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Showing posts with label Mexico. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mexico. Show all posts

Thursday, April 14, 2016

#Mexico has world's 11th-highest GDP based on PPP. As Europe weakens, it will be in the top 10 @johnfmauldin

Mexico as a Major Power

March 14, 2016

This from Mauldin Economics



Mexico has the 11th-highest GDP in the world based
on purchasing power parity, according to the International Monetary
Fund. As Europe weakens, it will be in the top 10 in the not-too-distant
future. Yet, this country is regarded by many Americans as a Third
World nation, dominated by drug cartels and impoverished people
desperate to get into the United States.

While it is true that organized crime exists in Mexico and
that many Mexicans want to immigrate to the US, a roughly equal number
are leaving the US and returning to Mexico… drawn by economic
opportunities in their home country. The largest auto plant in the
Western Hemisphere is in Mexico, and Bombardier builds major components
for aircraft there. Mexico has many problems, of course, but so does the
U.K. (the 10th-largest economy) and Italy (12th).

No one would be surprised by the U.K. or Italy rankings, but many
people would be stunned to find that Mexico is ranked right up with
them. Obviously, Mexico is not as developed as Britain is. Like most
nations transitioning from underdevelopment to greater development,
Mexico suffers from substantial class and regional inequality, and the
emergence of a dominant middle class is still unfolding.

At the same time, Italy also has substantial regional inequality.
Mexico can't aspire to British standards, but Italy is a reasonable
model. Inequality diminishes the significance of being 11th in some
ways, but it doesn't change the basic reality of Mexico’s relative
strength.

Mexico is commonly perceived, far too simplistically, as a Third
World country with a general breakdown of law and a population seeking
to flee north. That perception is also common among many Mexicans, who
seem to have internalized the contempt in which they are held.

Mexicans know that their country’s economy grew 2.5 percent last year
and is forecast to grow between 2 percent and 3 percent in 2016—roughly
equal to the growth projection for the US economy.  But, oddly, they
tend to discount the significance of Mexico’s competitive growth numbers
in a sluggish global economy.

Here, therefore, we have an interesting phenomenon. Mexico is, in
fact, one of the leading economies of the world, yet most people don’t
recognize it as such and tend to dismiss its importance.



Read the rest of the article here: Mexico as a Major Power



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Tuesday, November 3, 2015

#LatinAmerica: after a decade of budgets and politics buoyed by high commodity prices, the raw realities of geopolitics are back with a vengeance.

An excellent analysis from Stratfor on the future political landscape shape in Latin America. 

The New Latin America

By Reggie Thompson

Several years into a Chinese economic slowdown, the Latin American economies that relied on China to buy up their key exports are feeling the pain. With less hard currency coming in, governments across the region are rapidly readjusting their spending plans and preparing to govern in an environment in which they will have fewer resources to secure their key constituents' political loyalties.

The Role of Geography

Ever since commodity prices began dropping several years ago, much has been written about how slow economic growth and potential political instability will plague Latin America in coming years. But what will Latin America as a whole look like in a decade as a result of the Chinese economic downturn? What ideologies will dominate in a continent that over the past decade veered toward leftist populism? And what issues will define its relationship with the United States, the hemisphere's undisputed hegemon?

The region's geopolitics hold the beginning of an answer. The first step is to view Latin America's geographic regions and countries as a series of divided islands rather than a united entity. Unlike Western Europe, where the relative absence of natural obstacles eventually gave rise to interconnected political entities, South America is bisected by the dense Amazon rainforest and divided lengthwise by the nearly insurmountable Andean mountain range. Latin American colonies were divided even before the collapse of the Spanish Empire in the Americas more than two centuries ago. After independence, this disconnected geographic landscape created dozens of economies of wildly varying sizes often more linked by trade with partners outside the region than with each other. With few unbroken expanses of arable land and high transport costs across the forests and mountains, Latin America was simply not in a position to create capital on the scale of the United States or Western Europe. Consequently, even major Latin American states such as Brazil or Mexico remain highly reliant on inflows of cash from abroad to keep their economies afloat and rely on exports to China or the United States for a significant part of their foreign trade.

