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Showing posts with label Corruption. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Corruption. Show all posts

Tuesday, October 27, 2015

The Anatomy of Anti #Corruption @Stratfor

The Anatomy of Anti-Corruption | Stratfor
An excellent analysis from Stratfor on the resurgence of anti-corruption probes throughout the world. 

"A question that has received far less attention is what fuels the anti-corruption engine. What is giving new anti-corruption bodies around the world the space and courage to act now? There is of course no single answer, but a closer examination traces these actions back to declining growth rates, internal political competition and encouragement from larger outside powers seeking their own geopolitical gains."

The Anatomy of Anti-Corruption

By Reva Bhalla
The tradition of abusing political power for personal gain goes back to antiquity, as does the debate over whether corruption is a necessary cultural vice in a country's development or a cancer that must be obliterated for a society to progress. A topic less covered, however, is what is behind the counter-corruption current.
In the past year or so, a striking number of scandals have been exposed, anti-corruption campaigns launched, probes deepened and leaders toppled over corruption charges. Brazil's state-run oil giant Petrobras, now the most indebted company in the world, is at the center of the biggest corruption scandal in the country's history; dozens of business executives and politicians, including the heads of the upper and lower houses of Brazil's legislature and Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, are under investigation. In Mexico, President Enrique Pena Nieto has been heavily scrutinized for granting big contracts to companies that also sold him houses on favorable terms and for abruptly canceling a contract with a Chinese-led consortium for a high-speed rail contract over corruption allegations, as well as after the brazen escape of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman from federal prison. In Guatemala, a U.S.-backed anti-corruption investigative committee forced the resignation of President Otto Perez Molina, while in Honduras, another U.S.-led anti-corruption investigation has taken down one of the country's wealthiest and most politically connected families.
In Zurich, a U.S. and Swiss investigation has brought down on bribery charges the once untouchable Sepp Blatter, who headed FIFA, the global governing body for soccer. Elsewhere in Europe, Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta is barely holding onto his seat while standing trial for tax evasion and money laundering. And an already fragile government in neighboring Moldova could fall any day now as mass protests persist over more than $1 billion that suspiciously vanished from the country's three largest banks.
Further east, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is working every institutional lever he can to neutralize corruption charges against himself, his son and a group of former ministers before he faces off against a vengeful opposition in a second round of elections. Chinese President Xi Jinping's sweeping anti-corruption probe is surging ahead after rounding up the biggest tiger yet, former security czar and former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang and his network of powerful allies. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak is facing a series of no-confidence votes following allegations that the state development fund had deposited $700 million in his personal bank account.
Meanwhile, foreign investors and Nigerians alike are waiting for action after Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari came to power with the promise of pursuing an aggressive anti-corruption campaign. In a desperate attempt to defuse mass street protests, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi launched a sweeping anti-corruption campaign that does away with sectarian-allotted government posts.
The list could go on, but the trend is discernable: Around the globe, and under a variety of circumstances, the momentum to expose and crush corruption appears to be building. Even the most presumably immune members of the political elite in many countries have to watch their backs much more carefully than before.
The question then becomes why. We could assume that the world is collectively cleaning up its act and that international bodies promoting good governance and investigative reporters, aided by social media distribution channels, are having more success in mobilizing the public to demand more from their leaders. But nothing is that simple. Even in the list of cases cited above, there are great differences in each country's stage of economic growth, internal political climate and geopolitical circumstances.

