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Showing posts with label Diplomacy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Diplomacy. Show all posts

Sunday, October 19, 2014

"We face a #leadership deficit of global proportions" We Have Reached Peak President by @AaronDMiller2

From @ForeignPolicy, Aaron David Miller tackles the lack of leaders in the world today.

We face a leadership deficit of global proportions. In fact, we seem to be pretty well along into what you might call the post-heroic leadership era

We Have Reached Peak President

Why the time of great American leadership is over.



A couple years back, I gave a talk to a group of Princeton graduate students and faculty on the indispensable role leaders play in successful Arab-Israeli negotiations. Having worked on the Middle East peace process for over 20 years, I had come to the conclusion that, far more than any other factor, it was willful leaders -- masters, not prisoners, of their political houses -- who produced the agreements that endure.
It proved to be a pretty tough crowd.
One graduate student insisted that I had been taken hostage by Thomas Carlyle and his "Great Man" theory of history. Another critic, a visiting professor from Turkey, protested that I had completely ignored the broader social and economic forces that really drive and determine change.
I conceded to both that the debate about what mattered more -- the individual or circumstances -- was a complicated business. But I reminded the professor that she hailed from a land in which one man,Mustafa Kemal -- otherwise known as Ataturk -- had fundamentally changed the entire direction of her country's modern history. We left it at that.
History, to be sure, is driven by the interaction between human agency and circumstance. Based on my own experiences in government and negotiations, individuals count greatly in this mix, particularly in matters of war, peace, and nation-building. Historian John Keegan made the stunning assertion that the story of much of the 20th century was a tale -- the biographies, really -- of six men: Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Churchill, FDR, and Mao. Wherever you stand on the issue of the individual's role in history, its impact must be factored into the equation, particularly when it comes to explaining turning points in a nation's history.
Nonetheless, the professor from Turkey had a point. Today we are consumed with leaders and leadership as the solution, if not the panacea, to just about everything that ails us. We admire the bold, transformational leader who seeks fundamental change, and value less the cautious transactor who negotiates, triangulates, and settles for less dramatic results. And we tend to forget too that great leaders almost always emerge in times of national crisis, trauma, and exigency, a risk we run if we hunger for the return of such leaders. Still, in Holy Grail-like pursuit, we search for some magic formula or key to try to understand what accounts for great leadership. Indeed, we seem nothing short of obsessed with the L-word.
Micah Zenko, my fellow columnist at Foreign Policy, in a column on this very word, notes that if you type "leadership books" into the Amazon search engine you get 126,288 results. Want to study leadership or, better yet, become a leader? There is certainly a program for you. The International Leadership Association lists over 1,500 academic programs in the field. Yale University alone has a Leadership Institute, a Women's Leadership Initiative, a Global Health Leadership Institute, and an MBA on Leadership in Healthcare.
This focus on leaders is understandable, particularly during times of great uncertainty and stress. The psychologists and mythologists tell us that the need to search for the great leader to guide or even rescue us is an ancient -- even primordial -- impulse. But what happens when we reach for something we may no longer be able to have?
Indeed, these days, those who favor and align with the Carlyle crowd and the "Great Man" view of history -- myself included -- have a serious problem.
We are now well into the 21st century, a full 70 years after Keegan's six transformers either tried to take over the world or to save it. Look around. Where are the giants of old, the transformers who changed the world and left great legacies? Plenty of very bad leaders have come and gone -- Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Saddam Hussein, Muammar al-Qaddafi, Slobodan Milosevic -- and some larger-than-life good ones too, like Charles de Gaulle, Konrad Adenauer, Anwar Sadat, Mikhail Gorbachev, Pope John Paul II, and Nelson Mandela.
Leaders, to be sure, can emerge from the most unlikely places and at the least expected and most fortuitous times. Think only of Abraham Lincoln, Mahatma Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr. And who knows what kind of leaders history's long arc might produce in the future?
That said, today things don't look that bright. We face a leadership deficit of global proportions. In fact, we seem to be pretty well along into what you might call the post-heroic leadership era.
Today, 193 countries sit in the United Nations, among them 88 free and functioning democracies. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the so-called great powers -- the United States, Britain, France, China, and Russia -- are not led by great, transformative leaders. Nor do rising states such as Brazil, India, and South Africa boast leaders with strong and accomplished records. We certainly see leaders who are adept at maintaining power and keeping their seats -- some, like Russia's Vladimir Putin and Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan, for many years. Germany's Angela Merkel is certainly a powerful leader and skilled politician.
But where are those whom we could honestly describe as potentially great, heroic, or inspirational? And how many are not only great, but good -- with compassion and high moral and ethical standards -- too? Today, if I were pressed to identify a potentially great leader, I might offer up not a traditional head of state at all, but rather a religious figure: Pope Francis I, whose greatness as well as goodness may well be defined by the irony of his anti-greatness, commonness, and humility.
Nowhere is this leadership vacuum more acutely felt than in the politics of the United States, the world's greatest and most consequential power.
Nowhere is this leadership vacuum more acutely felt than in the politics of the United States, the world's greatest and most consequential power. Greatness is certainly not missing in the American story. Despite talk of decline, America remains the world's sole superpower, with a better balance of military, political, economic, and soft power than any other nation in the world. With 5 percent of the world's population, the United States accounts for a full 25 percent of the world's economic output, nearly half of its military expenditures, and has the best capacity to project its educational, cultural, and social media soft-power resources. We surely have no shortage of great athletes, actors, entrepreneurs, and scientists.

