What Really Happened in #Iran in 1953?

Conventional wisdom about the 1953 coup in Iran rests on the myth that the CIA toppled the country's democratically elected prime minister. In reality, the coup was primarily a domestic Iranian affair, and the CIA's impact was ultimately insignificant.

What Really Happened in Iran

Back in 2009, during his heavily promoted Cairo speech on American relations with the Muslim world, U.S. President Barack Obama noted, in passing, that “in the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government.” Obama was referring to the 1953 coup that toppled Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and consolidated the rule of the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Obama would go on to remind his audience that Iran had also committed its share of misdeeds against Americans. But he clearly intended his allusion to Washington’s role in the coup as a concession -- a public acknowledgment that the United States shared some of the blame for its long-simmering conflict with the Islamic Republic.

Yet there was a supreme irony to Obama’s concession. The history of the U.S. role in Iran’s 1953 coup may be “well known,” as the president declared in his speech, but it is not well founded. On the contrary, it rests heavily on two related myths: that machinations by the CIA were the most important factor in Mosaddeq’s downfall and that Iran’s brief democratic interlude was spoiled primarily by American and British meddling. For decades, historians, journalists, and pundits have promoted these myths, injecting them not just into the political discourse but also into popular culture: most recently, Argo, a Hollywood thriller that won the 2013 Academy Award for Best Picture, suggested that Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution was a belated response to an injustice perpetrated by the United States a quarter century earlier. That version of events has also been promoted by Iran’s theocratic leaders, who have exploited it to stoke anti-Americanism and to obscure the fact that the clergy itself played a major role in toppling Mosaddeq.

In reality, the CIA’s impact on the events of 1953 was ultimately insignificant. Regardless of anything the United States did or did not do, Mosaddeq was bound to fall and the shah was bound to retain his throne and expand his power. Yet the narrative of American culpability has become so entrenched that it now shapes how many Americans understand the history of U.S.-Iranian relations and influences how American leaders think about Iran. In reaching out to the Islamic Republic, the United States has cast itself as a sinner expiating its previous transgressions. This has allowed the Iranian theocracy, which has abused history in a thousand ways, to claim the moral high ground, giving it an unearned advantage over Washington and the West, even in situations that have nothing to do with 1953 and in which Iran’s behavior is the sole cause of the conflict, such as the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program.

All of this makes developing a better and more accurate understanding of the real U.S. role in Iran’s past critically important. It’s far more than a matter of correcting the history books. Getting things right would help the United States develop a less self-defeating approach to the Islamic Republic today and would encourage Iranians -- especially the country’s clerical elite -- to claim ownership of their past.

Day in court: Mohammad Mosaddeq on trial, November 1953. (Getty / Carl Mydans)

HONEST BROKERS

In the years following World War II, Iran was a devastated country, recovering from famine and poverty brought on by the war. It was also a wealthy country, whose ample oil reserves fueled the engines of the British Empire. But Iran’s government didn’t control that oil: the wheel was held by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, whose majority shareholder happened to be the British government. By the early 1950s, as assertive nationalism swept the developing world, many Iranians were beginning to see this colonial-era arrangement as an unjust, undignified anachronism.

So strong was the desire to take back control of Iran’s national resources that it united the country’s liberal reformers, its intelligentsia, elements of its clerical establishment, and its middle-class professionals into a coherent political movement. At the center of that movement stood Mosaddeq, an upper-class lawyer who had been involved in Iranian politics from a young age, serving in various ministries and as a member of parliament. Toward the end of World War II, Mosaddeq reemerged on the political scene as a champion of Iranian anticolonialism and nationalism and managed to draw together many disparate elements into his political party, the National Front. Mosaddeq was not a revolutionary; he was respectful of the traditions of his social class and supported the idea of constitutional monarchy. But he also sought a more modern and more democratic Iran, and in addition to the nationalization of Iran’s oil, his party’s agenda called for improved public education, freedom of the press, judicial reforms, and a more representative government.

In April 1951, the Iranian parliament voted to appoint Mosaddeq prime minister. In a clever move, Mosaddeq insisted that he would not assume the office unless the parliament also approved an act he had proposed that would nationalize the Iranian oil industry. Mosaddeq got his way in a unanimous vote, and the easily intimidated shah capitulated to the parliament’s demands. Iran now entered a new and more dangerous crisis.

Special Report: Hamas In Transition | STRATFOR

Special Report: Hamas In Transition | STRATFOR


After more than five years of existing in political stalemate, Hamas is now trying to manage a worsening relationship with Iran and Syria and exploit the political rise of its Islamist parent organization, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Without a clear vision on how to proceed, Hamas is likely to undergo serious internal strains that could raise the potential for a splintering of the heretofore most tightly run organization of the Palestinian territories.
Six years ago, Hamas unexpectedly swept parliamentary elections in the Palestinian territories and won the right to form a government. But the idea of a self-professed Islamist militant organization running the Palestinian government did not sit well with Israel and much of the West or with Hamas' rival, Fatah. Sanctions on Hamas immediately intensified, and a civil war broke out between Hamas and Fatah. Hamas was driven into political isolation after it forcibly took over the Gaza Strip in mid-2007.
Hamas then entered a long period of political stagnation. As a heavily sanctioned political pariah, the group's financial stresses rose. This provided Iran an opportunity to deepen its financial links with the Hamas regime. Though weapons and supplies still flowed to Gaza, the Egyptian regime of then-President Hosni Mubarak maintained a tight security grip over the Sinai-Gaza border to keep Hamas under control. When Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in December 2008, Hamas was able to both resist and garner international sympathy, but the two-month operation still dealt a blow to Hamas militarily and did little to ease the group's political constraints. Apart from a rampant smuggling trade via Gaza tunnels, Hamas had little space to exercise its political authority.
But regional events in 2011 brought about large changes in the challenges and opportunities faced by Hamas. Political demonstrations in Egypt led to the fall of Mubarak. After decades of being repressed by the Mubarak regime, the Egyptian MB entered the political mainstream. Though the military, which remains Egypt's ultimate authority, wants to keep Hamas confined in Gaza, the MB's rise has raised international acceptance of Islamists as political players. When Arab unrest reached Syria, Hamas' refusal to publicly support the regime of President Bashar al Assad cost its exiled politburo its footing with the regime in Damascus; Hamas had to start seeking an alternative base. Meanwhile, as demonstrations continued to spread throughout the Arab world, Iran's growing assertiveness in the region put the spotlight on Hamas, a Sunni entity, for its substantial ties with the Shiite Islamic Republic.
The group now finds itself at a turning point. Hamas has to balance deteriorating relationships with longtime patrons Iran and Syria, establish a new political vision, identify proper sources of funding and manage growing internal disagreements.

