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Showing posts with label Palestinians. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Palestinians. Show all posts

Tuesday, December 26, 2017

The #UN, with special mention to @UN_HRC #HumanRights Council, has outdone itself this year. Thanks @UNWatch


From electing #Mugabe as Goodwill Ambassador @WHO and #Erdogan to the @UNESCO Board, to naming #SaudiArabia to its #Women's Rights Commission ...

The #UN, with special mention to the @UN_HRC #HumanRights Council, has outdone itself this year...
The Top 10 Most Evil U.N. Actions of 2017 @UNWatch 
UN Briefing
UN Watch Briefing
Latest from the United Nations
 December 25, 2017
The Top 10 Most Evil U.N. Actions of 2017

Saturday, October 17, 2015

The Roots of the #StabbingIntifada in Jerusalem - The Atlantic

The Roots of the Stabbing Intifada in Jerusalem - The Atlantic
Jeffrey Goldberg has a good piece this week in The Atlantic on one of the fundamental problems between Israelis and Palestinians. 


The Paranoid, Supremacist Roots of the Stabbing Intifada


In September of 1928, a group of Jewish residents of Jerusalem placed a bench in front of the Western Wall of the Temple Mount, for the comfort of elderly worshipers. They also brought with them a wooden partition, to separate the sexes during prayer. Jerusalem's Muslim leaders treated the introduction of furniture into the alleyway in front of the Wall as a provocation, part of a Jewish conspiracy to slowly take control of the entire Temple Mount.

Many of the leaders of Palestine's Muslims believed—or claimed to believe—that Jews had manufactured a set of historical and theological connections to the Western Wall and to the Mount, the site of the al-Aqsa mosque and the Dome of the Rock, in order to advance the Zionist project. This belief defied Muslim history—the Dome of the Rock was built by Jerusalem's Arab conquerors on the site of the Second Jewish Temple in order to venerate its memory (the site had previously been defiled by Jerusalem's Christian rulers as a kind of rebuke to Judaism, the despised mother religion of Christianity). Jews themselves consider the Mount itself to be the holiest site in their faith. The Western Wall, a large retaining wall from the Second Temple period, is sacred only by proxy.

The spiritual leader of Palestine's Muslims, the mufti of Jerusalem, Amin al-Husseini, incited Arabs in Palestine against their Jewish neighbors by arguing that Islam itself was under threat. (Husseini would later become one of Hitler's most important Muslim allies.) Jews in British-occupied Palestine responded to Muslim invective by demanding more access to the Wall, sometimes holding demonstrations at the holy site. By the next year, violence directed against Jews by their neighbors had become more common: Arab rioters took the lives of 133 Jews that summer; British forces killed 116 Arabs in their attempt to subdue the riots. In Hebron, a devastating pogrom was launched against the city's ancient Jewish community after Muslim officials distributed fabricated photographs of a damaged Dome of the Rock, and spread the rumor that Jews had attacked the shrine.

The current "stabbing Intifada" now taking place in Israel—a quasi-uprising in which young Palestinians have been trying, and occasionally succeeding, to kill Jews with knives—is prompted in good part by the same set of manipulated emotions that sparked the anti-Jewish riots of the 1920s: a deeply felt desire on the part of Palestinians to "protect" the Temple Mount from Jews.

Tuesday, August 26, 2014

The world is not responding to events in #Israel, but rather to the description of these events by news organizations @tabletmag



A former AP correspondent explains how and why reporters get Israel so wrong, and why it matters

An Insider’s Guide to the Most Important Story on Earth






The Israel Story


Is there anything left to say about Israel and Gaza? Newspapers this
summer have been full of little else. Television viewers see heaps of
rubble and plumes of smoke in their sleep. A representative article from a recent issue of The New Yorker
described the summer’s events by dedicating one sentence each to the
horrors in Nigeria and Ukraine, four sentences to the crazed génocidaires of ISIS, and the rest of the article—30 sentences—to Israel and Gaza.


When the hysteria abates, I believe the events in Gaza will not be
remembered by the world as particularly important. People were killed,
most of them Palestinians, including many unarmed innocents. I wish I
could say the tragedy of their deaths, or the deaths of Israel’s
soldiers, will change something, that they mark a turning point. But
they don’t. This round was not the first in the Arab wars with Israel
and will not be the last. The Israeli campaign was little different in
its execution from any other waged by a Western army against a similar
enemy in recent years, except for the more immediate nature of the
threat to a country’s own population, and the greater exertions, however
futile, to avoid civilian deaths.


The lasting importance of this summer’s war, I believe, doesn’t lie
in the war itself. It lies instead in the way the war has been described
and responded to abroad, and the way this has laid bare the resurgence
of an old, twisted pattern of thought and its migration from the margins
to the mainstream of Western discourse—namely, a hostile obsession with
Jews. The key to understanding this resurgence is not to be found among
jihadi webmasters, basement conspiracy theorists, or radical activists.
It is instead to be found first among the educated and respectable
people who populate the international news industry; decent people, many
of them, and some of them my former colleagues.


While global mania about Israeli actions has come to be taken for
granted, it is actually the result of decisions made by individual human
beings in positions of responsibility—in this case, journalists and
editors. The world is not responding to events in this country, but
rather to the description of these events by news organizations. The key
to understanding the strange nature of the response is thus to be found
in the practice of journalism, and specifically in a severe malfunction
that is occurring in that profession—my profession—here in Israel.


In this essay I will try to provide a few tools to make sense of the
news from Israel. I acquired these tools as an insider: Between 2006 and
the end of 2011 I was a reporter and editor in the Jerusalem bureau of
the Associated Press, one of the world’s two biggest news providers. I
have lived in Israel since 1995 and have been reporting on it since
1997.


This essay is not an exhaustive survey of the sins of the
international media, a conservative polemic, or a defense of Israeli
policies. (I am a believer in the importance of the “mainstream” media, a
liberal, and a critic of many of my country’s policies.) It necessarily
involves some generalizations. I will first outline the central tropes
of the international media’s Israel story—a story on which there is
surprisingly little variation among mainstream outlets, and one which
is, as the word “story” suggests, a narrative construct that is largely
fiction. I will then note the broader historical context of the way
Israel has come to be discussed and explain why I believe it to be a
matter of concern not only for people preoccupied with Jewish affairs. I
will try to keep it brief.


