the dollar's best gains in three months, gold buckled mid-morning as the euro cut gains in tandem with falling U.S. Treasuries prices, when the first day of heavy purchasing by the Federal Reserve failed to jump-start wider demand for debt.

Spot silver tumbled almost 7 percent, its biggest one-day loss since February and second major slide this week, as investors liquidated more positions in heavy trade after the exchange raised margins by 30 percent earlier this week.

In a week marked by disrupted correlations and extreme volatility, dealers said precious metals were caught up in near indiscriminate selling across the commodity spectrum rather than suffering from any bullion-specific bearishness.

Spot gold slid 3.3 percent to $1,362.66 an ounce at 2:09 p.m. EDT (1909 GMT), having earlier hit a one-week low at $1,359.70 an ounce. It was the biggest one-day fall since July 1.

U.S. gold futures for December delivery settled down $37.80 an ounce at $1,365.50.

The Reuters/Jefferies CRB .CRB index dropped almost 4 percent, its biggest daily loss in a year and a half, after a sell-off triggered early by fears of a Chinese interest rate rise snowballed through the rest of the session. Copper and oil fell 3 percent, wheat dropped 5 percent and sugar 12 percent. 


"We have a liquidation pattern across the board in every commodity market here," said Adam Klopfenstein, senior market strategist with MF Global's unit Lind-Waldock.

"Gold and other commodities are going to suffer in the short run as a result of the change in the opinion in the marketplace that China might not be able to grow as fast if it is going ... to rein in ... inflation or to curb fast money that has been spurring the economy," Klopfenstein said.
China stocks fell more than 5 percent on Friday for their biggest percentage loss in over a year, sparking a global commodities sell-off on speculation the central bank will raise interest rates to tackle inflation.
China this week raised bank reserve requirements, boosted yields on new government bills, and introduced new rules to curb money inflows. Those moves came ahead of Thursday data showing Chinese inflation at a 25-month peak, and spurring speculation that an interest rate hike will follow soon.
Other commodities extended losses at midday after the Fed bought $7.23 billion in Treasury paper on Friday under its $600 billion bond-buying program announced last week to stimulate the economy. Treasuries prices hit session lows after the Fed completed its purchases, with both seven-year notes and 10-year notes trading a full point lower in price.

"People are worried now about China tightening. China has been driving a lot of commodities and so fears of further interest rate rises in China ... will have an impact on buying," said David Thurtell, a London-based analyst for Citigroup.

The euro rose from a six-week low against the dollar after European leaders sought to reassure nervous bondholders about the value of their holdings, and as Ireland said it has not formally applied for emergency funding from the European Union.

While the inverse link between gold and the dollar weakened significantly this week as investors focused on European risk, it resurfaced part-way through Friday's trade when the euro pared gains as roiling financial markets outweighed a move by European leaders to reassure nervous bondholders.
(Graphic: r.reuters.com/xuc35q)

G20 DISAPPOINTMENT
Analysts said that gold should be supported by underlying safe-haven buying after the G20 meeting highlighted deep divides on currencies and trade imbalances among member countries.
G20 leaders closed ranks on Friday and agreed to a watered-down commitment to watch out for dangerous imbalances, yet offered investors little proof the world was any safer from economic catastrophe.

Interest in investment vehicles such as exchange-traded funds was soft, with holdings of the world's largest gold-backed ETF, New York's SPDR Gold Trust, falling by just under 1 tonne on Thursday.

Among other precious metals, spot silver dropped 6.5 percent to $25.94 an ounce, while platinum fell 4.5 percent to $1,673.24 an ounce and palladium slipped 5.2 percent to $672.72.

(Additional reporting by Jan Harvey and Marie-Louise Gumuchian in London; Editing by Lisa Shumaker)
© Thomson Reuters 2010. All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this website for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Republication or redistribution of Thomson Reuters content, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters and its logo are registered trademarks or trademarks of the Thomson Reuters group of companies around the world.
Thomson Reuters journalists are subject to an Editorial Handbook which requires fair presentation and disclosure of relevant interests.