Still, great nations are supposed to have great political leaders too, right? And yet today in America we hear very little talk of greatness in our politics. Instead, the focus is on the leadership deficit, on America the ungovernable, and on the sorry state of its dysfunctional politics. One 2013 poll revealed that the public's view of Congress was significantly less positive than its view of root canal operations, NFL replacement refs, colonoscopies, France, and even cockroaches.
It should come as no surprise that the concern about the leadership deficit in our political class also extends to the presidency itself, an institution that has become, both for better and worse, the central element in our political system.
Yet the centrality of the presidency must be reconciled with the limitations of the office and the constraints that bind it. The presidency has always been an implausible, some might even say an impossible, job. But the following mix of challenges and constraints -- some old, some new -- has made the post-World War II presidency harder still: constitutional and practical constraints on the office itself; the president's expanding reach and responsibilities; the expanding role of a government we trust less, even when we demand more from it; America's global role; and an intrusive, omnipresent, and nonstop media.
These challenges have created the ultimate presidential bind. On one hand, we have become presidency-dependent in a president-centric system; on the other hand, our expectations have risen while the president's capacity to deliver has diminished.
In essence, we are lost in a kind of presidential Bermuda Triangle, adrift between the presidents we still want and the ones we can no longer have.
That bind is the subject of my new book, The End of Greatness: Why America Can't Have (and Doesn't Want) Another Great President. And three elements define and drive the core argument:
First, greatness in the presidency may be rare, but it is both real and measurable.
Three undeniably great presidents straddle the American story: Washington, the proverbial father of his country; Lincoln, who kept it whole through the Civil War; and Franklin Roosevelt, who shepherded the nation through its worst economic calamity and won its greatest war. Their very deeds define the meaning of greatness in American political life. So let me be clear about my definition of that greatness: Each of the undeniably great presidents overcame a truly nation-wrenching challenge or crisis; each used his crisis moment to fundamentally alter the way we see ourselves as a nation and the way we govern ourselves too, and in doing so changed the nation forever for the better; and each in the process transcended narrow partisanship and in time came to be seen even by critics as an extraordinary national leader.
In addition to these three undeniable greats, perhaps five others whom historians and the public judge favorably too -- their own legacies secured through great accomplishments at critical moments in the nation's story -- round out the group of top performers. The operative point is that this greatness club has created a frame of reference, a high bar really -- and a problematic one, at that -- against which we have come to judge and evaluate our modern presidents and they have come to judge themselves. In the book's early sections, I look at what defines greatness in the presidency and look at who gets admitted into this elite presidential club and why.
Second, historic greatness in the presidency has gone the way of the dodo.
And it is unlikely to return any time soon. The presidents we judge to be great are very much with us still -- everywhere, really. They are on our money and monuments, stars of our HBO specials and Hollywood movies, and subjects of best-selling presidential biographies. They are everywhere, that is, except in the White House.
As we will see, what I describe as "traces of greatness," both real and perceived, have appeared in several of our more contemporary presidents. But those "traces" are not to be confused with the performance of the three undeniables or the handful of other top performers we hold in high esteem. The greatness I described earlier belongs to an America of a different time and place, to a different country really. In the second part of the book, I explain why the history of the post-FDR presidency has been such a challenging tale, and why the times and circumstances have narrowed the prospects, the need, and the opportunity for sustained heroic action in the presidency.
Third, and there really is no other way to say this: We need to get over the greatness thing and stop pining for the return of leaders we can no longer have.
Like the ghosts in Charles Dickens's A Christmas Carol, great presidents continue to hover, to teach, and to inspire. And we have much to learn from their successes and failures. But there is a risk in thinking, let alone succumbing to the illusion, that we will see their likes again, even in an altered contemporary guise. The world and country have changed and so have we. And besides, we should not want to see them again. Greatness in the presidency is too rare to be relevant in our modern times and -- driven as it is in our political system by big crisis -- too risky and dangerous to be desirable. Our continued search for idealized presidents raises our expectations and theirs, skews presidential performance, and leads to an impossible standard that can only frustrate and disappoint. To sum up: We can no longer have a truly great president, we seldom need one, and, as irrational as it sounds, we may not want one, either. And the final chapters of the book contemplate why.
So what do we do about our seemingly insatiable presidential addiction?
Americans will always aspire to more. And we can no more give up on our presidents than we can on ourselves.
Maybe our story, a journey really through a period of presidential greatness once revealed and now gone, will offer up some answers. And perhaps at journey's end we can even begin to discover a way to narrow the gap between the presidents we want and the ones we can realistically have.
This piece was adapted from Aaron David Miller's recent book, The End of Greatness: Why America Can't Have (and Doesn't Want) Another Great President.


We Have Reached Peak President





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Saturday, June 21, 2014

What Really Happened in #Iran in 1953?

Conventional wisdom about the 1953 coup in Iran rests on the myth that the CIA toppled the country's democratically elected prime minister. In reality, the coup was primarily a domestic Iranian affair, and the CIA's impact was ultimately insignificant.