The Roots of Corruption

A lot of scholarly thinking has been devoted to what drives corruption, what mitigates its corrosive effects and what role (for better or for worse) corruption plays in a country's economic development. A developmental economic approach would lament the "resource curse" afflicting countries that are overly dependent on extractive industries when large amounts of money taken in by state-owned firms is easily funneled into the pockets of a small political elite. A sociological approach would emphasize the differences between cultures and how they perceive corruption. For example, the West looks down on the tribal tradition of handing out positions to one's brother or cousin, but there are parts of the world where entrusting one's business to a stranger would be considered outright reckless.
Geopolitics will tell you that countries that are physically difficult to govern will be more prone to bribery. If a country is internally fragmented by its geographic features, allowing for the development of distinct cultures and sects that need to be brought under some form of central rule, then patronage-building will likely be an ingrained practice of the government and will be difficult, if not impossible, to root out.
Samuel Huntington, a revered political scientist who died in 2008, would stress that the taming of corruption and the rise of political order all comes down to institutions. If institutions are too beholden to the political ego of the day, then a wide gap between the political elite and the civil society will result, leaving ample room for a culture of impunity to develop at the top. From Huntington's point of view, the style of government (for example, a liberal democracy) is not a prerequisite for effective governance; rather, the degree of government — and thus the strength of its institutions — will chart a country's path toward growth or decay. Huntington even postulated that corruption could actually compensate for weak rule of law and provide an alternative path to growth when a country becomes bloated with bureaucracy. In other words, corruption will at least get things done in countries where the formal channels of government simply do not work.
A question that has received far less attention is what fuels the anti-corruption engine. What is giving new anti-corruption bodies around the world the space and courage to act now? There is of course no single answer, but a closer examination traces these actions back to declining growth rates, internal political competition and encouragement from larger outside powers seeking their own geopolitical gains.

Anti-Corruption in Action

This part of the discussion focuses on a selection of countries: Turkey, Brazil, China, Mexico, India and Indonesia. Each has experienced dramatic economic growth since the early 2000s, and each of those growth stories has been heavily tainted by corruption.
The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators include "Control of Corruption" as one of the core variables to measure governance in countries. Drawn from a compilation of sources that measure everything from perception of corruption through surveys to anti-corruption policy and prosecution, the index ranks countries annually from 0 to 100, with a higher number showing stronger control of corruption and a lower number showing weak control of corruption. Overlaying the Control of Corruption measure against gross domestic product and foreign direct investment rates from 1996 to 2014 has yielded some notable observations.

In boom times, when credit is abundant and foreign direct investment is shooting up in developing countries, corruption on the grandest scale becomes possible. After all, when a government is the chief party awarding major infrastructure projects with multimillion- and sometimes multibillion-dollar price tags attached, there is ample opportunity to pad the budget with political favors. Each step — from the environmental and technical feasibility studies to ongoing maintenance — is an opportunity for government bureaucrats and businessmen to cut ribbons in public and make furtive financial deals in private to move the process along.
When economic times are good and there is more money to go around, there is little variance in the Control of Corruption variable. However, when global economic conditions began stagnating following the 2008-2009 financial crisis and growth flattened out in 2011-2012, Turkey, Brazil and Mexico all showed a noticeable decline in Control of Corruption as major scandals were exposed and the perception of high-level corruption rose. Under more stressful economic conditions, political competition will naturally escalate, and civil society will be hyperaware of abuses of political power.

Unsurprisingly, spikes in the Control of Corruption variable correlate closely with political transitions in many of these cases. For example, when Erdogan came to power in 2003, many Turks — both secular and conservative — saw him as the fresh face that would clean up Turkey, root out the Mafioso networks and make the economy work again. For a while, that perception held, and Turkey's corruption ranking steadily rose. Meanwhile, Erdogan used Turkey's growth spurt to rapidly build out his patronage network and hand out contracts to political loyalists while sidelining his political adversaries. Once news started trickling out on the scale of corruption that had emerged during his tenure, Erdogan did not bother trying to redeem himself with a fresh anti-corruption drive. Instead, he dug his heels in further, promising more privileges to those who remained loyal to him.

Volatility in Indonesia's Control of Corruption variable seems to mirror significant political shifts in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The Suharto New Order dictatorship came to an end in 1998, and new efforts were made to undo his tightly knit and centralized patronage network extending from the armed forces to a sizable class of capitalist cronies. Indonesia has hit several major bumps along the way as successive governments have attempted to adopt anti-corruption platforms, only to see more entrenched interest groups derail these efforts from within. In fact, as post-Suharto Indonesia has become more politically decentralized, corruption has simply taken on a new form as additional layers of regulation at the local level create more space for bribery.

India's corruption ranking, on the other hand, appears to be largely insensitive to political shifts. The Indian National Congress party was hit by a slew of major corruption scandals involving the coal sector, telecom, railways, aerospace and defense, and construction. India's Control of Corruption rating declined steadily during that time. When it was in the opposition, the Bharatiya Janata Party used these scandals to smear the Congress party, but now the Bharatiya Janata Party is caught up in "Lalitgate" — a scandal involving India's professional cricket association — and the Vyapam scandal, which exposed payoffs to place students in the best schools and government jobs. The fledgling anti-corruption Aam Aadmi Party, which unseated the Bharatiya Janata Party in state elections in Delhi, is already faltering in popularity. Perhaps India's politics are too deeply mired in corruption to build a credible anti-corruption platform at this stage of development.