  

Unsurprisingly, the goal of forming institutions that can provide lasting political and economic unity has eluded Latin American statesmen. Numerous attempts have been made to unite the fractious region: Simon Bolivar's ill-fated 19th-century bid to unite South America, a similar attempt at uniting the Central American states into a federation and the more recent creation of separate economic blocs in Latin America. Yet the isolation created by geographic barriers has foiled leaders' attempts to unite the region's countries into a real economic or political union on the scale of the European Union or even the North American Free Trade Agreement. In recent history, the closest that Latin American states came to some sort of unity — besides regional trading blocs such as the Common Market of the South and the Pacific Alliance — was the wave of leftist populist governments that swept the continent beginning in the early 2000s. But after a decade of budgets and politics buoyed by high commodity prices, the raw realities of geopolitics are back with a vengeance.

The Shape of Governments to Come

We cannot define the exact nature of the national governments that will emerge during the next decade; short-term actions are less predictable than long-term trends, and attempting to forecast which people or parties will lead countries such as Brazil after its 2018 elections or Venezuela after its presidential election in 2019 is very risky. However, we have a rough idea of the shape these governments will take. With less revenue available to pacify restive populations, the new governments will likely be more economically pragmatic than their predecessors. This is not to say that populism as a means of governance in Latin America will subside; rather, rulers are likely to take more care in how they relate to their voters and the outside world.

Because the region is so dependent on foreign capital for continued economic growth, and because states' export revenues are so depleted (in Bolivia, for example, export revenue is down by nearly a third compared with last year), leaders are more likely to refrain from mass nationalizations or hostility to foreign companies. During the past decade, leftist governments seized numerous private assets in disputes with private firms. Except for extreme cases such as Venezuela  — which, because of its default risk, economic problems and past expropriations, is already de facto cut off from most foreign lending and many investments — most states will likely now try to encourage investments rather than scare them off. Consequently, Latin America is likely entering an era in which the grand populist gestures of the past decade will no longer yield the same results as before and can, in fact, be counterproductive for leaders trying to restart their faltering economies.

The weakening of the Latin American left is another factor that will shape the coming decade. In the next 10 years, the governments that came to power during the boom times will reach the end of their tenures. The list of states that will evolve from leftist administrations into some other type of government is lengthy. Venezuela will reach the painful point of reckoning in which its ruling United Socialist Party will split apart. And as the party splits, Venezuela will undergo a painful economic restructuring and a political shift away from extreme populism. In Ecuador, leftist President Rafael Correa may not secure even another four-year term. In Bolivia, low export prices for natural gas will put President Evo Morales' ability to secure another decade in office to the test.

Perhaps the only exception will be Colombia, where a possible peace deal with rebel groups could bring the left into the national fold, which could lead other parties to co-opt more leftist ideas. But even Cuba, long the bastion of Latin America's left and its ideological center, will eventually move into the United States' political orbit, likely in exchange for the lifting of the five-decade trade embargo.

The left's decline will give the United States an exceptionally benign climate for managing its relationships and priorities to the south. To be sure, longstanding concerns — such as trade, drug trafficking and illegal migration — guiding the United States' actions in much of Latin America will remain. But the bumper crop of leftist states that were often minor hindrances to U.S. political moves in the region will become less of a factor in the next decade. Washington's new priorities in the region, such as cushioning Venezuela's economic collapse and bringing Cuba into some sort of improved trade relationship, will occupy the United States' time.

Of the states currently undergoing deep economic downturns, several seem poised to make a resurgence. Mexico is an outlier, given than it is so linked to the United States through trade. But those links will ensure that despite problematic public finances, Mexico will remain a major force in Latin American economic growth. For Peru and Colombia, international trade will drop over the next several years, but their stable public finances will likely ensure some degree of social stability. And even Brazil, in the midst of a massive corruption scandal at Petrobras, will ride out the crisis due to its strong (albeit currently strained) domestic manufacturing base and sheer economic size.