Picking Sides

When al Assad's Alawite regime began resorting to more violent crackdowns against a growing, Sunni-dominated opposition, Hamas leaders in Damascus, led by politburo chief Khaled Meshaal, had reason to be nervous. Damascus has served as the exiled leadership's main hub of operations since 2001, and it is the main channel for funding to reach Hamas. When unrest in Syria began, Hamas' best option was to try to not appear involved in Syria's internal affairs; the group could not risk its credibility by standing behind an Iranian-backed Alawite regime against Sunni resistance. Because of the overwhelming support in the Arab world for the Sunni-led uprising, Hamas could no longer ignore, as it did in the past, the al Assad regime's intolerance of its comrades in Syria's branch of the MB.
In August and September, Syria and Iran tried to pressure Hamas into organizing pro-Assad demonstrations in the Palestinian refugee camps in Syria. It was time for Hamas to decide whom it would support. Hamas had two choices: It could follow orders and showcase its close alignment with the Iran and Syria, or it could create some distance from the Iranian-led coalition, use that distance to reinforce its relations with its Sunni Arab neighbors and, most critically, seize the opportunity to follow the MB's lead out of political isolation.
Hamas chose the latter and refused to stage the demonstrations. The group could not afford to side against a wave of Sunni opposition without absorbing a hit to its legitimacy. Yet beyond the ideological discomfort it was experiencing, Hamas had a bigger vision in mind.

Hamas' Political Vision

Hamas formally was created in 1987, largely as the result of two factors. First was public dissatisfaction with the secularist and corrupt Fatah-led Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The second was an effort by the MB to respond to the first intifada in a way that allowed it to remain politically insulated. The creation of a separate Gaza group that could engage in armed resistance answered the MB's dilemma. However, Hamas' original leadership still viewed militancy as a means to a political end. Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the leader of the MB and of the Islamic Center in Gaza, argued that Hamas was basically a political movement: It would fight for the rights of Palestinians, with the objective of eliminating Israel. The violent means Hamas has used make it highly controversial as a political player, but it is important to note that Hamas has held political ambitions since its inception.
Hamas' core struggle is over how to proceed along that political path while presiding over a stateless entity -- especially when its reputation has been primarily built on militant resistance, not on political credentials. As the organization learned after the 2006 election, even a sweeping political victory in the Palestinian territories yields limited results for an organization widely recognized as the premier Palestinian militant group. In other words, if Hamas was not prepared to abandon its militant arm and change its charter to recognize Israel, it needed to undergo a serious rebranding effort.
That opportunity came with the fall of Mubarak. The spread of unrest provided an opening for Islamist groups throughout the region to raise their political voice and force a wider acceptance of their growing role in the political affairs of the Arab world. The rise of the Egyptian MB in particular created an opening for Hamas to publicly reassert itself as a legitimate political player operating in the same league as its parent organization.
However, Hamas must make several difficult political decisions to achieve such a transition.

Coping with Finances

Hamas is highly secretive about its finances, but it has been unable to fully conceal the financial stress it has experienced over the past several months. It has been widely rumored that Iran began curtailing its monthly payments to Hamas after the group's refusal to demonstrate on behalf of the Syrian regime. According to multiple sources, Iran had directed $25 million per month to Hamas; to put that in perspective, Hamas' stated annual budget for administering the Gaza Strip is about $700 million.
In addition to the decline in Iranian financing, Hamas may also have reason to be concerned about the status of its investments in Syria. A number of Hamas members have business partnerships with members of the Syrian business community, including those close to the regime. Though the value of these assets is unknown, much of Syrian investment linked to Hamas is in real estate, resorts, food imports and olive oil exports.
Hamas may also be seeing less income from Islamic charities. Though a significant amount of funding is still likely earmarked for Hamas, a Stratfor source linked to the group said the rise of the MB and other regional Islamist opposition groups has attracted a major influx of money from donors looking to sustain the effects of the Arab Spring, making Hamas a lower priority.
These are not the only sources of Hamas funding. Hamas is believed to make about $50 million per year by taxing trade that runs through the Gaza Strip's extensive tunnel system. The group also reaps an unknown amount of profits from local businesses in which it holds a significant stake, including the Gaza Strip's only shopping mall and sea resorts and businesses spread throughout the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Central Asia.
Nonetheless, there are indications that Hamas is experiencing significant financial pain because of its worsening relationship with Iran and Syria. Meshaal and Gaza-based Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh have been taking tours throughout the region in recent weeks to meet with leaders from Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Hamas has allegedly sought financing from these states to compensate for the drop in Iranian support. Due to the uncertainty faced by the Syrian regime, Meshaal's faction also has reportedly been gauging these states' willingness to provide a new base and office space for the group's exiled leadership.

The Costs and Benefits of a Relationship with Hamas

Hamas can make a compelling offer to these states. With concern growing in the region over how to check Iran's power, Hamas' move to distance itself from Iran and its allies in Syria could significantly undermine Tehran's influence in the Levant region. Additionally, these countries, particularly Egypt and Jordan, see a strategic interest in bringing Hamas closer. They can build leverage with the group -- creating another mechanism to balance Israel's power -- but also use that increased influence to keep Hamas in check. However, the strict condition these states are attaching to any deal are giving Hamas pause.
Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey share an interest in keeping Hamas hemmed in Gaza. These states frequently express their support of the principle of Palestinian statehood, but Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in particular are most concerned by the idea of a Palestinian polity emerging that could threaten their national security. Egypt, dealing with an emboldened MB, does not want Hamas to break free of its isolation and meddle in Egyptian affairs. The Egyptian military elite is already on alert for Hamas attempts to instigate a crisis between Egypt and Israel; such a crisis could rally Egyptians and Palestinians alike and provide the Islamist opposition with the means to discredit the military's authority. In Jordan, where Palestinians constitute a majority of the population, the ethnically distinct Hashemite regime is facing a vociferous opposition led by the Jordanian MB and does not want to embolden its Palestinian population. Saudi Arabia has long had a tense relationship with Hamas and remembers well its past brushes with Palestinian militancy.
Building leverage with a militant group comes with risks. If any of these states agreed to start or increase funding for Hamas or host a Hamas office, they would not want to be held accountable for renegade actions by the group, especially by the United States and Israel. At the same time, they know Hamas is not ready to disarm, recognize Israel and make a full political transition.