What Really Happened in Iran

Back in 2009, during his heavily promoted Cairo speech on American relations with the Muslim world, U.S. President Barack Obama noted, in passing, that “in the middle of the Cold War, the United States played a role in the overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government.” Obama was referring to the 1953 coup that toppled Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and consolidated the rule of the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Obama would go on to remind his audience that Iran had also committed its share of misdeeds against Americans. But he clearly intended his allusion to Washington’s role in the coup as a concession -- a public acknowledgment that the United States shared some of the blame for its long-simmering conflict with the Islamic Republic.
Yet there was a supreme irony to Obama’s concession. The history of the U.S. role in Iran’s 1953 coup may be “well known,” as the president declared in his speech, but it is not well founded. On the contrary, it rests heavily on two related myths: that machinations by the CIA were the most important factor in Mosaddeq’s downfall and that Iran’s brief democratic interlude was spoiled primarily by American and British meddling. For decades, historians, journalists, and pundits have promoted these myths, injecting them not just into the political discourse but also into popular culture: most recently, Argo, a Hollywood thriller that won the 2013 Academy Award for Best Picture, suggested that Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution was a belated response to an injustice perpetrated by the United States a quarter century earlier. That version of events has also been promoted by Iran’s theocratic leaders, who have exploited it to stoke anti-Americanism and to obscure the fact that the clergy itself played a major role in toppling Mosaddeq.
In reality, the CIA’s impact on the events of 1953 was ultimately insignificant. Regardless of anything the United States did or did not do, Mosaddeq was bound to fall and the shah was bound to retain his throne and expand his power. Yet the narrative of American culpability has become so entrenched that it now shapes how many Americans understand the history of U.S.-Iranian relations and influences how American leaders think about Iran. In reaching out to the Islamic Republic, the United States has cast itself as a sinner expiating its previous transgressions. This has allowed the Iranian theocracy, which has abused history in a thousand ways, to claim the moral high ground, giving it an unearned advantage over Washington and the West, even in situations that have nothing to do with 1953 and in which Iran’s behavior is the sole cause of the conflict, such as the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program.
All of this makes developing a better and more accurate understanding of the real U.S. role in Iran’s past critically important. It’s far more than a matter of correcting the history books. Getting things right would help the United States develop a less self-defeating approach to the Islamic Republic today and would encourage Iranians -- especially the country’s clerical elite -- to claim ownership of their past.
Day in court: Mohammad Mosaddeq on trial, November 1953.

Day in court: Mohammad Mosaddeq on trial, November 1953. (Getty / Carl Mydans)

HONEST BROKERS
In the years following World War II, Iran was a devastated country, recovering from famine and poverty brought on by the war. It was also a wealthy country, whose ample oil reserves fueled the engines of the British Empire. But Iran’s government didn’t control that oil: the wheel was held by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, whose majority shareholder happened to be the British government. By the early 1950s, as assertive nationalism swept the developing world, many Iranians were beginning to see this colonial-era arrangement as an unjust, undignified anachronism.
So strong was the desire to take back control of Iran’s national resources that it united the country’s liberal reformers, its intelligentsia, elements of its clerical establishment, and its middle-class professionals into a coherent political movement. At the center of that movement stood Mosaddeq, an upper-class lawyer who had been involved in Iranian politics from a young age, serving in various ministries and as a member of parliament. Toward the end of World War II, Mosaddeq reemerged on the political scene as a champion of Iranian anticolonialism and nationalism and managed to draw together many disparate elements into his political party, the National Front. Mosaddeq was not a revolutionary; he was respectful of the traditions of his social class and supported the idea of constitutional monarchy. But he also sought a more modern and more democratic Iran, and in addition to the nationalization of Iran’s oil, his party’s agenda called for improved public education, freedom of the press, judicial reforms, and a more representative government.
In April 1951, the Iranian parliament voted to appoint Mosaddeq prime minister. In a clever move, Mosaddeq insisted that he would not assume the office unless the parliament also approved an act he had proposed that would nationalize the Iranian oil industry. Mosaddeq got his way in a unanimous vote, and the easily intimidated shah capitulated to the parliament’s demands. Iran now entered a new and more dangerous crisis.

Friday, February 4, 2011

Everybody Loves(ed) Hosni - Foreign Policy

Everybody Loves Loved Hosni

For 30 years the world welcomed Egypt's president -- they shook his hand and looked the other way. But the time for photo ops is likely over. 

FEBRUARY 1, 2011


U.S. President Jimmy Carter brokered the 1978 peace talks between Israel and Egypt when Hosni Mubarak was President Anwar Sadat's vice president. (To sweeten the deal, Carter threw in generous U.S. military support to Egypt, setting the terms of the largely military-driven relationship between the two countries that has continued throughout Mubarak's rule.) Those talks resulted in the 1979 treaty between Egypt and Israel. And while Carter told a reporter on Jan. 30 that he felt he knew "Mubarak quite well," the former U.S. president also said that the Egyptian president had become "more politically corrupt" than he was during their Camp David days. "The United States wants Mubarak to stay in power," Carter commented, "but the people have decided."
AFP/Getty Images

The U.S. relationship with Egypt deteriorated in the early 1980s largely because of mutual distrust over relations with Israel. Egypt was angry that Washington failed to put pressure on Israel after it invaded Lebanon in 1982, while the United States complained that Egypt was slow to normalize relations with the Jewish state after the 1979 Camp David Accord. Mubarak visited U.S. President Ronald Reagan at the White House in 1985 in an attempt to rebuild the relationship. After the meeting, Reagan declared that he and Mubarak were "close friends and partners in peace."
Diana Walker//Time Life Pictures/Getty Images 

Thursday, January 27, 2011

The odd couple at Europe’s helm

The odd couple at Europe's helm
From The International Herald Tribune:

PARIS — She makes fun, in private, of the way he walks and talks, of his rapid, jerky gestures and facial grimaces. He mocks her deliberation, her reluctance, her matronly caution.
She has compared him to Mr. Bean and to the French comic Louis de Funès, with his curly hair and large nose. He sometimes calls her ''La Boche,'' the offensive French version of ''Kraut,'' and goes out of his way to give her an embrace and a double-cheeked kiss in the French fashion, the kind of contact that he knows very well, aides say, she cannot stand.