Re-Emerging Differences

The rampant populism of the past 15 years — bolstered by rapidly increasing exports to hungry markets abroad — imposed a false appearance of unity among the Latin American leftist states. Superficially, Nestor Kirchner's Argentina appeared to have much in common with Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, even though both countries' individual geographic and political characteristics ultimately dictated the governments' decisions. With the rise of another leftist bloc unlikely in the next decade, the divided nature of Latin America will again become evident.

And the continent's divided nature means that the shortcomings of international bodies there, such as the Common Market of the South (Mercosur) and the Union of South American Nations (Unasur), will become even more self-evident. For example, Brasilia will use Mercosur to do what is in its own immediate benefit: increase trade links with Latin American states outside its immediate neighborhood, such as Mexico. But truly lucrative deals, such as a Mercosur-European Union trade agreement, will remain just out of reach because they require full approval of all the group's members. Mercosur's other key member, Argentina, opposes any such deals lest they harm its domestic industry. Consequently, Brazil will continue looking for small bilateral deals, but it will continue to be hamstrung by Mercosur. Unasur, on the other hand, which was originally conceived of as a sort of South American United Nations, is highly unlikely to progress beyond a regional body that meets a couple of times a year. It is not that there is no political will in Latin America to push toward greater unity, but unlike the European Union, such bodies cannot be superimposed onto a region whose trade ties and key political relationships are focused toward other continents rather than each other.

The next decade will bring with it some political and economic continuity. The region will maintain its fundamental relationship with the rest of the globe, in which its foreign trade is overwhelmingly skewed toward the export of raw materials and its economies are heavily reliant on foreign capital markets. But deeper internal changes are already in motion, and the states of the region will change accordingly. The parties at the helm of these states will be different, and the way these parties relate with the outside world on a political and economic level will be undeniably different. Over the next 10 years, the shortcomings of extreme reliance on the Chinese economy will spur cost-cutting and domestic economic diversification. The trappings of the Cold War will fade in Latin America as leaders are replaced and political institutions evolve, but the new Latin America will continue to be more defined by its divisions than by any idea of unity.


"<a href="https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/new-latin-america">The New Latin America</a> is republished with permission of Stratfor."
The New Latin America | Stratfor