Sending Mixed Signals to Tehran

These states also understand that Hamas is unlikely to completely sever its ties with Iran. Beyond the money, weapons and training it has received from Iran and its allies, Hamas needs to maintain a decent working relationship with Iran to avoid creating greater complications for itself in the Gaza Strip.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a much smaller militant outfit than Hamas, has had a tight financial, ideological and logistical relationship with the Islamic Republic since the group's inception in 1980. PIJ is firmly committed to its militant campaign. The group openly rejects building ties with surrounding Arab states due to their perceived hypocrisy toward Palestinian statehood and the Arab states' alleged collusion with Israel. PIJ is thus the most likely Palestinian recipient of Iranian aid no longer destined for Hamas. PIJ and Hamas have long cooperated. Hamas is even suspected of occasionally relying on PIJ to carry out attacks, in an effort for Hamas to maintain plausible deniability in dealing with Israel. However, Hamas may have a decreased ability to control PIJ actions within Gaza if Hamas is no longer cooperating closely with PIJ's main backer, Iran. So long as Hamas controls Gaza, Israel will likely hold Hamas accountable for any attacks that emanate from there. A significant loss of control over militancy in Gaza could thus leave Hamas in a much more precarious position with regard to Israel.
Hamas' leadership seems to have been sending mixed signals to Tehran -- rather than running the risks involved in an outright break -- while waiting for agreements to come through with the Arab states. However, these states first want real assurances that Hamas will behave according to their standards and fundamentally shift away from the Iran-Syria axis. Indeed, according to the Palestinian Al Quds daily, Haniyeh was allegedly strongly advised by the leaders of Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait to cancel his upcoming visit to Tehran if Hamas is serious about making a deal. Haniyeh's arrival in Tehran on Feb. 10, despite the demands of the Arab states, shows that Hamas still feels the need to keep its options open with Iran.
Hamas knows the opportunity the MB's political elevation presents, but several complications apparently are preventing Hamas from making any clear, hard decisions.
While struggling to balance between Sunni states and Iran, Hamas is also trying to find a way to moderate its political position at home. Ongoing Hamas efforts to reconcile with Fatah and become part of the PLO are designed to insulate Hamas from the drawbacks of ruling Gaza alone. Hamas will not capitulate to Fatah for the sake of reverting to a more comfortable opposition posture. The group wants to share enough power – and present itself in enough of a pragmatic light – to resume financial flows and provide Hamas with some plausible deniability in dealing with Israeli military reprisals against the Gaza Strip.
However, this is placing a lot of pressure on the group. In trying to reintegrate itself with Fatah under the PLO umbrella and reinforce its relations with the surrounding Arab states, Hamas risks developing a crisis in legitimacy among Palestinians. The group already has accomplished little during its time in political office. Should a power-sharing government with Fatah fail to yield results, Hamas could be susceptible to the same criticism levied against its secularist rivals. Money is still sorely lacking in the Gaza Strip, and middle class members of Hamas who are making money are increasingly viewed as corrupt in the Palestinian territories. Hamas does not want to risk being put in the same light as Fatah and thereby seeing its credibility erode among its own supporters.

A Hamas Splintering?

Stresses within Hamas are already beginning to manifest in the form of public spats between the group's Gaza-based leadership and its exiled leadership over which political course to take with Fatah, how to manage the group's finances and what terms Hamas should agree to in dealing with foreign backers. Deep, personal rivalries have long existed within these factions, but the strains appear to be turning more severe. This dynamic was most recently illustrated the week of Feb. 6, when Meshaal signed a power-sharing agreement with Fatah leader and Palestinian National Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas in Doha, Qatar. Haniyeh and his deputy Mahmoud Zahar did not attend the Doha summit, and their parliamentary bloc strongly rejected the deal two days later, citing a clause that said Abbas would remain both president and prime minister in a future government. Haniyeh has since denied any rifts within his movement, but the more Hamas insists on its unity, the more doubts are raised regarding its internal coherence.
Aside from questions about how to reconcile with Fatah, there is also the important question of who will handle Hamas' finances if the exiled leadership moves from its financial base in Damascus. It appears that Hamas is looking to set up multiple offices in countries that agree to host Hamas and help fund the organization. This could see the exiled leadership spread across Cairo, Amman and possibly Doha. Meshaal, who has Jordanian citizenship, is likely to end up in Amman while Mousa Abu Marzouk, deputy head of Hamas' political bureau, has already reportedly moved with his family to Cairo. A scattering of Hamas' exiled leadership to these capitals may serve to enhance the group's ties with each of these states and encourage them to increase their funding to Hamas, but it also leaves the group beholden to the interests of multiple states that share a desire to keep the group contained. Moreover, the wider Hamas' exiled leadership is spread, the more difficult these leaders will find it to coordinate and remain relevant compared to the Gaza-based leadership.


\Special Report: Hamas In Transition | STRATFOR

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Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Creeping its Way into Power

Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood on the March, but Cautiously

 Stratfor Geopolitical Diary: May 19, 2011

The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) officially registered Wednesday for the formation of a new political wing, paving the way for the establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party. With parliamentary elections scheduled in September, Freedom and Justice is expected to do well at the first polls of the post-Mubarak era. Just how well is the main question on the minds of the country's ruling military council, which would prefer to hand off the day-to-day responsibilities of governing Egypt, while holding onto real power behind the scenes.

Leading MB official Saad al-Katatny, one of the founders of Freedom and Justice, said he hopes for the party to officially begin its activities June 17, and to begin selecting its executive authority and top leaders one month later. Members of Egypt's Political Parties Affairs Committee will convene Sunday to discuss the application and will announce their decision the next day. They are expected to approve the request. Three and a half months after the fall of Hosni Mubarak, Egypt's leading Islamist group is on the verge of forming an official political party for the first time in its history.

Following Mubarak's ouster, MB wasted little time in seizing what it saw as the group's historical moment to enter Egypt's political mainstream. They announced plans to form a political party on Feb. 14. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which took over administration of the country following the deposal of Mubarak, did nothing to hinder this development, despite the military's deep antipathy toward Islamist groups. Political instability was (and is) rampant in the country, and the military sought to find a balance that would allow it to maintain control while appearing amenable to the people's demands, and bring life back to normal. Opening up political space to Islamist groups, including at least two emerging Salafist parties, and announcing plans for fairly rapid elections, was seen by the military as the most effective way to achieve this balance.

It bears repeating that what happened in Egypt in January and February did not constitute a revolution. There was no regime change; there was regime preservation, through a carefully orchestrated military coup that used the 19 days of popular demonstrations against Mubarak as a smokescreen for achieving its objective. Though a system of one-party rule existed from the aftermath of the 1967 War until Feb. 11 of this year, true power in Egypt since 1952 has been with the military and that did not change with the ouster of Mubarak. What changed was that for the first time since the 1960s, Egypt's military found itself not just ruling, but actually governing, despite the existence of an interim government (which the SCAF itself appointed).