While the agonies of the European Union — sovereign defaults, deficits and bubbles — unfold like a great wonk drama, at their core is something more intimate: the fractured tale of Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy. They have been photographed across Europe giving the appearance of happy partnership. They are the best hope Europe has for continued unity. But they do not like each other at all.

As with any couple in trouble, economic difficulty has added to the strain. Two years ago, at the beginning of the crisis, Mr. Sarkozy burst out in public, saying, ''France is acting, while Germany is only thinking about it!''

Later, before an E.U. meeting in Brussels on the Greek bailout, the French president was in a rage at his inability to persuade Mrs. Merkel to do more for that country.


http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/magazine/16MerkelSarkozy-t.html


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Wednesday, January 19, 2011

Tunisia and the myth of the ‘benevolent dictator’

Tunisia and the myth of the ‘benevolent dictator’
By JUSTIN D. MARTIN
17/01/2011

The more a nation grows, the more the tyrants must pilfer from the public chest to remain dictator du jour
Print Edition
Photo by: Associated Press



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Last year I published essays from Tunisia, Kuwait and Singapore, screaming about the human rights abuses in each, particularly their muzzling of free expression. After writing each of these commentaries, I received feedback along these lines: “Since these countries are, to varying degrees, economic success stories, does it really matter that political speech is roped off? Perhaps there is something ungovernable about these societies, and they need a ruler with a ceaseless grip.”

For years, Tunisia was perceived by many observers as a nation ruled by a truncheon, but which functioned just fine because it was somehow benevolent.

Rotting, putrid nonsense. Dictatorships are, by definition, self-serving and nonbenevolent; some dictatorships are just noisier than others. I spent 2005-2006 in Jordan – also a country that is an economic success story and deemed innocuous. Without significant natural resources, and with a massive refugee population, Jordan has nonetheless demonstrated impressive economic growth over the past 15 years, and boasts a large and growing middle class. Jordan, though, is a police state if ever there was one, and its secret security force is a dark, cold institution. There is no benevolence when the Jordanian mukhabarat whisks a political dissident away before dawn to extract information.

Anyone who argues that a would-be group of rowdy people cannot govern themselves need only look to India. It is one of the loudest, most bustling, frenetic places on the planet, and also the world’s most populous democracy. And anyone who claims Islam is incompatible with democracy should recall that India has hundreds of millions of Muslim democrats.

TUNISIA IS the most recent and vivid example of the myth of benevolent autocracy. Despotism is what’s untenable; self-governance is not. For decades, the world humored Tunisia’s overlords, and because the country is small, it’s been relatively quiet. It demonstrated impressive economic growth, and it’s a damn fine place to visit. My wife and I were in Tunisia in November for 10 days, and struggle to think of a country we find more delightful. Tunisia’s beauty took my breath away, and I grew up on the Gulf coast of Florida.

Among the millions of pictures of Tunisia’s now-hiding despot is the slogan of a government PR campaign: “Tunisia: A country that works.”

Tunisia is one of the most prosperous states among the non-oil-rich nations in North Africa and the Middle East. But even dictatorships that seem to work do not work forever. Not when a swelling middle class demands more influence over its own political future. Not in an age when webizens get a digital taste of the freedoms in countries that actually do work. As far as free speech and political rights are concerned, Tunisia has for years been one of the most rotten places on the planet.

Singapore, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and other economically functional dictatorships, be warned: You’re not benevolent and your people know it, even if the world ignores your quiet brutality.

Americans and Europeans, of all people, should recognize the canard of the benevolent dictator, as it was the debunking of this myth that formed modern democracies in the West. Britain’s King George III viewed himself as a benevolent dictator in the late 1700s. “There’s economic progress in the colonies,” George no doubt observed. “What more do these brigands want?”

The reality is that illegitimate tyrants are despised regardless of whether the economy is growing or not, because the more a nation grows, the more the tyrants must pilfer from the public chest to remain dictator du jour.

Like George, Tunisia’s fleeing hack is a creaking, unelected, unjustly enriched, out-of- touch sack of wrinkles. The world would be better off if the 74-year-old stays in Saudi Arabia and dies in obscurity. But whatever plays out, the uprising in Tunisia is helping lay bare the lie that autocrats can be cuddly.

The words “benevolent dictator” aren’t humorously oxymoronic yet occasionally true, like “honest politician” or “sober Irishman.” Benevolent dictators just don’t exist. Many words describe erstwhile Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, but “benevolent” isn’t among them.