China is a much more complex story. China's current leaders seemed aware early on that the country's rapid growth could endanger the Party's credibility and viability should corruption go unchecked. Xi is well aware of his country's long history of dynastic cycles, beginning with centralized power and consolidation, the erosion of the imperial court by bureaucratic corruption, the gradual empowerment of local landlords at the expense of the center, a call too late to reform and inevitable dynastic decline. Now stuck in the throes of an economic slowdown and still far behind in a number of crucial reforms to rebalance the economy, Xi is focused on the need to consolidate control under himself while he works to redeem the Party's credibility through the most aggressive anti-corruption drive since Maoist China. The spike in China's Control of Corruption ranking seems to correspond closely with the launch of Xi's anti-corruption drive, but it also appears to be leveling out. Although Xi's anti-corruption drive is earnest, his ability to enforce reforms is still questionable. When officials are too intimidated to make decisions, they avoid them altogether, and reforms are left in limbo. It remains to be seen whether Xi can avoid the historical paradox of anti-corruption reform precipitating political decline in China.

The Role of Outside Players

In other cases, the agendas of larger outside powers influencing smaller states in their periphery could drive anti-corruption efforts more than economic cycles. In Ukraine, the protesters who withstood the cold in Maidan Square for weeks in hopes of toppling former President Viktor Yanukovich were incensed by his flagrant spending habits, but would they have succeeded in overthrowing their president without support from certain Western intelligence agencies interested in pushing back against Russia in one of the most sensitive points in its periphery? In Moldova, a highly fragile coalition of pro-European parties is facing the ire of protesters (many of whom are Russian-backed) over a major corruption scandal that could topple the government once again and give Moscow an opening in another proxy battleground with the West.
Backing foreign anti-corruption bodies is developing into a handy foreign policy tool for Washington. The United States did not have to build institutions from scratch; it inherited them from the British and then figured out a more equitable system in the end to check and balance political power. This makes it all the easier for Washington to export the argument that institution building is the path to effective governance and economic growth. And if the United States is a leading provider of capital in a time of great economic stress, then U.S. officials towing large delegations of investors have a bit more leverage in trying to shape institutional development in countries of interest.
In Romania, a critical Western ally in the former Soviet periphery known for entrenched corruption, the United States has worked very closely with the country's intelligence service strengthening the National Anti-Corruption Directorate. Against all odds, this investigative body has succeeded in removing a number of high-level officials and stripping politicians of immunity and is currently trying to unseat a sitting prime minister. From the Western perspective, if Romania is more politically stable and more conducive to foreign investment, it will be more immune to Russian influence and sit more comfortably in the Western camp.
In Central America, the United States has the ability to withhold crucial aid to pressure drug-ridden and corrupt countries to enable anti-corruption investigative bodies. One such entity, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, actually brought down President Otto Perez Molina. The bitter former president is now blaming U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and the "geostrategic" agenda of the U.S. government for pressuring him to extend the mandate of the committee that ultimately brought about his downfall. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration has played a particularly significant role in building cases and pursuing corrupt politicians in Latin America, from Honduras to Venezuela. In the name of building more credible institutions and stable governments to limit drug-trafficking and illegal immigration, Washington can increasingly be expected to use anti-corruption measures to shape political evolutions in many of these states.
No simple or single explanations will come from examining the drivers of corruption and the forces that counter the abuse of political power for personal gain. In some cases, anti-corruption initiatives will amount to little more than a political campaign, only to fizzle out within a couple of years. In other cases, corruption is so endemic that political and economic changes will have little impact on a country's ranking. For several countries, the recent explosion of bribery scandals is the natural product of more than a decade of unprecedented economic growth. And for a country like China, an anti-corruption campaign is both the saving grace of the Party and the potential harbinger of decline. A less familiar but growing trend reveals how countries sitting in the shadow of bigger powers can be pushed and pulled through anti-corruption protests and investigations toward broader geopolitical ends.
"https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/anatomy-anti-corruption">The Anatomy of Anti-Corruption </a> is republished with permission of Stratfor."