The SCAF wants to get back to ruling and give up the job of governing, but it knows that there has been a sea change in Egypt's political environment that prevents a return to the way things were done under Mubarak. The days of single-party rule are over. If the military wants stability, it is going to have to accept a true multiparty political system, one that allows for a broad spectrum of participation from all corners of Egyptian society. The generals can maintain control of the regime, but the day-to-day affairs of governance will fall under the control of coalition governments that could never have existed in the old Egypt.

This opens the door for MB to gain more political power than it has ever held and explains why its leaders were so quick to announce their plans for the formation of Freedom and Justice in February. But the group has tempered eagerness with caution. MB is aware of its reputation in the eyes of the SCAF (and the outside world, for that matter) and is playing a shrewd game to dispel its image as an extremist Islamist group.

Gadhafi's Pal In Venezuela

Weekly Standard: Gadhafi's Pal In Venezuela

by VANESSA NEUMANN

EnlargeJuan Barreto /AFP/Getty Images

Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, greeting sympathizers in northwestern Venezuela in 2009. Recently, Chavez offered to mediate the dispute between anti-Gadhafi rebels and the Libyan leader, a proposal that was flatly refused by the rebels.

March 7, 2011

Vanessa Neumann is editor-at-large ofDiplomat magazine and a commentator on Latin American politics for Caracol radio.

If Washington is apt to see the recent uprisings in the Middle East — against U.S. allies like Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak as well as adversaries like the Islamic Republic of Iran — in terms of challenges to and opportunities for U.S. strategic interests, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez sees nothing but an opening to boost his own Bolivarian brand.

Consider Chavez's stance toward his OPEC colleague Moammar Gadhafi. Early during the fighting in Libya, there were rumors, maybe even floated by Chavez himself, that the Libyan dictator was about to flee to Venezuela. The government-friendly Venezuelan press speculated that when Gadhafi arrived he would be bearing with him the replica of Simon Bolivar's sword that Chavez gave him in 2009 when he bestowed on his "revolutionary brother" the Order of the Liberator, Venezuela's highest civilian honor. "What Simon Bolivar is to the Venezuelan people," said Chavez, "Gadhafi is to the Libyan people."

When Gadhafi started bombing the Libyan people, and showed that he was not going anywhere, the Venezuelan ruler adjusted accordingly, offering to mediate between the colonel and his rivals. Aides to Chavez said Gadhafi accepted the proposal, though his son did not, and, not surprisingly, the rebels rejected his offer, as has the entire international community. But Chavez is hardly finished meddling in the Middle East, for the relationship between that region's state sponsors of terror and the countries under the influence of Chavez's Bolivarian Revolution is more than just a puppet show. The irony is that if the Venezuelan strongman isn't careful, those Middle Eastern revolts might come back to haunt him.

Of course, Libya isn't the only rogue state under internal pressure that Chavez has warmed to. Venezuela has assiduously nurtured its relationship with Iran such that the Caracas-Tehran alliance may now represent the greatest threat to stability in Washington's direct sphere of influence.

Chavez and Ahmadinejad call each other "brothers" and last year signed 11 memorandums of understanding for, among other initiatives, joint oil and gas exploration, as well as the construction of tanker ships and petrochemical plants. Chavez's assistance to the Islamic Republic in circumventing U.N. sanctions has got the attention of the new Republican leadership of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Connie Mack (both R-FL) have said they intend to launch an investigation into the Venezuelan state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). In July, the EU ordered the seizure of all the assets of the Venezuelan International Development Bank, an affiliate of the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI), one of 34 Iranian entities implicated in the development of nuclear or ballistic technology and sanctioned by the Treasury Department. In the meantime, Tehran and Caracas have announced that PDVSA will be investing $780 million in the South Pars gas field in southern Iran.

Another key aspect of the two countries' strategic relationship is uranium exploration. Iran is reportedly helping Venezuela find and refine its estimated 50,000 tons of uranium reserves — a deal modeled after Caracas's arrangement with Moscow, which has already signed agreements to build two 1,200-megawatt reactors in Venezuela.

And then there's terrorism and the role that Hezbollah, Iran's Lebanese-based asset, plays in the relationship. Hezbollah's past work in Latin America includes its alleged involvement in two Buenos Aires bombings — the 1992 attack on the Israeli embassy and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center. And now, reports are surfacing that Venezuela has provided Hezbollah operatives with Venezuelan national identity cards — a concern raised in the July 27, 2010, Senate hearing for the recently nominated U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, Larry Palmer.

Elsewhere in Latin America, Iran has developed significant relationships with Chavez's allies and fellow Bolivarian Revolutionaries, Bolivia's Evo Morales, Ecuador's Rafael Correa and Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega. For instance, in December 2008 the EDBI offered to deposit $120 million in the Ecuadorean Central Bank to fund bilateral trade, and Iran and Ecuador have signed a $30 million deal to conduct joint mining projects in Ecuador through the Chemical-Geotechnical-Metallurgical Research Center in Ecuador. Even as that deal carefully avoids mentioning uranium, the IAEA's March 2009 plans to help Ecuador explore its vast uranium reserves were largely intended to highlight and preclude Iranian involvement. In February 2010 the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force, a multilateral organization that combats money laundering and terrorist financing, placed Ecuador on a list of countries that failed to comply with its regulations.

The problem for Chavez and the Bolivarians is that in aligning themselves with Middle Eastern rogue states they may have made a bad bet. To be sure, even if Chavez loses Tripoli and Tehran as allies, instability in the Middle East will raise demand for Venezuela's higher-sulfur heavy crude, and the spike in price will help solidify his hold on power as he approaches the 2012 elections. But insofar as Middle Easterners have been inspired by the examples of their peers — from Tunisia to Bahrain and Libya to Iran — there is no reason that Latin Americans should not be similarly moved to go to the streets to demonstrate against their own repressive regimes. Indeed, the signs do not augur well for the Bolivarians.

Recently, 63 Venezuelan students went on a hunger strike to protest Chavez's human rights record, his repression of the country's opposition parties, and his gutting of independent state institutions. They campaigned for international pressure to support the release of high-profile political prisoners, including judges, opposition officials, and members of the national assembly.

As another representative from Venezuela's National Assembly, Maria Corina Machado, recently told me:

"The building of the society we dream about will be done by us Venezuelans, but we do ask the world not to make it more difficult for us, not to legitimize a regime that consistently violates human rights. Venezuelans have a right to raise their voices in protest and demand that other countries not be complicit. What we want is for the true nature of the Venezuelan regime to be recognized, that they have violated all the pillars of a democratic system: There's no respect for human rights, no separation of powers, and recurrent violation of the constitution."

Chavez and his Bolivarian colleagues are on notice — if an Arab tyrant in exile disdains refuge in Venezuela, there's plenty of space for Latin American despots alongside ousted Arab rulers in the deserts of Saudi Arabia.