The writer teaches journalism at The American University in Cairo, and is a columnist for Columbia Journalism Review. martin@aucegypt.edu


Tunisia and the myth of the ‘benevolent dictator’

Monday, December 13, 2010

Stratfor Dispatch: Intersection of Iranian Domestic and Foreign Policies

Dispatch: Intersection of Iranian Domestic and Foreign Policies

Dispatch: Intersection of Iranian Domestic and Foreign Policies | STRATFOR

Analyst Kamran Bokhari discusses the firing of Iran’s foreign minister and how the move illustrates the Iranian president’s ability to steer through domestic opposition and push his foreign policy agenda.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad fired his foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, at a time when Iran is engaged with intense nuclear negotiations. The firing of the foreign minister is evidence of a simmering internal power struggle that has the ability to impact the Islamic republic’s negotiations with the West.
Mottaki was actually abroad in Senegal when he was fired by the president, and that’s very significant in that it tells us that not only is this the result of an internal power struggle, but it’s also a very abrupt measure. And we know that Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been engaged in trying to bypass the foreign ministry by appointing key people in advisory positions and making use of the National Security Council to make foreign policy. Ahmadinejad faces opposition from across the entire political establishment in Tehran. There are people in various institutions within various factions that support the president, and then there are people in those same institutions and same factions that oppose the president. This makes the president’s job of policymaking and governance very difficult. It constrains him far beyond what a normal Iranian president would face from the byzantine structure that is the Islamic republic. So therefore, Ahmadinejad has had to navigate through this complex swamp in a very skillful way to not only maintain power, but also to push ahead his policy agenda.
That the firing of the foreign minister comes within days of the nuclear talks between the West and Iran suggests that there is some significant tension within the establishment. We know that over the past year, the supreme leader and Ahmadinejad have been at odds over the proposed uranium swapping deal that the West has been offering Iran. Ahmadinejad accepted it in the talks that were held over a year ago last October in 2009. Shortly thereafter, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei came out and rejected it very publicly. So if we go by that and we look at the way the foreign minister has been removed, it appears as though Ahmadinejad was facing a lot of opposition to any negotiation that he was conducting with the West from certain very powerful quarters, and in order to bypass those quarters, he went ahead and removed the foreign minister. If you look at the person who has replaced him, he is, or at least was until today, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and someone who has worked closely with the president in recent years.
Today’s move to oust a foreign minister who has been in his Cabinet since day one speaks volumes about how Ahmadinejad is willing to take risks to push his agenda and to be able to navigate and maintain his position as president and head of state. Will he be successful? It’s too early to say. The game is not over, in fact, I think the game has just begun.
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to www.stratfor.com


Read more: Dispatch: Intersection of Iranian Domestic and Foreign Policies | STRATFOR
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Finally, Wikileaks says something interesting about Venezuela: how it intervenes in Salvadoran affairs

Finally, Wikileaks says something interesting about Venezuela: how it intervenes in Salvadoran affairs

The cable drip keeps going on and now we are starting to see patterns emerge besides the obvious gossip content.  El Pais from Spain, which is the "partner" specializing in cables related to Latin America, is starting to make interesting studies putting together several cables at once to let the big picture emerge.  Today we have a fascinating narration about El Salvador, about how the FLMN tries to sabotage the current president Funes, how the secret service of Salvador basically works against its president and exposes the country to future problem by letting, for example, the Venezuelan foreign minister go through the country unnoticed to set the reentry of Zelaya in Honduras a year ago.  You can read the five cables 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, that will let you know how even Funes is not feeling safe, and with good reasons.


What is shocking here is not what we read, we sort of suspected all of that stuff.  The thing is that the US knew about all of this stuff during the Honduras crisis, how the risk for a domino effect on El Salvador could happen if Zelaya was back in office and yet we had to wait for the wikileaks to know about such an extensive knowledge.

In a way I can understand the secrecy: the US was not in any condition materially or morally to back up Funes publicly considering the past of El Salvador.  However such knowledge should have made the US more critical of Zelaya brinkmanship pushed by Chavez and Lula.  Eventually the US strategy did prevail in the end and I want to believe that it was due in part to the Salvador embassy cables.

Finally, since from Brazil to El Salvador it is common knowledge AND opinion that Chavez is a saboteur, destroying any international organization he can get away with (only MERCOSUR still is worth something in this hemisphere because Paraguay refuses to let Venezuela in), how come they are not trying harder to contain Chavez?  Or a the Brazilian cables reveal, is it because the Brazilian are only too happy to let Chavez do the dirty job of Empire building in their favor?

Whatever it is, one thing is certain: Chaevz does not want anyone to look inside Venezuela but he is quiet the busy bee elsewhere.  Is anyone, ANYONE, going to call him on that?  And this also goes for the Venezuelan opposition who seems to be catatonic since September 26.
Read more…

Friday, December 10, 2010

Assange To Be Indicted Under US Espionage Act on The MasterBlog

Assange To Be Indicted Under US Espionage Act

Tyler Durden's picture



Here it comes, via ABC News:
Wikileaks founder Julian Assange, the man behind the publication of more than a 250,000 classified U.S. diplomatic cables, could soon be facing spying charges in the U.S. related to the Espionage Act, Assange's lawyer said today.

"Our position of course is that we don't believe it applies to Mr. Assange and that in any event he's entitled to First Amendment protection as publisher of Wikileaks and any prosecution under the Espionage Act would in my view be unconstitutional and puts at risk all media organizations in the U.S.," Assange's attorney Jennifer Robinson told ABC News.

Robinson said a U.S. indictment of Assange was imminent.

Justice Department officials declined to comment on the possible coming charges, but earlier this week, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder said the release of the documents had put the United States at risk and said he authorized a criminal investigation into Assange.

"The lives of people who work for the American people has been put at risk; the American people themselves have been put at risk by these actions that are, I believe, arrogant, misguided and ultimately not helpful in any way. We are doing everything that we can," Holder said Tuesday. "We have a very serious, active, ongoing investigation that is criminal in nature. I authorized just last week a number of things to be done so that we can hopefully get to the bottom of this and hold people accountable, as they -- as they should be."
Very soon, we expect that every jouranlism degree will come with a free indictment of treason and a sentence of public stoning.