How Important Is the Israel Story?


Staffing is the best measure of the importance of a story to a
particular news organization. When I was a correspondent at the AP, the
agency had more than 40 staffers covering Israel and the Palestinian
territories. That was significantly more news staff than the AP had in
China, Russia, or India, or in all of the 50 countries of sub-Saharan
Africa combined. It was higher than the total number of news-gathering
employees in all the countries where the uprisings of the “Arab Spring”
eventually erupted.


To offer a sense of scale: Before the outbreak of the civil war in
Syria, the permanent AP presence in that country consisted of a single
regime-approved stringer. The AP’s editors believed, that is, that
Syria’s importance was less than one-40th that of Israel. I don’t mean
to pick on the AP—the agency is wholly average, which makes it useful as
an example. The big players in the news business practice groupthink,
and these staffing arrangements were reflected across the herd. Staffing
levels in Israel have decreased somewhat since the Arab uprisings
began, but remain high. And when Israel flares up, as it did this
summer, reporters are often moved from deadlier conflicts. Israel still
trumps nearly everything else.


The volume of press coverage that results, even when little is going
on, gives this conflict a prominence compared to which its actual human
toll is absurdly small. In all of 2013, for example, the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict claimed 42 lives—that is, roughly the
monthly homicide rate in the city of Chicago. Jerusalem, internationally
renowned as a city of conflict, had slightly fewer violent deaths per
capita last year than Portland, Ore., one of America’s safer cities. In
contrast, in three years the Syrian conflict has claimed an estimated
190,000 lives, or about 70,000 more than the number of people who have
ever died in the Arab-Israeli conflict since it began a century ago.


News organizations have nonetheless decided that this conflict is more important than, for example, the more than 1,600 women murdered in Pakistan last year (271 after being raped and 193 of them burned alive), the ongoing erasure of Tibet by the Chinese Communist Party, the carnage in Congo (more than 5 million dead as of 2012) or the Central African Republic , and the drug wars in Mexico (death toll between 2006 and 2012: 60,000 ), let alone conflicts no one has ever heard of in obscure corners of India or Thailand . They believe Israel to be the most important story on earth, or very close.


What Is Important About the Israel Story, and What Is Not


A reporter working in the international press corps here understands
quickly that what is important in the Israel-Palestinian story is
Israel. If you follow mainstream coverage, you will find nearly no real
analysis of Palestinian society or ideologies, profiles of armed
Palestinian groups, or investigation of Palestinian government.
Palestinians are not taken seriously as agents of their own fate. The
West has decided that Palestinians should want a state alongside Israel,
so that opinion is attributed to them as fact, though anyone who has
spent time with actual Palestinians understands that things are
(understandably, in my opinion) more complicated. Who they are and what
they want is not important: The story mandates that they exist as
passive victims of the party that matters.


Corruption, for example, is a pressing concern for many Palestinians
under the rule of the Palestinian Authority, but when I and another
reporter once suggested an article on the subject, we were informed by
the bureau chief that Palestinian corruption was “not the story.”
(Israeli corruption was, and we covered it at length.)



Israeli actions are analyzed and criticized, and every flaw in
Israeli society is aggressively reported. In one seven-week period, from
Nov. 8 to Dec. 16, 2011, I decided to count the stories coming out of
our bureau on the various moral failings of Israeli society—proposed
legislation meant to suppress the media, the rising influence of
Orthodox Jews, unauthorized settlement outposts, gender segregation, and
so forth. I counted 27 separate articles, an average of a story every
two days. In a very conservative estimate, this seven-week tally was
higher than the total number of significantly critical stories about
Palestinian government and society, including the totalitarian Islamists
of Hamas, that our bureau had published in the preceding three years.


The Hamas charter, for example, calls not just for Israel’s
destruction but for the murder of Jews and blames Jews for engineering
the French and Russian revolutions and both world wars; the charter was
never mentioned in print when I was at the AP, though Hamas won a
Palestinian national election and had become one of the region’s most
important players. To draw the link with this summer’s events: An
observer might think Hamas’ decision in recent years to construct a
military infrastructure beneath Gaza’s civilian infrastructure would be
deemed newsworthy, if only because of what it meant about the way the
next conflict would be fought and the cost to innocent people. But that
is not the case. The Hamas emplacements were not important in
themselves, and were therefore ignored. What was important was the
Israeli decision to attack them.


There has been much discussion recently of Hamas attempts to
intimidate reporters. Any veteran of the press corps here knows the
intimidation is real, and I saw it in action myself as an editor on the
AP news desk. During the 2008-2009 Gaza fighting I personally erased a
key detail—that Hamas fighters were dressed as civilians and being
counted as civilians in the death toll—because of a threat to our
reporter in Gaza. (The policy was then, and remains, not to inform
readers that the story is censored unless the censorship is Israeli.
Earlier this month, the AP’s Jerusalem news editor reported and
submitted a story on Hamas intimidation; the story was shunted into deep
freeze by his superiors and has not been published.)


But if critics imagine that journalists are clamoring to cover Hamas
and are stymied by thugs and threats, it is generally not so. There are
many low-risk ways to report Hamas actions, if the will is there: under
bylines from Israel, under no byline, by citing Israeli sources.
Reporters are resourceful when they want to be.


The fact is that Hamas intimidation is largely beside the point
because the actions of Palestinians are beside the point: Most reporters
in Gaza believe their job is to document violence directed by Israel at
Palestinian civilians. That is the essence of the Israel story. In
addition, reporters are under deadline and often at risk, and many don’t
speak the language and have only the most tenuous grip on what is going
on. They are dependent on Palestinian colleagues and fixers who either
fear Hamas, support Hamas, or both. Reporters don’t need Hamas enforcers
to shoo them away from facts that muddy the simple story they have been
sent to tell.


It is not coincidence that the few journalists who have documented
Hamas fighters and rocket launches in civilian areas this summer were
generally not, as you might expect, from the large news organizations
with big and permanent Gaza operations. They were mostly scrappy,
peripheral, and newly arrived players—a Finn, an Indian crew, a few others. These poor souls didn’t get the memo.


What Else Isn’t Important?