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Analyst View: How serious is the Chavez Libya peace plan? | Reuters

Analyst View: How serious is the Chavez Libya peace plan?

12:37pm EST

DUBAI (Reuters) - The Arab League head Amr Moussa said on the Thursday the group would consider a proposal by Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to negotiate a peaceful settlement to Libya's intensifying conflict.
Energy analysts consulted by Reuters said they saw little chance that any Chavez-backed plan would succeed.
JOEL HIRST, FELLOW, U.S.-BASED COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
"Gaddafi is an ideological friend and ally who has stood with Chavez in difficult times and now Chavez is reciprocating. It is unclear whether the Arab League or the U.N. will agree given his clear bias in favor of Gaddafi. If Chavez can spin this that he is a powerful figure astride the world stage who can solve international problems while propping up an ally who he is really worried will be overthrown, it will help Chavez with anti-American countries who like to see America lose. It won't help him domestically."
SAMUEL CISZUK, Middle East Analyst, IHS Energy, London:
"I don't think that another relatively extreme leader who is an ally to Gaddafi has a chance to be accepted as a peace-broker. It's very unlikely to work."
"It has become likely that Libyan fighting will affect, and potentially destroy, oil infrastructure serving the country's largest, central basin, which is right on the fault line between Gaddafi loyalists and rebels."
"The violence and bomb strikes could hit export terminals, and might extend to upstream infrastructure and pipelines. I think that the risk of Libyan oil exports remaining affected for a long period are already being priced into oil."
OLIVIER JAKOB, Swiss-based research firm Petromatrix:
"Prices have weakened on the news, or the rumor, that Gaddafi could accept a proposal made by Chavez for mediation. Chavez' credibility does not fly very high; the only value of such a proposal is if it offers some honorable way out for the Gaddafi clan. The only value is if it offers a face-saving way out to exile."

In Jordan, Some Regret a Missed Opportunity

NY Times

By RANA F. SWEIS

March 2, 2011

AMMAN — Two weeks ago, Manal, 27, dressed in a black robe, walked slowly in a crowd of several hundred demonstrators — mostly men — carrying children, waving Jordanian flags or holding up homemade protest signs near the prime minister’s office.
This was her first public protest, said Manal, who declined to give her last name for fear of angering conservative members of her family. “I’m here to demand reforms,” she said. “I’m here to say enough. Enough corruption. Enough with the high prices. Enough of being silent.”
In the past month, the government has offered various promises and initiatives to stem the wave of popular discontent sweeping the country and the region, but the impact of these gestures has been blunted by the fact that a comprehensive 10-year National Agenda for reform has existed, in theory, since 2006.
The agenda includes strategies and initiatives for social, economic and political development. It also calls for the evaluation and monitoring of progress.
“Under this plan, Jordanian laws were to change in ways that would open up elections, improve freedom of the press and reduce bias against women — in other words, creating meritocracies,” wrote Marwan Muasher, a former deputy prime minister, who led the introduction of the 10-year plan.
Many intellectuals, former politicians and ordinary citizens say that if the National Agenda had been carried out — with changes in the electoral laws, more civil rights and better economic policies — in the past five years, Jordan would not be faced with the difficult challenges of today.
“We have been speaking about this National Agenda and reform for so long,” said Audeh Quawas, a former member of Parliament. “We heard about several political reforms — but the truth is we were going backwards, including in terms of civil rights.”
Amid continuing protests across the region, several thousand demonstrators took to the streets of Jordan this week to press for real political, judicial and economic change. Newspapers, too, have been campaigning for comprehensive, rapid political change. A cartoon published in Al Ghad, an independent newspaper, featured a map of Jordan covered with protest banners.
Jordanians on Twitter have created a “ReformJO” hashtag, a 140-character platform in which they spill their thoughts on how their country should move forward. Facebook pages like “What the Jordanian People Want” have been created. Journalists at the government-owned newspaper Al Rai staged their first protest ever, demanding higher salaries and more press freedom. A journalist standing in front of the newspaper building carried a placard that read: “You have suffocated us.”
Reacting to the uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and elsewhere, King Abdullah II has tried to head off anger by siding with the demonstrators.
“When I say reform, I want real and quick reform, because without genuine reforms, the situation will remain as it was,” the king said in a speech to the heads and members of the executive, legislative and judicial authorities.
After the announcement of subsidies for fuel and basic goods and pay increases for civil servants and security personnel failed to restore calm, Abdullah last month dismissed the government of Prime Minister Samir Rifai.
“The king realized that it’s time to make major changes,” said Hani al-Hourani, an analyst and director at al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center, a political science institute. “I hope that these changes will be implemented and the government that is chosen is sensitive to the needs of the people.”
Steps by the government in recent weeks have included scrapping an article in the Public Assembly Law that required government consent to hold rallies and protests. But final approval is still pending in Parliament.
“We have a crisis and the people of Jordan will continue protesting because obviously policies have failed in the past,” said Mohammed Sweidan, the managing editor of Al Ghad. “I am not confident this new government has the political will for serious reform because they are saying it can take three or six months. There is no need to wait that long to start the implementation process.”
School teachers in Jordan had started protesting even before the Tunisian uprising, calling for better working conditions and higher salaries. This week they demanded fundamental changes in the education system and announced plans to form a union.
“Prior to the regional uprisings, there were demands issued by political parties, unions and even from teachers in Jordan, but today the statements are bolder than ever,” said Hussein al-Khozahe, a sociologist and expert in developmental studies at al-Balqa Applied University in Amman.
This week a group of university professors, including Towfic Shomar, an associate professor at Philadelphia University in Amman, opened a campaign for a university teachers’ union.
“We think this is a very good time to establish a union because of the democratic changes in the region and we hope to have the union established in the next two or three months,” Mr. Shomar said.
The government has, meanwhile, set up a committee to overhaul the electoral system, a persistent demand by demonstrators and the public. Hamzah Mansur, chief of the Islamic Action Front, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, told protesters last week: “We want immediate constitutional change to help create productive governments and a truly representative Parliament.”
Some long-running grievances are also being addressed. A national housing initiative, Decent Housing for a Decent Living, introduced by Abdullah in February 2008 to build homes for poor Jordanians, has been referred to the government’s anti-corruption unit after repeated allegations of favoritism and nepotism.
“I believe corruption is a big challenge for Jordan,” Mr. Hourani said. “When there are laws and nongovernmental organizations fighting corruption, yet it increases, it means there needs to be a real political will, real democracy, real Parliament, a robust media that has enough strength to fight without fear.”
For a younger generation reared on the Internet and satellite television, “it’s no longer about the political will, but when,” said Mr. Khozahe, the sociologist. “You can’t silence them and you can’t beat them into submission. They see the region, they see the world and there’s no turning back this time.” 