Saturday, October 23, 2010

Mexican Authorities Burn 134 Tons of Seized Marijuana - NYTimes.com

October 21, 2010

Marijuana Bonfire Celebrates a Fragile Calm

TIJUANA, Mexico — It is now the city safe enough for an Al Gore speech.
Indeed, Tijuana has become a place, in the narrative of federal and local officials, not only where the former vice president of the United States can attend a business conference, as he did earlier this month, but where the drug cartels are on the run.
Human remains are no longer discovered partly dissolved in chemicals; shootouts in broad daylight are rare; and local, state and federal law enforcement work so closely that they celebrated this week over the destruction of the largest load of marijuana — 134 metric tons, or about 150 United States tons — ever seized in the country.
“Citizens of Tijuana should be proud of the authorities and the armed forces,” said Gen. Alfonso Duarte Múgica, regional commander of the army, as the seized marijuana erupted in flames and smoke after soldiers set it ablaze.
But the question on the minds of many here is whether this is a fragile peace, or even peace at all.
It is true that this is not 2008, when the headlines reflected a sense of mayhem and out-of-control violence that led to 843 killings, a record high in this city of 1.6 million people across the border from San Diego.
Yet the body count this year stands at 639, on pace to match or exceed the 695 of last year.
“The only thing that has changed is you don’t see spectacular murders in the middle of the city,” said Victor Clark-Alfaro, a visiting professor from Tijuana at San Diego State University who has studied drug violence for years. “The elite feel more safe, but in the neighborhoods where drug dealers and addicts are dying, people do not feel any more safe,” he added.
Questions have also been raised about the hard-line tactics of the police and military here. Human Rights Watch, in a letter to President Felipe Calderón last month, urged him to investigate abuses at the hands of the authorities here, including more than 100 cases in the past year in which the group said people were taken to military bases and tortured into making confessions.
“Tijuana is anything but a model for an effective public security operation,” the letter said.
The police chief here, Julián Leyzaola, an army veteran who has been photographed kicking the body of a gunman believed responsible for killing a police officer, has remained unapologetic, saying a tough line is just what the town needs to clean up its police force and take on organized crime.
He beamed at an elaborate ceremony on Thursday, complete with a military band, bused-in dignitaries, and ample national and international coverage, to burn the tons of marijuana seized earlier in the week.
It was a spectacle meant as much to send a message to the traffickers as to reassure an anxious public of success, any success.
“This was a strike at the structure of this criminal group,” Chief Leyzaola said.
And for a moment at least, residents like Juan Alberto, 21, a law school student who watched the burning ceremony at the invitation of a professor, felt a measure of calm.
“I have felt a little safe these past few months,” Mr. Alberto said. “But I know things can change quickly.
Shopping centers are busy and bars and restaurants are slowly filling again, though American tourists remain scarce.
People go to work and school, and young people are venturing out, though with some trepidation.
“It is getting better, certainly better than a couple of years ago when everybody was afraid,” said Paula Cruz, 20.
Civic leaders have been anxious to put on the city’s best face.
The two-week Tijuana Innovadora conference, intended to stoke investment, concluded Thursday after speeches by Mr. Gore; the co-founder of Twitter, Biz Stone; the co-founder of Wikipedia, Jimmy Wales; Mr. Calderón; and others.
But as if to remind the public of the drug war never far away, two decapitated bodies were found hanging from a bridge, and four young men were killed, both discoveries several miles from the conference.
David A. Shirk, who researches criminal justice in Mexico as the director of the Trans-Border Institute at the University of San Diego, said Tijuana might simply be in a lull while gangs regroup.
He noted that the authorities claimed success both when violence was high, as a sign of destabilization among criminal organizations, and when it was low, as a mark of criminal activity being kept under control.
The violence tends to ebb and flow with little explanation, Mr. Shirk added, as one group gains strength or cuts deals with the police while others fall out of favor or lose ground.
The conventional wisdom is that the gruesome shows of violence decreased after the arrest in January of Teodoro Eduardo García Simental, a kingpin known as El Teo who, among other crimes, was accused of having the bodies of scores of enemies dissolved in vats of chemicals.
Still, the bottom line, Mr. Shirk said, was that the marijuana seizure would not greatly affect the drug market and that “even with 134 tons, there is no sign the flow of drugs into the United States has abated.”
A United States Justice Department report this year said marijuana production in Mexico had increased 59 percent since 2003. The report attributed the increase in production to a 48 percent decrease in eradication efforts over the last four years.
The decrease in crop destruction “is the result of the Mexican military’s focus on antiviolence measures rather than illicit crop cultivation,” the report said.
Alejandro Poiré, the Mexican government’s chief spokesman on security, said in a recent interview that it had and would continue to make big seizures.
The seizure of the big marijuana haul, which occurred Sunday and was announced Monday, came about after the local police happened on a convoy and were fired upon.
They, along with the state police and the military, eventually found three tractor-trailers and a smaller truck in an industrial neighborhood near the border, raising the question of how such a large load could have eluded police and military checkpoints leading into Tijuana from the interior, where most of the marijuana is grown.
The 15,300 bales were tightly wrapped in plastic and aluminum foil, with some labeled “yoyo,” “dog” or “wolf,” or bearing the smiling image of Homer Simpson, apparent branding or labels for drug distributors in the United States.
It will take two days to burn it all.