Thursday, December 2, 2010

Stratfor: Dispatch: WikiLeaks and Implications for Intelligence Sharing

Stratfor logo

Dispatch: WikiLeaks and Implications for Intelligence Sharing

December 1, 2010 | 2140 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:

Vice President of Intelligence Fred Burton discusses how the U.S. Intelligence community may return to a pre-9/11 approach to information-sharing.
Editor's Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
In aftermath of the WikiLeaks disclosure Stratfor sources are indicating that the US intelligence community are looking at ways to further compartment information to prohibit this kind of disclosure in the future.
In the pre-9/11 world there was not a steady flow of information, primarily between the FBI and the CIA. But the other government agencies were also affected. As a result of that, one of the recommendations of the 9/11 commission was a much broader dissemination of information so analysts saw more so they could reach accurate assessments. As a result of WikiLeaks, what you're seeing is the desire to restrict that flow of data. In essence analysts will not have access to perhaps operational channel messages which contain very granular data on the sources as well as the kind of terrorism information they may need to do their job.
Analysts like to see all source reporting. That would be open-source to highly classified intelligence information in order to make the most accurate assessment on whatever topic it is. By restricting what the analysts can see as a result of WikiLeaks, does impact upon that analysts ability to get an accurate read into a specific topic.
In the intelligence business there is always a friction that exists between the collectors; the agents in the field, the case officers that's meeting with the sources and reporting that data back, and the analysts that are sitting behind the desk at headquarters. There has to be a very careful balance between the two to ensure that the analyst gets the data that they need to do their job as well as the operators can protect the sources identity to ensure that individuals are protected and providing information to the US government.
So this is a very cyclical kind of process that we're going through right now and it's usually as a result of disastrous events like WikiLeaks or aircraft hijackings or embassy bombings or 9/11 kinds of events.
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Tuesday, November 30, 2010

WikiLeaks: France refuses to confirm Iran, Venezuela criticism | Reuters

France refuses to confirm Iran, Venezuela criticism

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8:59am EST
PARIS (Reuters) - France refused to confirm on Monday scathing criticism of Iran and Venezuela by a senior French diplomat contained in U.S. State Department documents leaked by the whistle-blowing WikiLeaks web site.
A spokesman for France's foreign ministry branded WikiLeaks as "irresponsible" for releasing U.S. diplomatic correspondence which he said could "harm the resolution of issues essential for the security and stability of international relations and place at risk people's safety."
"We strongly deplore the deliberate and irresponsible disclosure by the WikiLeaks site of American diplomatic correspondence," the foreign ministry spokesman said.
"We do not confirm any of the points attributed to French authorities and diplomats in these documents," the spokesman said in response to a question about the reported criticism of Iran and Venezuela.
The Guardian, one of a handful of newspapers allowed access to the documents, reported that the top diplomatic adviser to President Nicolas Sarkozy had told a senior U.S. diplomat in September 2009 that Iran was a "fascist" state and the time had come to decide on further steps.
The newspaper printed the text of a diplomatic telegram which said that Jean-Davide Levitte had described Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez as "crazy" and said: "Unfortunately, Chavez is taking one of Latin America's richest countries and turning it into another Zimbabwe."
The foreign ministry spokesman said the disclosure of classified U.S. State Department cables constituted a violation of state sovereignty and of the Vienna convention, which guarantees the secrecy of diplomatic correspondence.
The spokesman said the U.S. administration had warned the French government about the leaks and Paris had offered to work together in response to any repercussions. (Reporting by Daniel Flynn; editing by Mark Heinrich)
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France refuses to confirm Iran, Venezuela criticism | Reuters

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Friday, October 1, 2010

Pakistan and the U.S. Exit From Afghanistan

Pakistan and the U.S. Exit From Afghanistan

By George Friedman
Bob Woodward has released another book, this one on the debate over Afghanistan strategy in the Obama administration. As all his books do, the book has riveted Washington. It reveals that intense debate occurred over what course to take, that the president sought alternative strategies and that compromises were reached. But while knowing the details of these things is interesting, what would have been shocking is if they hadn't taken place.
It is interesting to reflect on the institutional inevitability of these disagreements. The military is involved in a war. It is institutionally and emotionally committed to victory in the theater of combat. It will demand all available resources for executing the war under way. For a soldier who has bled in that war, questioning the importance of the war is obscene. A war must be fought relentlessly and with all available means.
But while the military's top generals and senior civilian leadership are responsible for providing the president with sound, clearheaded advice on all military matters including the highest levels of grand strategy, they are ultimately responsible for the pursuit of military objectives to which the commander-in-chief directs them. Generals must think about how to win the war they are fighting. Presidents must think about whether the war is worth fighting. The president is responsible for America's global posture. He must consider what an unlimited commitment to a particular conflict might mean in other regions of the world where forces would be unavailable.
A president must take a more dispassionate view than his generals. He must calculate not only whether victory is possible but also the value of the victory relative to the cost. Given the nature of the war in Afghanistan, U.S. President Barack Obama and Gen. David Petraeus — first the U.S. Central Command chief and now the top commander in Afghanistan — had to view it differently. This is unavoidable. This is natural. And only one of the two is ultimately in charge.