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/world/middleeast/03iht-m03-jordan.html?_r=1&partner=rss&emc=rss

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Everybody Loves(ed) Hosni - Foreign Policy

Everybody Loves Loved Hosni

For 30 years the world welcomed Egypt's president -- they shook his hand and looked the other way. But the time for photo ops is likely over. 

FEBRUARY 1, 2011

U.S. President Jimmy Carter brokered the 1978 peace talks between Israel and Egypt when Hosni Mubarak was President Anwar Sadat's vice president. (To sweeten the deal, Carter threw in generous U.S. military support to Egypt, setting the terms of the largely military-driven relationship between the two countries that has continued throughout Mubarak's rule.) Those talks resulted in the 1979 treaty between Egypt and Israel. And while Carter told a reporter on Jan. 30 that he felt he knew "Mubarak quite well," the former U.S. president also said that the Egyptian president had become "more politically corrupt" than he was during their Camp David days. "The United States wants Mubarak to stay in power," Carter commented, "but the people have decided."
AFP/Getty Images

The U.S. relationship with Egypt deteriorated in the early 1980s largely because of mutual distrust over relations with Israel. Egypt was angry that Washington failed to put pressure on Israel after it invaded Lebanon in 1982, while the United States complained that Egypt was slow to normalize relations with the Jewish state after the 1979 Camp David Accord. Mubarak visited U.S. President Ronald Reagan at the White House in 1985 in an attempt to rebuild the relationship. After the meeting, Reagan declared that he and Mubarak were "close friends and partners in peace."
Diana Walker//Time Life Pictures/Getty Images 

Analysis: The problems Egypt still faces

Analysis: The problems Egypt still faces
By BARRY RUBIN
02/02/2011
Jerusalem Post

Weak moderates, a radical people, the economy's fragility, and strong Islamists.

There’s a lot of confusion about the Egyptian crisis, yet it is vital that people understand what is at stake.

The first issue is whether only the ruler or the entire regime is going to fall. The mere resignation of President Hosni Mubarak from office would not be a huge problem. Vice President Omar Suleiman or someone else will take over, the regime will make adjustments to build support (and probably repress the Muslim Brotherhood) and Egypt’s policy – certainly its foreign policy – remains relatively unchanged.

But if the entire regime falls, this would lead to a period of anarchy – bad – or a new regime – worse.

There are some huge problems:

• The moderates’ weakness. There are no well-organized moderate groups with a big base of support. Can any such politicians compete with the highly organized, disciplined Muslim Brotherhood which knows precisely what it wants? Indeed, the muchtouted Mohamed ElBardai is a weak and ineffectual man with no political experience whatsoever. Many of the activists who have backed his candidacy are themselves Islamists.

Indeed, many of the non-Islamist “moderates” are not so moderate. In sharp contrast to reformers in other Arab countries, many of the Egyptian “democrats” are themselves quite radical, especially in terms of anti-American and anti-Israel thinking.

• The public’s radicalism. According to a recent Pew Research Center poll, the Egyptian public is extremely radical even in comparison to Jordan’s or Lebanon’s. When asked whether they preferred “Islamists” or “modernizers,” the score was 59 percent to 27% in favor of the Islamists. In addition, 20% said they liked al-Qaida; 30%, Hizbullah; 49%, Hamas. And this was at a time that their government daily propagandized against these groups.

How about religious views? Egyptian Muslims said the following: 82% want adulterers punished with stoning; 77% want robbers to be whipped and have their hands amputated; 84% favor the death penalty for any Muslim who changes his religion.

So how is such a radical public going to vote and what policies would they support? The Muslim Brotherhood is likely to be very popular while one would think secular moderates in suits and ties would not be able to compete in elections.

• The economy’s fragility. In a country like Saudi Arabia, a government can buy off opposition. Not so in Egypt, a place where there are few resources (some oil, Suez Canal) and too many people. So how is a government going to make the public happy? It won’t be able to offer greatly improved living standards, more jobs, and better housing. Instead, demagoguery is likely – as it has so often done before in the Arab world – to be the means of gaining votes and keeping the masses out of the streets.

This means the Islamization to some degree of social life, and waves of hatred against Israel and America, the Middle East equivalent of bread (subsidies for food will be increased, but how to pay for them?) and circuses. Moderate governments thrive usually when they can offer benefits. This is very unlikely in Egypt.

• The Islamists’ strength and extremism. If someone tells you that the Muslim Brotherhood is mild and moderate, don’t believe it. In its speeches and publications, it pours forth vitriol and hatred. Making the Shari’a the sole source of legislation for Egypt is one of its most basic demands. The rights of Christians and women (at least those who don’t want to live within radical Islamist rules) are going to decline in a country ruled by the Brotherhood, even as part of the coalition.

As for foreign policy, is the alliance with the United States and the peace treaty with Israel going to survive under such a regime? Maybe but why should that happen? And of course, the regime will support revolutionary Islamists elsewhere. Even ElBardei wants an alliance with Hamas. Such a regime will not be friendly toward the Palestinian Authority or oppose Iranian expansionism (even though it might well hate Iran as Shi’ites).

And what will the effect be on the rest of the region? Everyone will know – Israel and moderate Arabs alike – that they cannot depend on the United States. Revolutionary Islamists would be emboldened to subvert Morocco and Tunisia, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. With an Islamist-ruled Lebanon (for all practical purposes, if only unofficially), Gaza Strip, Iran and Turkey, and with Syrian participation, what will happen in the Middle East?

The worst kind of disaster is one that isn’t recognized as such.

Again, this has nothing much to do whether Mubarak himself stays or not, and everything to do with whether the Egyptian regime stays or not.

The writer is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Analysis: The problems Egypt still faces

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The Egypt Crisis in a Global Context: A Special Report | STRATFOR

The Egypt Crisis in a Global Context: A Special Report
January 30, 2011 | 2253 GMT
By George Friedman


CHRIS HONDROS/Getty Images
Protesters wave the Egyptian flag in downtown Cairo on Jan. 30

Related Special Topic Page

• The Egypt Unrest: Full Coverage

It is not at all clear what will happen in the Egyptian revolution. It is not a surprise that this is happening. Hosni Mubarak has been president for more than a quarter of a century, ever since the assassination of Anwar Sadat. He is old and has been ill. No one expected him to live much longer, and his apparent plan, which was that he would be replaced by his son Gamal, was not going to happen even though it was a possibility a year ago. There was no one, save his closest business associates, who wanted to see Mubarak’s succession plans happen. As his father weakened, Gamal’s succession became even less likely. Mubarak’s failure to design a credible succession plan guaranteed instability on his death. Since everyone knew that there would be instability on his death, there were obviously those who saw little advantage to acting before he died. Who these people were and what they wanted is the issue.