Mexican Authorities Burn 134 Tons of Seized Marijuana - NYTimes.com

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Wednesday, July 21, 2010

Mexico politics: New minister, same challenges EIU ViewsWire






Mexico politics: New minister, same challenges - EIU ViewsWire



FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT


It ís one of the toughest jobs in Mexico's government: the interior, or government, secretary is responsible for public security as well as domestic political strategy and relations with Congress. It is traditionally viewed to be the most powerful post after the presidency, and a springboard to the top job. Yet President Felipe CalderÛn has named his fourth interior minister in four years, suggesting that the job has proved overwhelming and that the presidentís support base within his own party is growing shaky, in an environment of escalating violence and difficult political challenges. This increases the risk that Mr CalderÛn will be able to accomplish little in what remains of his term.


Mr CalderÛn replaced his previous interior secretary (ìsecretario de gobernaciÛnî), Fernando GÛmez Mont, on July 14th with the relatively unknown JosÈ Francisco Blake, a senior official from the ruling Partido AcciÛn Nacional (PAN) in the government of Baja California state. Mr GÛmez had been named to the post in 2008, after the sudden death of Juan Camilo MouriÒo, one of Mr CalderÛnís closest allies. But Mr GÛmez became highly unpopular because of the ever-growing drug violence in the country, which has taken more than 26,000 lives since the president launched his anti-crime offensive in December 2006. Mr GÛmez also angered many Mexicans by downplaying the worsening drug war and its impact.


He also raised hackles for opposing the conservative PANís strategy of allying with the leftist Partido de la RevoluciÛn Democr·tica (PRD) in some races before the July 4th local and gubernatorial elections. That strategy proved effective in slowing the momentum of the leading opposition party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). Mr GÛmez quit the PAN earlier this year in protest at the deal making between the PAN and the PRD, and this seems to have triggered his downfall.


Unstoppable violence


Mr Blake is picking up the portfolio at a time when criminal violence is reaching new heights. This year Mexico is on track to post another record of drug-related deaths, and the incidents are growing bolder by the day. On July 18th gunmen attacked people at a birthday party in the city of TorreÛn, killing 17. This followed a car bomb days earlier in Cuidad Ju·rez that killed four, the first attack of this kind in Mexico. The surge in deaths this year is worrying not only Mexicans, but increasingly officials in Washington.


Mr Blake seems to have had some relevant experience in combating organised crime in Baja California, but whether he can boost confidence in his office and the drug war nationwide is questionable, as the tools he has to work with are weak. Consequently, few believe the violence will end anytime soon. It will be difficult to make significant progress in important areas that need addressing, such as overhauling the corrupt police force and making the weak judiciary more effective, during what remains of the administrationís term (through December 2012), although some reforms in these areas have advanced.


Structural reforms stalled


Although Mr Blake brings some experience in the security area, as an unknown politician on the national level he will be handicapped in fulfilling another crucial part of the job. As interior secretary he is the most important political figure in the cabinet, charged with leading negotiations with opposition parties to advance the governmentís legislative agenda. This, too, will be a tall order in the next two years. Some critics fear that Mr Blake is simply another close friend of the president, and will not be up to the task.


The CalderÛn administration was able to secure some fiscal, pension and other reforms, albeit watered-down ones, in the first half of his term. But its agenda has stalled since the PAN was weakened in mid-term congressional elections last year. On the list of priorities are additional fiscal changes to boost Mexicoís low tax take, liberalisation of labour laws and reforms to allow more private investment into the state-controlled oil industry.


The agenda is ambitious, and legislative progress will be even more difficult as the 2012 presidential elections approach. The PRIónow the dominant party in the lower house of Congressówill be loath to co-operate with the government as it positions itself to regain the presidency (which it lost in 2000 after 71 years of uninterrupted rule). Further tax adjustments probably have the best chance of passage, given Mexicoís fiscal needs, but changes to labour laws and the stateís monopoly control of the oil sector have dim prospects.