The fact that Israelis quite recently elected moderate governments
that sought reconciliation with the Palestinians, and which were
undermined by the Palestinians, is considered unimportant and rarely
mentioned. These lacunae are often not oversights but a matter of
policy. In early 2009, for example, two colleagues of mine obtained
information that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had made a
significant peace offer to the Palestinian Authority several months
earlier, and that the Palestinians had deemed it insufficient. This had
not been reported yet and it was—or should have been—one of the biggest
stories of the year. The reporters obtained confirmation from both sides
and one even saw a map, but the top editors at the bureau decided that
they would not publish the story.


Some staffers were furious, but it didn’t help. Our narrative was
that the Palestinians were moderate and the Israelis recalcitrant and
increasingly extreme. Reporting the Olmert offer—like delving too deeply
into the subject of Hamas—would make that narrative look like nonsense.
And so we were instructed to ignore it, and did, for more than a year
and a half.


This decision taught me a lesson that should be clear to consumers of
the Israel story: Many of the people deciding what you will read and
see from here view their role not as explanatory but as political.
Coverage is a weapon to be placed at the disposal of the side they like.


How Is the Israel Story Framed?


The Israel story is framed in the same terms that have been in use
since the early 1990s—the quest for a “two-state solution.” It is
accepted that the conflict is “Israeli-Palestinian,” meaning that it is a
conflict taking place on land that Israel controls—0.2 percent of the
Arab world—in which Jews are a majority and Arabs a minority. The
conflict is more accurately described as “Israel-Arab,” or
“Jewish-Arab”—that is, a conflict between the 6 million Jews of Israel
and 300 million Arabs in surrounding countries. (Perhaps “Israel-Muslim”
would be more accurate, to take into account the enmity of non-Arab
states like Iran and Turkey, and, more broadly, 1 billion Muslims
worldwide.) This is the conflict that has been playing out in different
forms for a century, before Israel existed, before Israel captured the
Palestinian territories of Gaza and the West Bank, and before the term
“Palestinian” was in use.


The “Israeli-Palestinian” framing allows the Jews, a tiny minority in
the Middle East, to be depicted as the stronger party. It also includes
the implicit assumption that if the Palestinian problem is somehow
solved the conflict will be over, though no informed person today
believes this to be true. This definition also allows the Israeli
settlement project, which I believe is a serious moral and strategic
error on Israel’s part, to be described not as what it is—one more
destructive symptom of the conflict—but rather as its cause.


A knowledgeable observer of the Middle East cannot avoid the
impression that the region is a volcano and that the lava is radical
Islam, an ideology whose various incarnations are now shaping this part
of the world. Israel is a tiny village on the slopes of the volcano.
Hamas is the local representative of radical Islam and is openly
dedicated to the eradication of the Jewish minority enclave in Israel,
just as Hezbollah is the dominant representative of radical Islam in
Lebanon, the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, and so forth.


Hamas is not, as it freely admits, party to the effort to create a
Palestinian state alongside Israel. It has different goals about which
it is quite open and that are similar to those of the groups listed
above. Since the mid 1990s, more than any other player, Hamas has
destroyed the Israeli left, swayed moderate Israelis against territorial
withdrawals, and buried the chances of a two-state compromise. That’s
one accurate way to frame the story.


An observer might also legitimately frame the story through the lens
of minorities in the Middle East, all of which are under intense
pressure from Islam: When minorities are helpless, their fate is that of
the Yazidis or Christians of northern Iraq, as we have just seen, and
when they are armed and organized they can fight back and survive, as in
the case of the Jews and (we must hope) the Kurds.



There are, in other words, many different ways to see what is
happening here. Jerusalem is less than a day’s drive from Aleppo or
Baghdad, and it should be clear to everyone that peace is pretty elusive
in the Middle East even in places where Jews are absent. But reporters
generally cannot see the Israel story in relation to anything else.
Instead of describing Israel as one of the villages abutting the
volcano, they describe Israel as the volcano.


The Israel story is framed to seem as if it has nothing to do with
events nearby because the “Israel” of international journalism does not
exist in the same geo-political universe as Iraq, Syria, or Egypt. The
Israel story is not a story about current events. It is about something
else.


The Old Blank Screen


For centuries, stateless Jews played the role of a lightning rod for
ill will among the majority population. They were a symbol of things
that were wrong. Did you want to make the point that greed was bad? Jews
were greedy. Cowardice? Jews were cowardly. Were you a Communist? Jews
were capitalists. Were you a capitalist? In that case, Jews were
Communists. Moral failure was the essential trait of the Jew. It was
their role in Christian tradition—the only reason European society knew
or cared about them in the first place.


Like many Jews who grew up late in the 20th century in friendly
Western cities, I dismissed such ideas as the feverish memories of my
grandparents. One thing I have learned—and I’m not alone this summer—is
that I was foolish to have done so. Today, people in the West tend to
believe the ills of the age are racism, colonialism, and militarism. The
world’s only Jewish country has done less harm than most countries on
earth, and more good—and yet when people went looking for a country that
would symbolize the sins of our new post-colonial, post-militaristic,
post-ethnic dream-world, the country they chose was this one.


When the people responsible for explaining the world to the world,
journalists, cover the Jews’ war as more worthy of attention than any
other, when they portray the Jews of Israel as the party obviously in
the wrong, when they omit all possible justifications for the Jews’
actions and obscure the true face of their enemies, what they are saying
to their readers—whether they intend to or not—is that Jews are the
worst people on earth. The Jews are a symbol of the evils that civilized
people are taught from an early age to abhor. International press
coverage has become a morality play starring a familiar villain.


Some readers might remember that Britain participated in the 2003
invasion of Iraq, the fallout from which has now killed more than three
times the number of people ever killed in the Israel-Arab conflict; yet
in Britain, protesters furiously condemn Jewish militarism. White people
in London and Paris whose parents not long ago had themselves fanned by
dark people in the sitting rooms of Rangoon or Algiers condemn Jewish
“colonialism.” Americans who live in places called “Manhattan” or
“Seattle” condemn Jews for displacing the native people of Palestine.
Russian reporters condemn Israel’s brutal military tactics. Belgian
reporters condemn Israel’s treatment of Africans. When Israel opened a
transportation service for Palestinian workers in the occupied West Bank
a few years ago, American news consumers could read about Israel
“segregating buses.” And there are a lot of people in Europe, and not
just in Germany, who enjoy hearing the Jews accused of genocide.