Let’s begin by considering the regime. In 1952, Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser staged a military coup that displaced the Egyptian monarchy, civilian officers in the military, and British influence in Egypt. Nasser created a government based on military power as the major stabilizing and progressive force in Egypt. His revolution was secular and socialist. In short, it was a statist regime dominated by the military. On Nasser’s death, Anwar Sadat replaced him. On Sadat’s assassination, Hosni Mubarak replaced him. Both of these men came from the military as Nasser did. However their foreign policy might have differed from Nasser’s, the regime remained intact.

Guest Post: The CIA On Egypt's Economy, Financial Deregulation And Protest

January 31, 2011 01:15: CET

Subject:

Guest Post: The CIA On Egypt's Economy, Financial Deregulation And Protest

Source: zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero

Author: Tyler Durden

Submitted by Nomi Prins
The CIA on Egypt's Economy, Financial Deregulation and Protest

The ongoing demonstrations in Egypt are as much, if not more, about the mass deterioration of economic conditions and the harsh result of years of financial deregulation, than the political ideology that some of the media seems more focused on. Plus, as Mark Engler cross-posted on Alternet and Dissent yesterday, the notion that the protests in Cairo are 'spontaneous uprisings' misses the mark. As he eloquently wrote, "there are extraordinary moments when public demonstrations take on a mass character and people who would otherwise not have dreamed of taking part in an uprising rush onto the streets. But these protests are typically built upon years of organizing and preparation on the part of social movements."
That got me thinking about what else has been building up in Egypt under Mubarak's 29-year as President, but more specifically over the past decade, and in particular the years leading up to the world economic crisis catalyzed by the US banking system - and that would be, extreme financial deregulation and the increased influx of foreign banks, capital, and "investment" which tends to be a euphemism for "speculation" when it belies international funds looking for hot prospects, no matter what the costs to the local population.
According to the CIA's World Fact-book depiction of Egypt's economy, "Cairo from 2004 to 2008 aggressively pursued economic reforms to attract foreign investment and facilitate GDP growth." And, while that was happening, "Despite the relatively high levels of economic growth over the past few years, living conditions for the average Egyptian remain poor."
Unemployment in Egypt is hovering just below the 10% mark, like in the US, though similarly, this figure grossly underestimates underemployment, quality of employment, prospects for employment, and the growing youth population with a dismal job future. Nearly 20% of the country live below the poverty line (compared to 14% and growing in the US) and 10% of the population controls 28% of household income (compared to 30% in the US). But, these figures, as in the US, have been accelerating in ways that undermine financial security of the majority of the population, and have been doing so for more than have a decade.
Around 2005, Egypt decided to transform its financial system in order to increase its appeal as a magnet for foreign investment, notably banks and real estate speculators. Egypt reduced cumbersome bureaucracy and regulations around foreign property investment through decree (number 583.) International luxury property firms depicted the country as a mecca (of the tax-haven variety) for property speculation, a country offering no capital gains taxes on real estate transactions, no stamp duty, and no inheritance tax.
But, Egypt's more devastating economic transformation centered around its decision to aggressively sell off its national banks as a matter of foreign and financial policy between 2005 and early 2008 (around the time that US banks were stoking a global sub-prime and other forms-of-debt and leverage oriented crisis). Having opened its real estate to foreign investment and private equity speculation, the next step in the deregulation of the country's banks was spurring international bank takeovers complete with new bank openings, where international banks could begin plowing Egyptians for fees. Citigroup, for example, launched the first Cards reward program in 2005, followed by other banks.
According to an article in Executive Magazine in early 2007, which touted the competitive bidding, acquistion and rebranding of Egyptian banks by foreign banks and growth of foreign M&A action, the biggest bank deal of 2006 was the sale of one of the four largest state-run banks, Bank of Alexandria, to Italian bank, Gruppo Sanpaolo IMI. This, a much larger deal than the 70% acquisition by Greek's Piraeus Bank of the Egyptian Commercial Bank in 2005, one of the first deals to be blessed by the Central Bank of Egypt and the Ministry of Investment that unleashed the sale of Egypt's banking system to the highest international bidders.
The greater the pace of foreign bank influx and take-overs to 'modernize' Egypt's banking system, inevitably the more short-term, "hot" money poured into Egypt. Pieces of Egypt, or its companies, continued to be purchased by foreign conglomerates, trickling off when the global financial crisis brewed full force in 2008, though not before Goldman Sachs Strategic Investments Limited in the UK bought a $70 million chunk of Palm Hills Development SAE, a high-end real estate developer, in March, 2008.
When a country, among other shortcomings, relinquishes its financial system and its population's well-being to the pursuit of 'good deals', there is going to be substantial fallout. The citizens protesting in the streets of Greece, England, Tunisia, Egypt and anywhere else, may be revolting on a national basis against individual leaderships that have shafted them, but they have a common bond; they are revolting against a world besotted with benefiting the powerful and the deal-makers at the expense of ordinary people.

Prescient profile of Omar Suleiman from 2009 in FP: Egypt's Next Strongman FP_Magazine

Prescient profile of Omar Suleiman from 2009 in FP: Egypt's Next Strongman

Egypt's Next Strongman

Meet the two men most likely to succeed Egypt's aging president: His son, Gamal Mubarak, and his spy chief, Omar Suleiman. But does either one really represent desperately needed change?

BY ISSANDR AMRANI | AUGUST 17, 2009

Gamal Mubarak (left) and Omar Suleiman, the would-be heirs to b Egyptian presidency.

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak arrived in Washington today, bringing with him a large retinue of advisors, ministers, and assorted hangers-on. But only two of them really count, at least for those trying to figure out who will succeed one of the Middle East's longest-serving leaders.

The first is Mubarak's son Gamal, who is accompanying his father even though he has no formal position in the Egyptian government. (He is the assistant secretary-general of the ruling National Democratic Party, or NDP.) A more justified member of the entourage is Omar Suleiman, the head of Egypt's General Intelligence Service (GIS), known as the Mukhabarat.

Each has been touted for most of the past decade as a potential heir to the 81-year-old Mubarak, who has never appointed a vice president or publicly stated his preference for a successor. Most speculation in Egypt focuses on Gamal. His rise to political prominence earlier this decade spurred opposition figures to form the "Kefaya" movement, which rallies against both Mubaraks. But many well-informed Egyptians think the next president will come from the military -- and that the powerful Suleiman is the most likely candidate.