Wednesday, May 20, 2015

Disbanding the Venezuelan Mafia | Stratfor

Disbanding the Venezuelan Mafia | Stratfor
A number of powerful individuals who were propelled into positions of influence during the administration of former President Hugo Chavez have used that influence to shape the economy into a mangled instrument that suited their personal interests. These individuals now function less as a government than as a mafia.

Disbanding the Venezuelan Mafia

As the price of Brent crude continued its five-day dip, settling at $64 per barrel Tuesday, we can assume the latest slump is extremely worrisome for Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. The petrodollars he needs to keep the Venezuelan economy afloat are dwindling. He has only $17.8 billion sitting in largely illiquid reserves, most of which are stored in gold, and total reserves are declining by roughly $2 billion every month. Less oil revenue means fewer dollars to fund imports, which in turn means the average Venezuelan with a necessary ID card can shop only on days designated by the government. And on those days, that citizen has to rush to stand in maddeningly long lines patrolled by security guards only to find that basic goods, from toilet paper to milk, are stripped from the shelves.
But the drop in the price of oil is not the only thing Venezuelans can blame for the shortages. Festering within the government are a number of powerful individuals who were propelled into positions of influence during the administration of former President Hugo Chavez and who have used that influence to shape the economy into a mangled instrument that suited their personal interests. These individuals now function less as a government than as a mafia. Military generals and government officials have worked hand in hand to move cocaine from Colombia through Venezuela while gaming the country's purchasing and distribution mechanisms and subsidized exchange rates to realize profits from various arbitrage schemes. So even when the government is able to import basic goods, their partners in crime can hoard products at ports or in warehouses to sit and rot or eventually be sold on the black market.
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.
Maduro inherited a government stacked with officials and generals whose primary interest is to maintain the influence and the perks that come with their positions. But Maduro has a problem. Venezuela's shortages are eventually going to reach a critical point as the country's financial cushion deflates, creating the potential for more serious unrest. At the same time, elections are due this year, and the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela is going to struggle to win votes when the government is running on the fumes of the Chavez era. If Maduro has any chance of carrying the country through this crisis, he will have to start by dislodging Chavistas who are distorting critical parts of the economy through their elaborate corruption schemes.
Obviously, this is easier said than done. If Maduro had the power to purge his government, he would have done so by now. The people in question are powerful for a reason, and they have military backing and links to armed groups that can cause trouble if they are crossed. The prospect of messy street protests means he needs the support of his security forces more than ever.
It is for these reasons that we are particularly interested in the growing number of leaks and rumors on U.S. prosecutors and Drug Enforcement Administration members working to build cases against high-level Venezuelan officials complicit in drug trafficking. Following weeks of rumors in Venezuelan media on impending indictments against high-level officials, The Wall Street Journal captured a great deal of attention on Monday with its detailed investigation on this very issue. The report claimed that National Assembly President Diosdado Cabello, Aragua state Gov. Tareck El Aissami, head of the National Guard Nestor Reverol, Gen. Luis Motta Dominguez and retired Gen. Hugo Carvajal are under investigation in the United States, giving credence to previous claims in Venezuela that Cabello, in particular, is at the top of the United States' list of targets.
Of course, these cases have been building for some time, particularly after the 2010 arrest of Venezuelan drug kingpin Walid Makled. But it is notable that the rumors are intensifying at the same time the United States is trying to repair its relationship with Caracas. U.S. State Department Counselor Thomas Shannon met with Maduro on May 11, following up an April visit, and is reportedly expected to have more meetings with him in the coming weeks. The investigation of such high-profile Venezuelan officials would be discussed in these meetings. It is also reasonable to believe Cabello would be a central point as well.
Cabello, who participated in the 1992 coup attempt led by Chavez, has served in several powerful positions in the government and has influence over several members of the military. So long as he remains in a position of influence, the members in his criminal network are also protected. For now, as president of the National Assembly, Cabello has diplomatic immunity from any charges that the United States could throw at him. But if he loses his power — either through elections or through a decision by Maduro — then he and his cohorts will be susceptible to arrest and extradition if they leave the country now that he faces an impending indictment. Such concerns may be at least part of the reason we have not yet seen the Venezuelan government follow through in setting a date for the elections, even though Maduro likely knows that canceling the elections would result only in more severe and possibly unmanageable unrest on the streets.
That brings us back to the talks between Shannon and Maduro. Holding charges over the heads of powerful members of the Venezuelan government enables Washington to pressure Caracas into making political concessions, including a power-sharing arrangement with the opposition. But there may be more to the negotiation as well. Maduro may not be able to purge powerful figures such as Cabello and El Aissami on his own, but there is a possibility they could be sacrificed as part of a bargain with Washington — beginning the process of routing the government and the economy of its most destructive elements and delivering a message that the criminal networks distorting the economy are not impenetrable.
One way or another, Maduro needs to mitigate food shortages and secure economic aid. The United States is in no way the whole answer to Venezuela's problems or a substitute for the structural reforms needed to repair the economy, but it may be able to offer Maduro a partial solution. That prospect alone should have Cabello nervous.