You don’t need to be a history professor, or a psychiatrist, to
understand what’s going on. Having rehabilitated themselves against
considerable odds in a minute corner of the earth, the descendants of
powerless people who were pushed out of Europe and the Islamic Middle
East have become what their grandparents were—the pool into which the
world spits. The Jews of Israel are the screen onto which it has become
socially acceptable to project the things you hate about yourself and
your own country. The tool through which this psychological projection
is executed is the international press.


Who Cares If the World Gets the Israel Story Wrong?


Because a gap has opened here between the way things are and the way
they are described, opinions are wrong and policies are wrong, and
observers are regularly blindsided by events. Such things have happened
before. In the years leading to the breakdown of Soviet Communism in
1991, as the Russia expert Leon Aron wrote in a 2011 essay for Foreign Policy,
“virtually no Western expert, scholar, official, or politician foresaw
the impending collapse of the Soviet Union.” The empire had been rotting
for years and the signs were there, but the people who were supposed to
be seeing and reporting them failed and when the superpower imploded
everyone was surprised.


Whatever
the outcome in this region in the next decade, it will have as much to
do with Israel as World War II had to do with Spain
And there was the Spanish civil war: “Early in life I had noticed
that no event is ever correctly reported in a newspaper, but in Spain,
for the first time, I saw newspaper reports which do not bear any
relation to the facts, not even the relationship which is implied in an
ordinary lie. … I saw, in fact, history being written not in terms of
what had happened but of what ought to have happened according to
various ‘party lines.’ ” That was George Orwell, writing in 1942.


Orwell did not step off an airplane in Catalonia, stand next to a
Republican cannon, and have himself filmed while confidently repeating
what everyone else was saying or describing what any fool could see:
weaponry, rubble, bodies. He looked beyond the ideological fantasies of
his peers and knew that what was important was not necessarily visible.
Spain, he understood, was not really about Spain at all—it was about a
clash of totalitarian systems, German and Russian. He knew he was
witnessing a threat to European civilization, and he wrote that, and he
was right.


Understanding what happened in Gaza this summer means understanding
Hezbollah in Lebanon, the rise of the Sunni jihadis in Syria and Iraq,
and the long tentacles of Iran. It requires figuring out why countries
like Egypt and Saudi Arabia now see themselves as closer to Israel than
to Hamas. Above all, it requires us to understand what is clear to
nearly everyone in the Middle East: The ascendant force in our part of
the world is not democracy or modernity. It is rather an empowered
strain of Islam that assumes different and sometimes conflicting forms,
and that is willing to employ extreme violence in a quest to unite the
region under its control and confront the West. Those who grasp this
fact will be able to look around and connect the dots.


Israel is not an idea, a symbol of good or evil, or a litmus test for
liberal opinion at dinner parties. It is a small country in a scary
part of the world that is getting scarier. It should be reported as
critically as any other place, and understood in context and in
proportion. Israel is not one of the most important stories in the
world, or even in the Middle East; whatever the outcome in this region
in the next decade, it will have as much to do with Israel as World War
II had to do with Spain. Israel is a speck on the map—a sideshow that
happens to carry an unusual emotional charge.


Many in the West clearly prefer the old comfort of parsing the moral
failings of Jews, and the familiar feeling of superiority this brings
them, to confronting an unhappy and confusing reality. They may convince
themselves that all of this is the Jews’ problem, and indeed the Jews’
fault. But journalists engage in these fantasies at the cost of their
credibility and that of their profession. And, as Orwell would tell us,
the world entertains fantasies at its peril.


***




A Former AP Correspondent Explains How and Why His Colleagues Get Israel So Wrong – Tablet Magazine





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Tuesday, June 3, 2014

#Israel Is Experienced With Prisoner Exchanges and Their Consequences @TIME

"As a community [we] will do the utmost to bring them back home.
It’s a battlefield value."


“It’s crazy to outsiders, but that’s how it is,” Rami Igra, who formerly held the job, told TIME when the Shalit exchange was taking shape. “We are a small nation, a
fighting nation. We have to show the people that fight with us and for
us that we as a community will do the utmost to bring them back home.
It’s a battlefield value. It’s a very important value, and it has a lot
of weight in our national security. Unfortunately the other side knows
it, and they use it against us.”


Dichter, the former Shin Bet chief, points out that Israel has the
means to have the last word. Hamas founder Sheik Ahmed Yassin was
released twice from an Israeli prison, he notes, first in 1985 along
with 1,149 others in an exchange for three Israeli soldiers, then, after
being arrested again, for two Mossad agents caught trying to poison a
Hamas official in Jordan in 1997. Finally, an Israeli Apache gunship
fired a Hellfire missile at the partially blind cleric as he was wheeled out of morning prayers.
“When we had no option to detain him, we targeted him in 2004,” Dichter
says. “So those who think there’s only one round — no, no, no. There’s
many rounds.”
 See the whole article on Time here: Israel Is Experienced With Prisoner Exchanges and Their Consequences | TIME