The Nature of Guerrilla Warfare
In thinking about Afghanistan, it is essential that we begin by thinking about the nature of guerrilla warfare against an occupying force. The guerrilla lives in the country. He isn't going anywhere else, as he has nowhere to go. By contrast, the foreigner has a place to which he can return. This is the core weakness of the occupier and the strength of the guerrilla. The former can leave and in all likelihood, his nation will survive. The guerrilla can't. And having alternatives undermines the foreigner's will to fight regardless of the importance of the war to him.
The strategy of the guerrilla is to make the option to withdraw more attractive. In order to do this, his strategic goal is simply to survive and fight on whatever level he can. His patience is built into who he is and what he is fighting for. The occupier's patience is calculated against the cost of the occupation and its opportunity costs, thus, while troops are committed in this country, what is happening elsewhere?
Tactically, the guerrilla survives by being elusive. He disperses in small groups. He operates in hostile terrain. He denies the enemy intelligence on his location and capabilities. He forms political alliances with civilians who provide him supplies and intelligence on the occupation forces and misleads the occupiers about his own location. The guerrilla uses this intelligence network to decline combat on the enemy's terms and to strike the enemy when he is least prepared. The guerrilla's goal is not to seize and hold ground but to survive, evade and strike, imposing casualties on the occupier. Above all, the guerrilla must never form a center of gravity that, if struck, would lead to his defeat. He thus actively avoids anything that could be construed as a decisive contact.
The occupation force is normally a more conventional army. Its strength is superior firepower, resources and organization. If it knows where the guerrilla is and can strike before the guerrilla can disperse, the occupying force will defeat the guerrilla. The occupier's problems are that his intelligence is normally inferior to that of the guerrillas; the guerrillas rarely mass in ways that permit decisive combat and normally can disperse faster than the occupier can pinpoint and deploy forces against them; and the guerrillas' superior tactical capabilities allow them to impose a constant low rate of casualties on the occupier. Indeed, the massive amount of resources the occupier requires and the inflexibility of a military institution not solely committed to the particular theater of operations can actually work against the occupier by creating logistical vulnerabilities susceptible to guerrilla attacks and difficulty adapting at a rate sufficient to keep pace with the guerrilla. The occupation force will always win engagements, but that is never the measure of victory. If the guerrillas operate by doctrine, defeats in unplanned engagements will not undermine their basic goal of survival. While the occupier is not winning decisively, even while suffering only some casualties, he is losing. While the guerrilla is not losing decisively, even if suffering significant casualties, he is winning. Since the guerrilla is not going anywhere, he can afford far higher casualties than the occupier, who ultimately has the alternative of withdrawal.
The asymmetry of this warfare favors the guerrilla. This is particularly true when the strategic value of the war to the occupier is ambiguous, where the occupier does not possess sufficient force and patience to systematically overwhelm the guerrillas, and where either political or military constraints prevent operations against sanctuaries. This is a truth as relevant to David's insurgency against the Philistines as it is to the U.S. experience in Vietnam or the Russian occupation of Afghanistan.
There has long been a myth about the unwillingness of Americans to absorb casualties for very long in guerrilla wars. In reality, the United States fought in Vietnam for at least seven years (depending on when you count the start and stop) and has now fought in Afghanistan for nine years. The idea that Americans can't endure the long war has no empirical basis. What the United States has difficulty with — along with imperial and colonial powers before it — is a war in which the ability to impose one's will on the enemy through force of arms is lacking and when it is not clear that the failure of previous years to win the war will be solved in the years ahead.
Far more relevant than casualties to whether Americans continue a war is the question of the conflict's strategic importance, for which the president is ultimately responsible. This divides into several parts. This first is whether the United States has the ability with available force to achieve its political goals through prosecuting the war (since all war is fought for some political goal, from regime change to policy shift) and whether the force the United States is willing to dedicate suffices to achieve these goals. To address this question in Afghanistan, we have to focus on the political goal.
The Evolution of the U.S. Political Goal in Afghanistan
Washington's primary goal at the initiation of the conflict was to destroy or disrupt al Qaeda in Afghanistan to protect the U.S. homeland from follow-on attacks to 9/11. But if Afghanistan were completely pacified, the threat of Islamist-fueled transnational terrorism would remain at issue because it is no longer just an issue of a single organization — al Qaeda — but a series of fragmented groups conducting operations in Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, North Africa, Somalia and elsewhere.
Today, al Qaeda is simply one manifestation of the threat of this transnational jihadist phenomenon. It is important to stop and consider al Qaeda — and the transnational jihadist phenomenon in general — in terms of guerrillas, and to think of the phenomenon as a guerrilla force in its own right operating by the very same rules on a global basis. Thus, where the Taliban apply guerrilla principles to Afghanistan, today's transnational jihadist applies them to the Islamic world and beyond. The transnational jihadists are not leaving and are not giving up. Like the Taliban in Afghanistan, they will decline combat against larger American forces and strike vulnerable targets when they can.
There are certainly more players and more complexity to the global phenomenon than in a localized insurgency. Many governments across North Africa, the Middle East and South Asia have no interest in seeing these movements set up shop and stir up unrest in their territory. And al Qaeda's devolution has seen frustrations as well as successes as it spreads. But the underlying principles of guerrilla warfare remain at issue. Whenever the Americans concentrate force in one area, al Qaeda disengages, disperses and regroups elsewhere and, perhaps more important, the ideology that underpins the phenomenon continues to exist. The threat will undoubtedly continue to evolve and face challenges, but in the end, it will continue to exist along the lines of the guerrilla acting against the United States.