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

#Berezovsky’s Dubious Legacy Lives on in the #Kremlin - The Daily Beast

#Kasparov's take on Berezovsky's legacy. One brave man to be talking like this in Putin's Russia. 

Boris Berezovsky's Dubious Legacy Lives On in the Kremlin

By Gary Kasparov 

When Boris Berezovsky was found dead in his home in England last week, it was an abrupt conclusion to the long final act of a farce. Although after such a complicated life, even his death may turn out to be a question mark instead of a full stop. A kingmaker who was exiled by the man he made king, Berezovsky was the architect of the Russian "managed democracy" scheme now headed by his former acolyte Vladimir Putin, a system dedicated to finding every possible way to subvert real democracy and to centralize power in the hands of "wise men" like himself. Really it should be "wiseguys" in the Mario Puzo sense, as what this system most resembles is a mafia state with a few token democratic decorations.

130331-boris-death-kasparov-tease

Boris Berezovsky addresses the media outside the Royal Courts of Justice in London after losing his lawsuit against Chelsea FC owner Roman Abramovich in August 2012. (Warrick Page/Getty)

The task of burying Berezovsky is being taken care of with speed and diligence by his various enemies, especially the Kremlin and its wide circle of media lapdogs and employees inside and outside of Russia. Now that he is dead, and with that the possibility of being sued for libel, they are taking the gloves off and accusing him of everything under the sun, including murder. Here in Russia, Berezovsky has long been held up as a boogeyman along with other oligarchs driven into exile or otherwise persecuted by Putin and his allies.

What goes unmentioned in these tall tales of "Vladimir the Vanquisher of the Oligarchs" is what happened to the rest of them. Putin went after only those he perceived as a threat to his power and the state-security apparatus he quickly reestablished. The rest were given the opportunity to swear loyalty to him and become a partner in the greatest epidemic of larceny in world history. There was plenty of cash to go around. By the time Putin took power in 2000, Russia was seeing some of the benefits of economic reforms and access to the global marketplace. But what really made the difference was the decade-long 500 percent surge in oil prices that filled the state coffers no matter how much was skimmed off the top (and the middle).

The money may be long gone and hard to find—hidden as it is in Swiss accounts, New York real estate, and London football clubs—but there's a relatively easy way to check the results. Just look at the latest Forbes list of billionaires and compare it to those that came out when Putin first took office. The number of Russians on the list has gone from zero in 2000 to 110 on the latest edition. (And this is without one prominent name that would surely top the Russian list were his assets known. Unless of course you believe that the man who tightly controls the destiny of 110 billionaires is himself not interested in accumulating wealth.) Russia has nearly as many billionaires as China, whose economy is four times larger, and almost double the number of Germany, whose economy is 60 percent larger than Russia's. This incredible feat is hardly a reflection of a broad-based economic expansion. While the U.S. still has more billionaires per capita than Russia, it also ranks near the top in GDP per capita while Russia languishes in the mid-50s on that list, just ahead of Gabon and Botswana.

Putin's real achievement was to effectively coordinate the looting of the wealth of the Russian state and countryside. Perhaps Berezovsky's bitterness in exile was partially due to being deprived of the chance to participate in Putin's culmination of his schemes. From being the power behind the throne, Berezovsky spent a decade in London as little more than a jester, making wild statements and squandering his remaining assets on lawsuits and press battles. He never had the courage to fight against Putin from afar, as others have.