Tuesday, February 14, 2012

Special Report: Hamas In Transition | STRATFOR

Special Report: Hamas In Transition | STRATFOR


After more than five years of existing in political stalemate, Hamas is now trying to manage a worsening relationship with Iran and Syria and exploit the political rise of its Islamist parent organization, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Without a clear vision on how to proceed, Hamas is likely to undergo serious internal strains that could raise the potential for a splintering of the heretofore most tightly run organization of the Palestinian territories.
Six years ago, Hamas unexpectedly swept parliamentary elections in the Palestinian territories and won the right to form a government. But the idea of a self-professed Islamist militant organization running the Palestinian government did not sit well with Israel and much of the West or with Hamas' rival, Fatah. Sanctions on Hamas immediately intensified, and a civil war broke out between Hamas and Fatah. Hamas was driven into political isolation after it forcibly took over the Gaza Strip in mid-2007.
Hamas then entered a long period of political stagnation. As a heavily sanctioned political pariah, the group's financial stresses rose. This provided Iran an opportunity to deepen its financial links with the Hamas regime. Though weapons and supplies still flowed to Gaza, the Egyptian regime of then-President Hosni Mubarak maintained a tight security grip over the Sinai-Gaza border to keep Hamas under control. When Israel launched Operation Cast Lead in December 2008, Hamas was able to both resist and garner international sympathy, but the two-month operation still dealt a blow to Hamas militarily and did little to ease the group's political constraints. Apart from a rampant smuggling trade via Gaza tunnels, Hamas had little space to exercise its political authority.
But regional events in 2011 brought about large changes in the challenges and opportunities faced by Hamas. Political demonstrations in Egypt led to the fall of Mubarak. After decades of being repressed by the Mubarak regime, the Egyptian MB entered the political mainstream. Though the military, which remains Egypt's ultimate authority, wants to keep Hamas confined in Gaza, the MB's rise has raised international acceptance of Islamists as political players. When Arab unrest reached Syria, Hamas' refusal to publicly support the regime of President Bashar al Assad cost its exiled politburo its footing with the regime in Damascus; Hamas had to start seeking an alternative base. Meanwhile, as demonstrations continued to spread throughout the Arab world, Iran's growing assertiveness in the region put the spotlight on Hamas, a Sunni entity, for its substantial ties with the Shiite Islamic Republic.
The group now finds itself at a turning point. Hamas has to balance deteriorating relationships with longtime patrons Iran and Syria, establish a new political vision, identify proper sources of funding and manage growing internal disagreements.

Picking Sides

When al Assad's Alawite regime began resorting to more violent crackdowns against a growing, Sunni-dominated opposition, Hamas leaders in Damascus, led by politburo chief Khaled Meshaal, had reason to be nervous. Damascus has served as the exiled leadership's main hub of operations since 2001, and it is the main channel for funding to reach Hamas. When unrest in Syria began, Hamas' best option was to try to not appear involved in Syria's internal affairs; the group could not risk its credibility by standing behind an Iranian-backed Alawite regime against Sunni resistance. Because of the overwhelming support in the Arab world for the Sunni-led uprising, Hamas could no longer ignore, as it did in the past, the al Assad regime's intolerance of its comrades in Syria's branch of the MB.
In August and September, Syria and Iran tried to pressure Hamas into organizing pro-Assad demonstrations in the Palestinian refugee camps in Syria. It was time for Hamas to decide whom it would support. Hamas had two choices: It could follow orders and showcase its close alignment with the Iran and Syria, or it could create some distance from the Iranian-led coalition, use that distance to reinforce its relations with its Sunni Arab neighbors and, most critically, seize the opportunity to follow the MB's lead out of political isolation.
Hamas chose the latter and refused to stage the demonstrations. The group could not afford to side against a wave of Sunni opposition without absorbing a hit to its legitimacy. Yet beyond the ideological discomfort it was experiencing, Hamas had a bigger vision in mind.

Hamas' Political Vision

Hamas formally was created in 1987, largely as the result of two factors. First was public dissatisfaction with the secularist and corrupt Fatah-led Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The second was an effort by the MB to respond to the first intifada in a way that allowed it to remain politically insulated. The creation of a separate Gaza group that could engage in armed resistance answered the MB's dilemma. However, Hamas' original leadership still viewed militancy as a means to a political end. Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the leader of the MB and of the Islamic Center in Gaza, argued that Hamas was basically a political movement: It would fight for the rights of Palestinians, with the objective of eliminating Israel. The violent means Hamas has used make it highly controversial as a political player, but it is important to note that Hamas has held political ambitions since its inception.
Hamas' core struggle is over how to proceed along that political path while presiding over a stateless entity -- especially when its reputation has been primarily built on militant resistance, not on political credentials. As the organization learned after the 2006 election, even a sweeping political victory in the Palestinian territories yields limited results for an organization widely recognized as the premier Palestinian militant group. In other words, if Hamas was not prepared to abandon its militant arm and change its charter to recognize Israel, it needed to undergo a serious rebranding effort.
That opportunity came with the fall of Mubarak. The spread of unrest provided an opening for Islamist groups throughout the region to raise their political voice and force a wider acceptance of their growing role in the political affairs of the Arab world. The rise of the Egyptian MB in particular created an opening for Hamas to publicly reassert itself as a legitimate political player operating in the same league as its parent organization.
However, Hamas must make several difficult political decisions to achieve such a transition.

Coping with Finances

Hamas is highly secretive about its finances, but it has been unable to fully conceal the financial stress it has experienced over the past several months. It has been widely rumored that Iran began curtailing its monthly payments to Hamas after the group's refusal to demonstrate on behalf of the Syrian regime. According to multiple sources, Iran had directed $25 million per month to Hamas; to put that in perspective, Hamas' stated annual budget for administering the Gaza Strip is about $700 million.
In addition to the decline in Iranian financing, Hamas may also have reason to be concerned about the status of its investments in Syria. A number of Hamas members have business partnerships with members of the Syrian business community, including those close to the regime. Though the value of these assets is unknown, much of Syrian investment linked to Hamas is in real estate, resorts, food imports and olive oil exports.
Hamas may also be seeing less income from Islamic charities. Though a significant amount of funding is still likely earmarked for Hamas, a Stratfor source linked to the group said the rise of the MB and other regional Islamist opposition groups has attracted a major influx of money from donors looking to sustain the effects of the Arab Spring, making Hamas a lower priority.
These are not the only sources of Hamas funding. Hamas is believed to make about $50 million per year by taxing trade that runs through the Gaza Strip's extensive tunnel system. The group also reaps an unknown amount of profits from local businesses in which it holds a significant stake, including the Gaza Strip's only shopping mall and sea resorts and businesses spread throughout the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Central Asia.
Nonetheless, there are indications that Hamas is experiencing significant financial pain because of its worsening relationship with Iran and Syria. Meshaal and Gaza-based Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh have been taking tours throughout the region in recent weeks to meet with leaders from Jordan, Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Hamas has allegedly sought financing from these states to compensate for the drop in Iranian support. Due to the uncertainty faced by the Syrian regime, Meshaal's faction also has reportedly been gauging these states' willingness to provide a new base and office space for the group's exiled leadership.