Gold falls most since July on commodities rout | Reuters

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Sunday, November 7, 2010

Financial Times: China goes into oil overdrive

November 07 2010 3:49 PM GMT
China goes into oil overdrive
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By Sylvia Pfeifer in London and Leslie Hook in Beijing
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China's national oil companies have spent $24.6bn on overseas acquisitions this year, accounting for a fifth of global deal activity in oil and gas

Read the full article at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2df1ddd2-ea87-11df-b28d-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss

Financial Times: US companies welcome power shift

November 07 2010 7:49 PM GMT
US companies welcome power shift
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By Stephanie Kirchgaessner in Washington
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It must have sounded like music to their ears. Barack Obama acknowledged at his first press conference after the Democratic midterm rout that – amid the turbulence of the financial crisis, the controversy over executive bonuses, healthcare and Wall Street reform and the BP oil spill – his administration failed to send the right message to business. Namely, that its success mattered

Read the full article at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b1dd951a-eaa4-11df-b28d-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss



Friday, November 5, 2010

Financial Times: Race for resources tests trade openness

November 05 2010 5:23 PM GMT
Race for resources tests trade openness
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By Alan Beattie in Washington and Bernard Simon in Toronto
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An Australian minerals company failing to take over a Canadian fertiliser producer hardly sounds like the turning-point at which globalisation went into sharp retreat

Read the full article at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/64d3942e-e8fe-11df-a1b4-00144feab49a.html?ftcamp=rss


Tuesday, October 26, 2010

Reviving Codelco


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Reviving Codelco

"During last year's election campaign, Sebastián Piñera, who became Chile's president in March, often criticised Codelco, the country's state-owned copper company, for its inefficiency, griping over its stagnant output and climbing costs.

Yet it was engineers from Codelco who stood beside him this month as the 33 miners trapped since August 5th in the privately [...]

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Rare earth metals draw attention - The Globe and Mail

October 25, 2010

Rare earth metals draw attention

By RICHARD BLACKWELL
From Tuesday's Globe and Mail

The elements required in many technologies face a supply crunch as China - the world's main producer - cuts back exports

Among the hottest commodities these days are the rare earth elements - obscure metals used widely in key technologies such as smart phones, televisions, hybrid cars, lasers and military equipment.

These elements aren't actually rare, or earths, for that matter. They are metals that are found readily on Earth's crust, but not in concentrations that make them easy to mine.

Geopolitical trade issues have shone a light on them in recent months. More than 90 per cent of rare earths are produced in China, and there are worries the country will cut back exports to ensure it has enough domestic supply, leaving technology producers in Japan and the West in the lurch. Those concerns were heightened last month when it was reported that Chinese rare earth exports to Japan might be trimmed after a diplomatic incident in which the captain of a Chinese trawler was detained by the Japanese in disputed waters.

Worries about the security of supply has boosted the prices of rare earth metals, and lit a fire under producing companies or those exploring for new mines. But the possibility of an investment "bubble" is itself a concern, as some institutional investors are retreating from the sector.

It takes years to get a new mine up and running, so even if the flurry of activity results in new production in the West, there could still be short-term shortages.

What they are

Of the 17 most commonly used rare earth metals, 14 appear on one of the lower rows on the periodic table - the part you probably paid no attention to in high-school chemistry class.

Many have unpronounceable names, such as dysprosium, praseodymium, ytterbium, and neodymium.

In combination with other elements, they form compounds that are highly useful as pigments for glass and ceramics, or as components in electronic products that require high heat resistance.

Where they are used

Hybrid cars: In batteries, catalytic converters, electric motors and LCD screens.

Miniature electronics: In the batteries that make devices such as iPods and Blackberrys work, and in the tiny magnets needed for mini-motors and speakers.

Wind power: Used in the magnets that are key components of wind turbine generators.

Television screens: They provide a bright red phosphor that helps make television pictures sharp.

Canadian players

Quest Rare Minerals Ltd., Montreal: Exploration projects in Quebec, Ontario and New Brunswick;

Avalon Rare Metals Inc., Toronto: The Nechalacho project in the Northwest Territories is set to begin production in 2014.

Great Western Minerals Group Ltd., Saskatoon: Properties in Canada, the U.S. and South Africa

Neo Material Technologies Inc., Toronto: Production in China, Thailand, North America.


Rare earth metals draw attention - The Globe and Mail

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