Putin's circle has achieved a legitimacy Berezovsky could scarcely have dreamed of, and the United Kingdom welcomes looted Russian assets with open arms.

It is still worth condemning the eagerness of some Western news outlets to assist in the Kremlin's propaganda campaign against Berezovsky. Surely there are enough objectionable facts about the dead man available to make spreading slanderous theories unnecessary. Yet Forbes still found it worthy to ask, in a headline, if Berezovsky killed Forbes editor Paul Klebnikov in 2004. Klebnikov was shot in cold blood in front of his office in Moscow, a crime that is still unresolved, like so many others acts of brutal violence against the press in Russia. Making unsupported accusations like this—nothing resembling evidence is provided in the Forbes article, and the charge was never made by Forbes while Berezovsky was alive—assists the Kremlin in discrediting a critic and in throwing chaff into the air to hide the fact that Putin and his cronies have continued Berezovsky's larcenous practices in Russia.

Those journalists who wish to display their investigative talents more usefully should not ask what happened to Berezovsky. Instead, they should look into the dealings of the other Russian oligarchs, the ones whose names are routinely celebrated in the London financial pages, not the obituaries. Putin's circle has achieved a legitimacy Berezovsky could scarcely have dreamed of and the United Kingdom welcomes looted Russian assets with open arms. Berezovsky may briefly be a story, but he was history long ago. What matters now is to investigate the crimes still in progress, those being committed by Berezovsky's most successful project, Vladimir Putin.



Wednesday, February 1, 2012

Rosinés, la hija imperialista de Chávez | Personajes



Es habitual que los hijos adolescentes salgan por peteneras y avergüencen a sus padres en público de vez en cuando con alguna extravagancia. Seguro que a Sonsoles y Zapatero no les hizo ninguna gracia que sus niñas se presentasen con sendos atuendos góticos en la cena con los Obama. Y quiero pensar que a Hugo Chávez, la foto que su hija pequeña (de 14 años) colgó en Instagram, abanicándose con un puñado de dólares, tampoco le provocó ni media sonrisa. Sobre todo teniendo en cuanta que en Venezuela la posesión de moneda extranjera está regulada.
Aunque va a ser que Rosinés le ha salido un poco imperialista. No sólo se toma fotos luciendo una colección de billetes estadounidenses, sino que cuando Justin Bieber dio un concierto en Caracas, aprovechó su condición de hija de su papi para saludarlo y abrazarlo a su llegada al aeropuerto. Y algo parecido ocurrió con Miley Cyrus: una foto de ambas sonriendo a cámara circula desde hace tiempo por internet. Claro que qué culpa tiene ella de que su padre odie a Europa, Norteamérica, el capitalismo, y todas esas cosas. No sería la primera en contrariar a sus familiares líderes de su patria: al nieto de Kim Jong Il, por ejemplo, le encanta navegar por la red y lo hace con mucha soltura, pese a que su abuelo hubiese prácticamente prohibido el acceso a internet en todo Corea del Norte.
A lo mejor a Chávez no le molesta tanto el imperialismo galopante de su descendiente; todo el mundo sabe que Rosinés es su consentida. En el programa número 240 de ‘Aló Presidente’, relató a su audiencia cómo su hija pequeña, convaleciente en la cama, le había comentado que el caballo del escudo nacional caminaba en la dirección contraria: de la izquierda a la derecha. La supuesta anécdota familiar le sirvió al presidente venezolano para pedir a la Asamblea Nacional que se revisase la posición del caballo y se colocase de forma correcta: cabalgando de la derecha hacia la izquierda. Rosinés les había salvado del mal camino al que su propia bandera les guiaba.
Y ojito que nadie se meta con ella. En 2005, el humorista Laureano Márquez escribía una columna en el diario de la oposición Tal Cual en la que le pedía a Rosinés con mucha ironía y canchondeíto que hablase con su padre de algunos temas políticos, incidiendo en las contradicciones entre la vida familiar de los Chávez y su discurso político. El presidente de Venezuela denunció al humorista y al director de la revista por publicar un contenido que dañaba la imagen pública de Rosinés y éstos tuvieron que pagar tremenda suma por sus pecados.

ver el articulo en la web aca:

Rosinés, la hija imperialista de Chávez | Personajes

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