The Costs and Benefits of a Relationship with Hamas

Hamas can make a compelling offer to these states. With concern growing in the region over how to check Iran's power, Hamas' move to distance itself from Iran and its allies in Syria could significantly undermine Tehran's influence in the Levant region. Additionally, these countries, particularly Egypt and Jordan, see a strategic interest in bringing Hamas closer. They can build leverage with the group -- creating another mechanism to balance Israel's power -- but also use that increased influence to keep Hamas in check. However, the strict condition these states are attaching to any deal are giving Hamas pause.
Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey share an interest in keeping Hamas hemmed in Gaza. These states frequently express their support of the principle of Palestinian statehood, but Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia in particular are most concerned by the idea of a Palestinian polity emerging that could threaten their national security. Egypt, dealing with an emboldened MB, does not want Hamas to break free of its isolation and meddle in Egyptian affairs. The Egyptian military elite is already on alert for Hamas attempts to instigate a crisis between Egypt and Israel; such a crisis could rally Egyptians and Palestinians alike and provide the Islamist opposition with the means to discredit the military's authority. In Jordan, where Palestinians constitute a majority of the population, the ethnically distinct Hashemite regime is facing a vociferous opposition led by the Jordanian MB and does not want to embolden its Palestinian population. Saudi Arabia has long had a tense relationship with Hamas and remembers well its past brushes with Palestinian militancy.
Building leverage with a militant group comes with risks. If any of these states agreed to start or increase funding for Hamas or host a Hamas office, they would not want to be held accountable for renegade actions by the group, especially by the United States and Israel. At the same time, they know Hamas is not ready to disarm, recognize Israel and make a full political transition.

Sending Mixed Signals to Tehran

These states also understand that Hamas is unlikely to completely sever its ties with Iran. Beyond the money, weapons and training it has received from Iran and its allies, Hamas needs to maintain a decent working relationship with Iran to avoid creating greater complications for itself in the Gaza Strip.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), a much smaller militant outfit than Hamas, has had a tight financial, ideological and logistical relationship with the Islamic Republic since the group's inception in 1980. PIJ is firmly committed to its militant campaign. The group openly rejects building ties with surrounding Arab states due to their perceived hypocrisy toward Palestinian statehood and the Arab states' alleged collusion with Israel. PIJ is thus the most likely Palestinian recipient of Iranian aid no longer destined for Hamas. PIJ and Hamas have long cooperated. Hamas is even suspected of occasionally relying on PIJ to carry out attacks, in an effort for Hamas to maintain plausible deniability in dealing with Israel. However, Hamas may have a decreased ability to control PIJ actions within Gaza if Hamas is no longer cooperating closely with PIJ's main backer, Iran. So long as Hamas controls Gaza, Israel will likely hold Hamas accountable for any attacks that emanate from there. A significant loss of control over militancy in Gaza could thus leave Hamas in a much more precarious position with regard to Israel.
Hamas' leadership seems to have been sending mixed signals to Tehran -- rather than running the risks involved in an outright break -- while waiting for agreements to come through with the Arab states. However, these states first want real assurances that Hamas will behave according to their standards and fundamentally shift away from the Iran-Syria axis. Indeed, according to the Palestinian Al Quds daily, Haniyeh was allegedly strongly advised by the leaders of Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait to cancel his upcoming visit to Tehran if Hamas is serious about making a deal. Haniyeh's arrival in Tehran on Feb. 10, despite the demands of the Arab states, shows that Hamas still feels the need to keep its options open with Iran.
Hamas knows the opportunity the MB's political elevation presents, but several complications apparently are preventing Hamas from making any clear, hard decisions.
While struggling to balance between Sunni states and Iran, Hamas is also trying to find a way to moderate its political position at home. Ongoing Hamas efforts to reconcile with Fatah and become part of the PLO are designed to insulate Hamas from the drawbacks of ruling Gaza alone. Hamas will not capitulate to Fatah for the sake of reverting to a more comfortable opposition posture. The group wants to share enough power – and present itself in enough of a pragmatic light – to resume financial flows and provide Hamas with some plausible deniability in dealing with Israeli military reprisals against the Gaza Strip.
However, this is placing a lot of pressure on the group. In trying to reintegrate itself with Fatah under the PLO umbrella and reinforce its relations with the surrounding Arab states, Hamas risks developing a crisis in legitimacy among Palestinians. The group already has accomplished little during its time in political office. Should a power-sharing government with Fatah fail to yield results, Hamas could be susceptible to the same criticism levied against its secularist rivals. Money is still sorely lacking in the Gaza Strip, and middle class members of Hamas who are making money are increasingly viewed as corrupt in the Palestinian territories. Hamas does not want to risk being put in the same light as Fatah and thereby seeing its credibility erode among its own supporters.

A Hamas Splintering?

Stresses within Hamas are already beginning to manifest in the form of public spats between the group's Gaza-based leadership and its exiled leadership over which political course to take with Fatah, how to manage the group's finances and what terms Hamas should agree to in dealing with foreign backers. Deep, personal rivalries have long existed within these factions, but the strains appear to be turning more severe. This dynamic was most recently illustrated the week of Feb. 6, when Meshaal signed a power-sharing agreement with Fatah leader and Palestinian National Authority leader Mahmoud Abbas in Doha, Qatar. Haniyeh and his deputy Mahmoud Zahar did not attend the Doha summit, and their parliamentary bloc strongly rejected the deal two days later, citing a clause that said Abbas would remain both president and prime minister in a future government. Haniyeh has since denied any rifts within his movement, but the more Hamas insists on its unity, the more doubts are raised regarding its internal coherence.
Aside from questions about how to reconcile with Fatah, there is also the important question of who will handle Hamas' finances if the exiled leadership moves from its financial base in Damascus. It appears that Hamas is looking to set up multiple offices in countries that agree to host Hamas and help fund the organization. This could see the exiled leadership spread across Cairo, Amman and possibly Doha. Meshaal, who has Jordanian citizenship, is likely to end up in Amman while Mousa Abu Marzouk, deputy head of Hamas' political bureau, has already reportedly moved with his family to Cairo. A scattering of Hamas' exiled leadership to these capitals may serve to enhance the group's ties with each of these states and encourage them to increase their funding to Hamas, but it also leaves the group beholden to the interests of multiple states that share a desire to keep the group contained. Moreover, the wider Hamas' exiled leadership is spread, the more difficult these leaders will find it to coordinate and remain relevant compared to the Gaza-based leadership.