There is another important way in which the global guerrilla analogy is apt. STRATFOR has long held that Islamist-fueled transnational terrorism does not represent a strategic, existential threat to the United States. While acts of transnational terrorism target civilians, they are not attacks — have not been and are not evolving into attacks — that endanger the territorial integrity of the United States or the way of life of the American people. They are dangerous and must be defended against, but transnational terrorism is and remains a tactical problem that for nearly a decade has been treated as if it were the pre-eminent strategic threat to the United States.
Nietzsche wrote that, "The most fundamental form of human stupidity is forgetting what we were trying to do in the first place." The stated U.S. goal in Afghanistan was the destruction of al Qaeda. While al Qaeda as it existed in 2001 has certainly been disrupted and degraded, al Qaeda's evolution and migration means that disrupting and degrading it — to say nothing of destroying it — can no longer be achieved by waging a war in Afghanistan. The guerrilla does not rely on a single piece of real estate (in this case Afghanistan) but rather on his ability to move seamlessly across terrain to evade decisive combat in any specific location. Islamist-fueled transnational terrorism is not centered on Afghanistan and does not need Afghanistan, so no matter how successful that war might be, it would make little difference in the larger fight against transnational jihadism.
Thus far, the United States has chosen to carry on fighting the war in Afghanistan. As al Qaeda has fled Afghanistan, the overall political goal for the United States in the country has evolved to include the creation of a democratic and uncorrupt Afghanistan. It is not clear that anyone knows how to do this, particularly given that most Afghans consider the ruling government of President Hamid Karzai — with which the United States is allied — as the heart of the corruption problem, and beyond Kabul most Afghans do not regard their way of making political and social arrangements to be corrupt.
Simply withdrawing from Afghanistan carries its own strategic and political costs, however. The strategic problem is that simply terminating the war after nine years would destabilize the Islamic world. The United States has managed to block al Qaeda's goal of triggering a series of uprisings against existing regimes and replacing them with jihadist regimes. It did this by displaying a willingness to intervene where necessary. Of course, the idea that U.S. intervention destabilized the region raises the question of what regional stability would look like had it not intervened. The danger of withdrawal is that the network of relationships the United States created and imposed at the regime level could unravel if it withdrew. America would be seen as having lost the war, the prestige of radical Islamists and thereby the foundation of the ideology that underpins their movement would surge, and this could destabilize regimes and undermine American interests.
The political problem is domestic. Obama's approval rating now stands at 42 percent. This is not unprecedented, but it means he is politically weak. One of the charges against him, fair or not, is that he is inherently anti-war by background and so not fully committed to the war effort. Where a Republican would face charges of being a warmonger, which would make withdrawal easier, Obama faces charges of being too soft. Since a president must maintain political support to be effective, withdrawal becomes even harder. Therefore, strategic analysis aside, the president is not going to order a complete withdrawal of all combat forces any time soon — the national (and international) political alignment won't support such a step. At the same time, remaining in Afghanistan is unlikely to achieve any goal and leaves potential rivals like China andRussia freer rein.
The American Solution
The American solution, one that we suspect is already under way, is the Pakistanization of the war. By this, we do not mean extending the war into Pakistan but rather extending Pakistan into Afghanistan. The Taliban phenomenon has extended into Pakistan in ways that seriously complicate Pakistani efforts to regain their bearing in Afghanistan. It has created a major security problem for Islamabad, which, coupled with the severe deterioration of the country's economy and now the floods, has weakened the Pakistanis' ability to manage Afghanistan. In other words, the moment that the Pakistanis have been waiting for — American agreement and support for the Pakistanization of the war — has come at a time when the Pakistanis are not in an ideal position to capitalize on it.
In the past, the United States has endeavored to keep the Taliban in Afghanistan and the regime in Pakistan separate. (The Taliban movements in Afghanistan and Pakistan are not one and the same.) Washington has not succeeded in this regard, with the Pakistanis continuing to hedge their bets and maintain a relationship across the border. Still, U.S. opposition has been the single greatest impediment to Pakistan's consolidation of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and abandoning this opposition leaves important avenues open for Islamabad.
The Pakistani relationship to the Taliban, which was a liability for the United States in the past, now becomes an advantage for Washington because it creates a trusted channel for meaningful communication with the Taliban. Logic suggests this channel is quite active now.
The Vietnam War ended with the Paris peace talks. Those formal talks were not where the real bargaining took place but rather where the results were ultimately confirmed. If talks are under way, a similar venue for the formal manifestation of the talks is needed — and Islamabad is as good a place as any.
Pakistan is an American ally which the United States needs, both to balance growing Chinese influence in and partnership with Pakistan, and to contain India. Pakistan needs the United States for the same reason. Meanwhile, the Taliban want to run Afghanistan. The United States has no strong national interest in how Afghanistan is run so long as it does not support and espouse transnational jihadism. But it needs its withdrawal to take place in a manner that strengthens its influence rather than weakens it, and Pakistan can provide the cover for turning a retreat into a negotiated settlement.
Pakistan has every reason to play this role. It needs the United States over the long term to balance against India. It must have a stable or relatively stable Afghanistan to secure its western frontier. It needs an end to U.S. forays into Pakistan that are destabilizing the regime. And playing this role would enhance Pakistan's status in the Islamic world, something the United States could benefit from, too. We suspect that all sides are moving toward this end.
The United States isn't going to defeat the Taliban. The original goal of the war is irrelevant, and the current goal is rather difficult to take seriously. Even a victory, whatever that would look like, would make little difference in the fight against transnational jihad, but a defeat could harm U.S. interests. Therefore, the United States needs a withdrawal that is not a defeat. Such a strategic shift is not without profound political complexity and difficulties. But the disparity between — and increasingly, the incompatibility of — the struggle with transnational terrorism and the war effort geographically rooted in Afghanistan is only becoming more apparent — even to the American public.


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