This is not a fringe sentiment. The prolonged fin de régime mood has unnerved many Egyptians, who worry that a Syrian-style inheritance-of-power scenario would usher in an era of instability. Many consider the prospect of such father-to-son nepotism humiliating for a country that has long claimed the mantle of Arab leadership. In this political environment -- in which democratic alternatives are locked out, but the population wants change -- Suleiman appears the only viable alternative to Gamal Mubarak. But who is this once-mysterious power player? And would he really mean a new era for Egypt?

Like the elder Mubarak, Suleiman rose to national prominence through the armed forces. The arc of his career followed the arc of Egypt's political history. He attended the Soviet Union's Frunze Military Academy in the 1960s -- as Mubarak did a few years earlier -- and became an infantryman. He then took part in the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, likely as a staff officer. When Cairo switched its strategic alliance from Moscow to Washington, he received training at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare School and Center at Fort Bragg, N.C., in the 1980s. Suleiman continues to have privileged contacts with U.S. intelligence and military officials, with whom he has now been dealing for at least a quarter-century.

As the head of the Mukhabarat, Suleiman's political and military portfolio is vast. The GIS combines the intelligence-gathering elements of the CIA, the counterterrorism role of the FBI, the protection duties of the Secret Service, and the high-level diplomacy of the State Department. It also includes some functions unique to authoritarian regimes, such as monitoring Egypt's security apparatus for signs of internal coups. It is an elite institution, with a long reach inside government as well as abroad. It also crosses over the civilian and military worlds: Suleiman is one of a rare group of Egyptian officials who hold both a military rank (lieutenant general) and a civilian office (he is a cabinet minister, though he rarely attends meetings).

Traditionally, the identity of the head of the GIS is kept secret. But after 2001, when Suleiman began to take over key dossiers from the Foreign Ministry, his name and photograph began appearing in Al-Ahram, the staid government-owned daily. He even appeared on the top half of the front page, a space usually reserved for Mubarak. Since then, his high-profile assignments have garnered high-profile coverage. He has intervened in civil wars in Sudan, patched up the tiff between Saudi King Abdullah and Libyan leader Muammar el-Qaddafi over the latter's alleged attempt to assassinate the former, and put pressure on Syria to stop meddling in Lebanon and to dissociate itself from Iran.

Most importantly, Suleiman has mediated in the Israel-Palestine conflict, Egypt's most pressing national security priority. Since the June 2007 Hamas takeover of Gaza, Cairo has acted as an interlocutor and mediator between Hamas and Fatah. Although its attempts to reconcile the two groups have led to few clear victories -- in part, perhaps, because Egypt is clearly hostile to the Islamists -- its foreign policy has won the approval of the United States and the European Union.

Hamas' taking control of Gaza was a major setback for Suleiman, whose agents had, until that point, played an important role in the territory. His attempts at Palestinian reconciliation, which petered out by December 2008, were also unsuccessful, prompting some diplomats to wonder if his reputation was undeserved. But since last winter's Gaza war, Suleiman has regained standing. Egypt emerged out of that conflict once again with its role confirmed as an essential mediator in the Middle East peace process. Indeed, Suleiman is now arguably the region's most important troubleshooter -- Foreign Policy recently listed him as one of the most powerful spooks in the Middle East.

It isn't surprising, then, that he is so often described as a likely successor to Mubarak, who is showing increasingly signs of frailty. Every president of Egypt since 1952 has been a senior military officer, and the military remains, by most measures, the most powerful institution in Egypt.

Publicly, Suleiman has started to gain endorsements for the job from Egyptians across the political spectrum as the increasingly public discussion plays out of who will follow Mubarak. A leftist leader of the Kefaya movement, Abdel Halim Qandil, has urged the military to save the country from a Mubarak dynasty. The liberal intellectual Osama Ghazali Harb -- a former Gamal acolyte who turned to the opposition and founded the National Democratic Front party -- has openly advocated a military takeover followed by a period of "democratic transition." Hisham Kassem, head of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, also has stated that a Suleiman presidency would be vastly preferable to another Mubarak one. On Facebook, Twitter, and blogs, partisans of a Suleiman presidency make the same argument, often seemingly driven as much by animosity toward the Mubaraks as admiration for the military man.

But amendments made in 2005 and 2007 to the Egyptian Constitution's provisions for presidential elections might have rendered Suleiman's candidacy moot. Active-duty military officers are not allowed membership in political parties, meaning Suleiman would have to retire before running. Then, candidates must be members of their party's highest internal body for at least one year before the election, a significant obstacle for Suleiman. Plus, it is virtually impossible for independent candidates to run; to get on the ballot, candidates must garner the support of numerous elected officials, most of whom are NDP members and presumably loyal to Gamal Mubarak. And, finally, the NDP is a powerful electoral machine, closely connected to security services at the local and national level.

In other words, most Suleiman supporters recognize that to gain the presidency he would most likely have to carry out a coup -- perhaps a soft, constitutional one, but a coup nonetheless. (It is possible, one analyst told me, that "the day Mubarak dies there will be tanks on the street.") Strange though it sounds, many Egyptians would find such a coup acceptable. The amendments to the Constitution were broadly viewed as illegitimate, and the regime's standing may be at an all-time low.

Such a coup would prove more problematic for Egypt's foreign allies. Washington would likely be embarrassed by the rise of a new strongman, particularly after nearly a decade of fanfare around democracy promotion in Egypt. But what would the United States do about it, particularly if the plotters were pro-American and the strongman broadly supported?

Other scenarios are possible, of course. Gamal Mubarak could successfully make his bid for the presidency and keep Suleiman in place -- perhaps as the power behind the throne, or simply a guarantor of the military's corporate interests. Some previously unknown military figure could emerge as a contender. Or Hosni Mubarak could hang on to power, running again in 2011 at the ripe old age of 83. (Suleiman will be 75.)

Lost in this Egyptian Kremlinology is the fact that neither Gamal Mubarak nor Omar Suleiman presents a clear departure from the present state of affairs. Neither offers the new social contract that so many of Egypt's 80 million citizens are demanding in strikes and protests. The prevalence of the Gamal vs. Omar debate, more than anything, highlights the low expectations ordinary Egyptians have for a democratic succession to Hosni Mubarak's 28-year reign. Those low expectations come with their own quiet tyranny, too.

.

Mubarak: Anwar Amro/AFP/Getty Images; Suleiman: Hussein Hussein/PPO/Getty Images

Issandr Amrani is an independent journalist and political analyst based in Cairo. He blogs at www.arabist.net.

Foreign Policy (@FP_Magazine) 1/29/11 4:31 PM RT @blakehounshell Prescient profile of Omar Suleiman from 2009 in FP: Egypt's Next Strongman http://bit.ly/gwrAD0

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