Economy minister replaced


In another cabinet shift that investors hope will result in more positive results, Mr CalderÛn named Bruno Ferrari, until now head of ProMÈxico, an investment promotion office set up at the start of the current governmentís term, to the post of economy secretary. He replaces Gerardo Ruiz Mateos, who returns to being a top presidential advisor. The change indicates that the administration recognises the need to improve Mexicoís reputation after last yearís dismal economic performance, when the economy contracted by more than 6%. Mr Ferrariís experience should help support Mexicoís economic recovery and bring investorsí focus back on to the fact that growth has resumed. However, Mr Ferrariís effectiveness in his new role remains to be seen, as ProMÈxico has not been terribly effective in combating Mexicoís deteriorating image abroad of late.


Yet financial markets seem to have applauded Mr Ferrariís appointment: in its wake Mexicoís bond prices rose for several days, suggesting confidence that he will be able to attract more foreign investment.


Nonetheless, better investor, and popular, confidence will require more than just a cabinet shuffle at the top. Indeed, the latest changes are probably more a sign of the administrationís weaknesses at this point in its term than of its strengths. Mr CalderÛnís authority is likely to be increasingly undermined not only by the PANís reduced clout in Congress and the growing boldness of the opposition PRI, but also by the growing popular misgivings about the effectiveness of his government's military offensive against organised crime. Even with more than two years left to his term, he is looking ever more the lame duck.
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The Economist Intelligence Unit
Source: ViewsWire