\Special Report: Hamas In Transition | STRATFOR

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Saturday, August 6, 2011

The Palestinians' Imaginary State - By Steven J. Rosen | Foreign Policy

Excellent article on the vote for a Palestinian state being sought at the UN General Assembly in September. 
 
The Palestinians' Imaginary State 
A majority of the world's countries are gearing up to recognize a Palestinian state in September. But does Palestine really qualify? 
BY STEVEN J. ROSEN | AUGUST 3, 2011
 
In a few weeks, an overwhelming majority in the United Nations General Assembly will likely vote for collective recognition of a Palestinian state. But which Palestinian state? Of the three Palestinian states the assembly could recognize, two are real and arguably could meet the requirements for statehood. But it is the third, purely imaginary one that the assembly will endorse, one that neither has a functioning government nor meets the requirements of international law.
According to the prevailing legal standard, the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, a "state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states." Both the Hamas-controlled Palestinian entity in Gaza and the rival Fatah-governed Palestinian entity in the West Bank can be said to meet all four of these criteria of the law of statehood. The one on which the United Nations will vote does not.

In Gaza, Hamas controls a permanent population in a defined territory (i.e., Gaza within the armistice lines of 1949). Gaza has a functioning, if odious, government. And Hamas-controlled Gaza already conducts international relations with a large number of states. From a narrowly legal point of view, the Hamas Gaza entity could become a state, another miserable addition to a very imperfect world.

Of course, a Hamas state in Gaza is not something most of the world wants to see. A Hamas state allied to Iran would be a severe blow to international peace and security, and it would not be a state deserving of recognition by any democracy. It would be a state arising from the military coup of June 2007, a state that engages in large-scale violations of treaty obligations and human rights. Nor does Hamas seek statehood for Gaza alone. Hamas wants eventually to rule the whole of mandatory Palestine, comprising not just the West Bank along with Gaza, but all of today's Israel too. Gaza alone is too small a prize for so grand an ambition. So this possible state is not on the table.

The Fatah Palestinian entity in the West Bank also could meet the legal requirements for statehood, and it would have more international support. It has a functioning government in the Palestinian Authority (PA), a permanent population, and international relations with a very large number of states. It also controls a defined territory, which comprises what are called areas A and B as defined under the Oslo II agreement of September 1995, plus additional territory subsequently transferred by Israel in agreed further redeployments. (Area A is the zone of full civil and security control by the Palestinian Authority, and Area B is a zone of Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control.) The Fatah West Bank entity within these lines also could be recognized as a state under international law.

But Fatah, the PA, and the broader PLO do not seek statehood for this West Bank entity that arguably could meet the legal requirements. Their minimum demand is a state that includes Gaza along with the West Bank, the eastern part of Jerusalem, and all the other parts of mandatory Palestine that were under Jordanian and Egyptian control before 1967. Fatah, the PA, and the PLO are demanding title to lands and authority over populations they do not control, being as they are under the rule of Hamas and Israel.
Unlike the two Palestinian entities that already exist, either of which could be recognized as a Palestinian state because they seem to fulfill the legal requirements, the Palestinian entity that a General Assembly majority will recognize as a state this September does not actually exist on Earth. It is imaginary and aspirational, not real. And it does not meet the legal requirements.

First, it will have two rival presidents pursuing incompatible policies. Mahmoud Abbas is presenting himself as the president of the Palestine that is pressing the claim in the U.N. General Assembly, but he is not considered to be the president anymore by Hamas, the largest political party in the putative state. And Hamas has Palestine's own laws on its side in this dispute. Abbas was elected in 2005 to serve until January 2009, so his term has expired. In 2009, he unilaterally extended his term for another year until January 2010 (an extension that also has expired), but that extension did not adhere to Article 65 of the Palestinian constitution, the Basic Law. Hamas, which controls a majority in the now defunct Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), opposed the extension. According to Article 65 of the Basic Law, the legally empowered president of Palestine, since January 2009, has been PLC Speaker Abdel Aziz Dweik, a deputy representing Hamas. Palestine's ruling party, Hamas, considers Dweik, not Abbas, to be the legal president of Palestine, and it has a strong case.

Second, the Palestine that the General Assembly will recognize also will have two rival prime ministers pursuing incompatible policies. Hamas denies that Abbas has the authority to appoint Salam Fayyad as prime minister, because Abbas is not legally the president of Palestine under Article 65 and because Fayyad has not been empowered as prime minister by the Palestinian Legislative Council as required by Article 66 of the Basic Law. Neither his first appointment, on June 15, 2007, nor his reappointment on May 19, 2009, was confirmed by the PLC as required. Hamas, which controls the majority in the PLC, considers the legal prime minister of the Palestinian Authority to continue to be Ismail Haniyeh, a senior political leader of Hamas. Haniyeh was empowered by the PLC to be prime minister of Palestine in February 2006. Abbas dismissed Haniyeh from the office on June 14, 2007, after the Gaza coup, but Haniyeh counters that this decree violated articles 45, 78, and 83 and that he continues to exercise prime ministerial authority under Article 83. The PLC also continues to recognize Haniyeh's authority as prime minister. Here again, Hamas has the law on its side.

Third, this putative state of "Palestine" will also have a legislature that never meets. Elected on Jan. 25, 2006, for a term of four years, the PLC has enacted no laws, passed on no ministers, and conducted no meetings since 2007. Instead,Abbas says, "It is my right as a president to legislate laws and decisions that are called decrees. These decrees are legal, as long as the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) is not able to convene."

It is common for Palestinian observers and their supporters in the West to attribute the PLC's inaction to the fact that Israel arrested 21 of its more radical members in June 2006 after the abduction of Gilad Shalit, most of whom are still in detention. The Carter Center, for example, states, "With most of its representatives in Israeli prisons, the Palestinian Legislative Council never assembled the required quorum for meetings and hence was unable to carry out legislative functions designated to the PLC." But the PLC has 132 members, of whom fewer than 20 are detained by Israel, and a quorum of the PLC requires only one more than half the members -- 67 -- to be present. So it is not Israel that is preventing a quorum.

In fact, neither faction contending to rule Palestine actually wants the PLC to meet, for different reasons. Hamas does not want it brought to session to enact new laws or amendments to existing laws when its majority has been diluted, especially because it fears unfavorable amendments to the election law. And Fatah is only too happy to see the Hamas members in jail, because it too does not want the PLC to meet, lest it enforce the Basic Law by replacing Abbas and Fayyad. PLC Speaker Dweik, whom Hamas considers to be the legally empowered president of Palestine, has said of his own arrest by Israel, "Any action that put an end to our activity in the parliament was welcomed by many, among them the Palestinian Authority."

Fourth, this Palestine that the General Assembly will recognize will also lack the ability to hold presidential or legislative elections as required by Article 47 of its Basic Law -- not because Israel will prevent them, but again because the rival Palestinian rulers will not allow them to happen. Abbas's constitutionally defined term expired in January 2009, and the terms of the PLC representatives expired on Jan. 25, 2010, so new elections for both are overdue. The 2005 Palestinian Elections Law No. 9, Article 2, which Hamas recognizes as legally binding, and the replacement Elections Lawunilaterally decreed by Abbas on Sept. 2, 2007, Articles 2 to 4, which Hamas considers an unlawful usurpation of power under the constitution, require elections by now, but no such elections are in sight. Neither of the rivals wants an election to be held under the electoral rules recognized as legally binding by the other, and neither will permit the other to compete freely on territories it controls as required by both sets of regulations.

So there you have it. The General Assembly will make a remarkable decision about all this in the next few weeks. Instead of recognizing either of the two state-like entities that already exist, each having many of the attributes of statehood required by international law, the General Assembly will create an imaginary state that has two incompatible presidents, two rival prime ministers, a constitution whose most central provisions are violated by both sides, no functioning legislature, no ability to hold elections, a population mostly not under its control, borders that would annex territory under the control of other powers, and no clear path to resolve any of these conflicts. It is a resolution that plants the seeds for civil and international wars, not one that advances peace.

 
Thaer Ganaim/PPO via Getty Images 

Steven J. Rosen served for 23 years as a senior official of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. He is now the director of the Washington Project of the Middle East Forum. 

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/03/the_palestinians_imaginary_state?page=0,2

Wednesday, February 2, 2011

Analysis: The problems Egypt still faces

Analysis: The problems Egypt still faces
By BARRY RUBIN
02/02/2011
Jerusalem Post


Weak moderates, a radical people, the economy's fragility, and strong Islamists.


There’s a lot of confusion about the Egyptian crisis, yet it is vital that people understand what is at stake.

The first issue is whether only the ruler or the entire regime is going to fall. The mere resignation of President Hosni Mubarak from office would not be a huge problem. Vice President Omar Suleiman or someone else will take over, the regime will make adjustments to build support (and probably repress the Muslim Brotherhood) and Egypt’s policy – certainly its foreign policy – remains relatively unchanged.

But if the entire regime falls, this would lead to a period of anarchy – bad – or a new regime – worse.

There are some huge problems:

• The moderates’ weakness. There are no well-organized moderate groups with a big base of support. Can any such politicians compete with the highly organized, disciplined Muslim Brotherhood which knows precisely what it wants? Indeed, the muchtouted Mohamed ElBardai is a weak and ineffectual man with no political experience whatsoever. Many of the activists who have backed his candidacy are themselves Islamists.

Indeed, many of the non-Islamist “moderates” are not so moderate. In sharp contrast to reformers in other Arab countries, many of the Egyptian “democrats” are themselves quite radical, especially in terms of anti-American and anti-Israel thinking.

• The public’s radicalism. According to a recent Pew Research Center poll, the Egyptian public is extremely radical even in comparison to Jordan’s or Lebanon’s. When asked whether they preferred “Islamists” or “modernizers,” the score was 59 percent to 27% in favor of the Islamists. In addition, 20% said they liked al-Qaida; 30%, Hizbullah; 49%, Hamas. And this was at a time that their government daily propagandized against these groups.

How about religious views? Egyptian Muslims said the following: 82% want adulterers punished with stoning; 77% want robbers to be whipped and have their hands amputated; 84% favor the death penalty for any Muslim who changes his religion.

So how is such a radical public going to vote and what policies would they support? The Muslim Brotherhood is likely to be very popular while one would think secular moderates in suits and ties would not be able to compete in elections.

• The economy’s fragility. In a country like Saudi Arabia, a government can buy off opposition. Not so in Egypt, a place where there are few resources (some oil, Suez Canal) and too many people. So how is a government going to make the public happy? It won’t be able to offer greatly improved living standards, more jobs, and better housing. Instead, demagoguery is likely – as it has so often done before in the Arab world – to be the means of gaining votes and keeping the masses out of the streets.

This means the Islamization to some degree of social life, and waves of hatred against Israel and America, the Middle East equivalent of bread (subsidies for food will be increased, but how to pay for them?) and circuses. Moderate governments thrive usually when they can offer benefits. This is very unlikely in Egypt.

• The Islamists’ strength and extremism. If someone tells you that the Muslim Brotherhood is mild and moderate, don’t believe it. In its speeches and publications, it pours forth vitriol and hatred. Making the Shari’a the sole source of legislation for Egypt is one of its most basic demands. The rights of Christians and women (at least those who don’t want to live within radical Islamist rules) are going to decline in a country ruled by the Brotherhood, even as part of the coalition.

As for foreign policy, is the alliance with the United States and the peace treaty with Israel going to survive under such a regime? Maybe but why should that happen? And of course, the regime will support revolutionary Islamists elsewhere. Even ElBardei wants an alliance with Hamas. Such a regime will not be friendly toward the Palestinian Authority or oppose Iranian expansionism (even though it might well hate Iran as Shi’ites).

And what will the effect be on the rest of the region? Everyone will know – Israel and moderate Arabs alike – that they cannot depend on the United States. Revolutionary Islamists would be emboldened to subvert Morocco and Tunisia, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. With an Islamist-ruled Lebanon (for all practical purposes, if only unofficially), Gaza Strip, Iran and Turkey, and with Syrian participation, what will happen in the Middle East?

The worst kind of disaster is one that isn’t recognized as such.

Again, this has nothing much to do whether Mubarak himself stays or not, and everything to do with whether the Egyptian regime stays or not.

The writer is director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal.

Analysis: The problems Egypt still faces

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