Sunday, May 30, 2010

Slouching to Populism - The American


Slouching to Populism

Friday, March 20, 2009
Embattled democrats in Latin America read the State Department’s reticence as weakness and indifference.
Those of us who have worked to promote democracy in Latin America have seen our share of disappointment in the choices voters in the region are making at the ballot box—topped off by last Sunday’s results from El Salvador.
Why are we worried? In 1998, Venezuelans handed the presidency over to a trash-talking lieutenant colonel who led a bloody coup only six years earlier. Bolivians gave an unprecedented margin of victory in 2005 to a candidate who had a role in the violent overthrow of two preceding presidents. Nicaraguans elected a former dictator president in 2006. Ecuadoreans forced several presidents from office and, in 2006, elected a man who promised to uproot the political order.
One would like to think that the undemocratic way in which Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, Daniel Ortega, and Rafael Correa have run their respective countries would have been a cautionary tale to our friends in El Salvador. Alas, last Sunday, voters in that Central American country—arguably the United States’ best friend in the hemisphere—chose as their president the front man of a communist rebel group whose members have killed U.S. servicemen, are allied with terrorist groups, and celebrated the 9/11attacks. It remains to be seen whether El Salvador’s new president, Mauricio Funes, keeps his pledge to govern moderately or is overwhelmed by the leftist extremists who really run his party.
Followers of the rightist ruling party in El Salvador have not had time to reflect on what they accomplished for their people after 20 years in power. Indeed, they negotiated an end to a bloody civil war, implemented the peace accords, and will preside over their nation’s first peaceful transfer of power to an opposition party since that war. Candidates campaigned freely. U.N. peacekeepers were not required to patrol the streets. An independent media (from whence the opposition candidate, Funes, came) criticized both parties with vigor. National electoral observers monitored an orderly, tranquil process. An impartial electoral council published the results, which the losing candidate accepted without rancor, within several hours of the last ballot being cast.
A majority of Salvadorans decided that two decades with one party in power was plenty. The impact of crime on personal security is a nagging problem in a country that is home to the region’s nastiest gang, Mara Salvatrucha. The ruling party candidate’s stint as public security chief apparently left some voters underwhelmed. After years grappling with spiraling energy costs, El Salvador’s dollarized economy was hit hard by the recent U.S. economic crisis and the drop in remittances from migrants, which are that country’s largest source of hard currency. And, after a spirited campaign, the opposition candidate touting moderate change scored a narrow victory. So be it.
That is the way democracy is supposed to work. Democrats from Mexico to Chile to Brazil to the United States take that sort of process for granted. We each have our share of extraordinary challenges, but, as long as we sort them out democratically, we assume that things are going to be just fine.
Over the past several years, representative democracy has empowered people in Latin America who had been locked out of power; it also uncorked class tensions and unrequited demands that weak democratic institutions and poor states were hard-pressed to confront. Market reforms and trade produced economic growth, but in the absence of accountable and representative institutions, the poor majority saw themselves losing ground to privileged elites. So, it is no surprise to see a ruling party or an entire political class upended at the ballot box.
Does this mean that democracy is working? Well, yes and no.
For example, competitive (and even extraordinarily close) elections in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and elsewhere have ushered in strong governments with mandates to tackle serious problems. When leaders on the left or right win elections and set out to govern democratically, institutions gain credibility and strength.
In a handful of countries, elected caudillos (strongmen) have abused the power they gained through the ballot to tear down the democratic institutions that are vital to dealing with dissent, settling disputes, or producing a consensus to confront the corrosive problems that are far too common in these weak states. As a result, entire nations find themselves depending on the whims of authoritarian populists.
The results are objectively negative. Bolivia’s Morales has mugged his country’s judicial and political systems to ram through sweeping constitutional reforms. Correa is working from an eerily similar playbook in Ecuador. In Nicaragua, Ortega has stolen local elections that observers say were won by the opposition, and last week he hinted at changing the “unjust” ban on his reelection. Venezuela’s Chavez is in a class by himself, using a series of progressively more bogus elections to wrest absolute control over the national assembly, courts, national oil company, central bank, electoral council, etc. When he loses an election, he usually lies about the result. In response to opposition victories last November in Caracas and several important states, Chavez plans to appoint a new vice president to supersede these local authorities, whom he already has stripped of all revenue and power.
Chavez has used his petrodollars to bankroll acolytes throughout the region who share his vision and casual attitudes about democracy and the rule of law. Although he is bound to lose influence in the region and popularity at home as the price of oil dips, the damage is done. He has politicized the military and militarized politics so that he will never again have to pretend to win an election if that suits him.
So, why do we care? Beyond the fact that genuine democracy is an inherent good that produces more just societies and political stability, we have other interests at stake. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have rejected cooperation with U.S. anti-drug efforts and have given safe haven, political backing, or financial support to a narcoterrorist group battling our ally, Colombia. The loss in El Salvador eliminates a key friend in a region beset by illicit drug trafficking displaced by Mexico’s stepped-up counternarcotics campaign. No other Central American nation has the security resources or the political will to confront this deadly threat. As economies deteriorate and people flee political unrest or drug-related violence, the flood of refugees northward will spell big trouble for Mexico and the United States.
There may be little the United States can do to reverse this dangerous trend in the region. Indeed, American diplomats have calculated that publicly defending democratic values will merely provoke our enemies. Well, the fact is our enemies are doing fine; it is our friends we should worry about. It is tragic that embattled democrats in the region read the State Department’s reticence as weakness and indifference.
President Barack Obama can begin to turn things around as he looks across the table at a handful of troublemakers at the Summit of the Americas next month in Trinidad and Tobago. He should do his fair share of listening to our friends in the region, but he can crib from his inaugural address for a ready-made message for opponents of the United States and our values:
We will not apologize for our way of life, nor will we waver in its defense…. To those leaders around the globe who seek to sow conflict, or blame their society’s ills on the West—know that your people will judge you on what you can build, not what you destroy. To those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side of history; but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist.
Words are not enough, but these words—laden with values and resolve—will serve to remind everyone what is at stake and where we stand in the Americas.
Roger F. Noriega was a senior official in the State Department from 2001 to 2005. He is a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and managing director of Vision Americas LLC, a Washington advocacy firm that represents U.S. and foreign governments and companies.
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